Border management and human rights: a study of EU law and the law of the sea by Weinzierl, Ruth & Lisson, Urszula
www.ssoar.info
Border management and human rights: a study of
EU law and the law of the sea
Weinzierl, Ruth; Lisson, Urszula
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Forschungsbericht / research report
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Weinzierl, R., & Lisson, U. (2007). Border management and human rights: a study of EU law and the law of the
sea. (Studie / Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte). Berlin: Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte. https://nbn-
resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-316983
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
St
ud
y
Border Management  
and Human Rights
 
A study of EU Law and the Law of the Sea 
Ruth Weinzierl
Urszula Lisson
Imprint
Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte
German Institute for Human Rights
Zimmerstr. 26/27
D-10969 Berlin
Phone:  (+49) (0)30 – 259 359 0
Fax:  (+49) (0)30 – 259 359 59
info@institut-fuer-menschenrechte.de
www.institut-fuer-menschenrechte.de
Translation:
Eric Witte
Title Image: 
© dpa-Fotoreport
Layout:
iserundschmidt 
Kreativagentur für PublicRelations GmbH 
Bonn – Berlin
December 2007
ISBN 978-3-937714-59-2 (PDF Version)
Study
Border Management  
and Human Rights
 
A study of EU Law and the Law of the Sea 
Ruth Weinzierl
Urszula Lisson
4The Authors
Dr. Ruth Weinzierl, German Institute for Human Rights 
– Legal Services, Policy & Research. Her work focuses 
on migration, internal security and Europe
Urszula Lisson, LL.M. (College of Europe, Bruges), Legal 
clerk (Rechtsreferendarin) at the Supreme Court 
(Kammer gericht) of Berlin. She studied European and 
internatio nal law in Frankfurt (Oder), Nice and Bruges. 
(Contribution to parts 1 and 3)
The Authors
5Preface
The “Green Paper on the future common European asy-
lum system” presented by the European Commission 
in June 2007 declares an intention to create “a single 
protection area for refugees” in which the “full and 
inclusive application of the Geneva Convention” is 
guaranteed. With this the European Commission pro-
fesses its support for the goal of high-level legal har-
monisation and declares itself prepared to explore 
ways “for increasing the EU‘s contribution to a more 
accessible, equitable and effective international pro-
tection regime”. 
The reality at the EU’s external borders is far from this 
stated goal. With the primacy of repulsing illegal 
migration, border-control measures are shifting further 
beyond state borders – into the high seas or into the 
sovereign area of third states. This occurs without 
appropriate systematic observation of the obligations 
arising from human and refugee rights beyond state 
borders. New supranational and international struc-
tures of border security are being established, but 
without similarly precise formulation of the associ-
ated human- and refugee-rights requirements or their 
accompaniment in procedural law or institutions. This 
discrepancy has dramatic consequences for numerous 
people whose lives are lost or whose human rights are 
abused.
The following study highlights – with reference to the 
Geneva Refugee Convention, the European Convention 
on Human Rights, EU fundamental rights and other 
guidelines – the obligations to guarantee effective 
human rights and refugee protection that apply to the 
European Union as a whole, as well as to its individual 
Member States.
October 2007
German Institute for Human Rights
Prof. Dr. Heiner Bielefeldt
Frauke Seidensticker
Directors
Preface
6
7Content
Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
Main Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
I.   Life and health of migrants –  
rescue at sea  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
1.   Implementation of the duty under  
the law of the sea to rescue at sea . . . . . . . 12
2.   Formation of state services for rescue  
at sea and sea monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
II.  Access to international protection . . . . . .13
1.   The requirements of human rights  
and EU fundamental rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.1   Applications for international protection 
made in the territorial sea or at land  
or maritime borders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.2   Human rights obligations beyond  
EU maritime borders (high seas and  
territorial sea of third states)  . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.   EU secondary law’s lack of conformity  
with fundamental rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.   The EU legislature’s duties to adopt  
legal norms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.   Joint action with third countries: no release 
from human rights responsibility . . . . . . . . 17
Part 1:  
Problems relevant to human rights  
in current practice  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
I.   Multitude of deaths in the attempt  
at entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
1.   Distress at sea and inadequate rescue  
at sea through state search and rescue  
services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.   Private parties’ omission to undertake  
rescue at sea and unsuccessful rescue  
at sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.   Cases of death in border controls at sea . . . 20
II.   Non-existent or inadequate  
examination of applications of persons 
needing protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
1.   Forbidding entry to ports following  
rescue operations at sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.   Collective expulsion without  
examination of an application  
for international protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.   Forced return to insecure third states on  
the basis of readmission agreements or 
informal arrangements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.   Interception: catching, turning back,  
diverting and escorting back vessels  . . . . . 22
5.  Maltreatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
6.   Common emigration controls in states  
of transit and origin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Part 2:  
Protection of the EU’s common  
external border: strategies and legal  
development  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
I.   Fundamental elements of EU migration  
strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26
II.  Status of Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27
1.  Control of access to state territory . . . . . . . 27
1.1  Documents entitling entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.2   Control and observation measures  
at the EU’s external border, returns  . . . . . . 27
1.3   Pre-border controls: immigration  
and emigration controls. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.   The concept of integrated border  
management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.1   Increasing coordination of operational  
cooperation among the Member States  
and more regulation an der EU law:  
FRONTEX, etc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2   E-borders: the importance of information  
systems and biometrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Content
82.3   Border management as an interface  
with police, law enforecment agencies  
and secret services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.4   The external dimension of border  
management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.   Developments concerning the EU’s  
southern maritime external border,  
especially: “interception” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.   Fora for the implementation of the  
external dimension of the migration and  
border-management strategy . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Part 3:  
Legal obligations for border management  
stemming from the international law  
of the sea  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
I.   The jurisdiction of a Flag State  
over a vessel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32
II.   The right to exercise coercive measures  
in the various maritime zones . . . . . . . . . .32
1.  Internal waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.  Territorial sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.  Contiguous zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.  High seas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
III.  Rescue at Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35
1.   Surveillance of sea, search  
and rescue services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.  Duty to rescue at sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.1   Prerequisites of the duty to engage  
in rescue at sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.2   Substance of the duty to engage  
in rescue at sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.2.1  Guaranteeing provision of basic needs . . . . 37
2.2.2  Transit to a place of safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.2.2.1  Private vessels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.2.2.2  Government ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.2.3   Duty of coastal states to allow entry  
into the territorial sea and ports . . . . . . . . . 39
2.3   Securing the duties of private persons  
to undertake rescue at sea  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Part 4:  
The demands of human and EU fundamental 
rights for the management of the European 
Union’s External Borders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
I.  Criteria  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42
II.  The examination of applications for inter-
national protection made in the territorial 
sea or at land or maritime borders . . . . . .43
1.   Duty to accept and examine applications  
for international protection in accordance 
with the Asylum Procedures Directive . . . . 43
2.   Duty to accept and examine applications  
for international protection in accordance 
with the non-refoulement principle . . . . . . 44
3.   Especially: Implicit prohibitions of refoule-
ment in accordance with the ECHR . . . . . . 46
4.   Duty to grant a right to remain pending  
the examination of the application  . . . . . . 48
5.   Exceptions to the duty to grant a right  
to remain pending an examination  
of the application in the case where  
a safe third country exists? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
6.   Procedural guarantees and the right  
to effective legal remedy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
7.   Admissibility of reducing procedural  
guarantees and legal remedies in border  
procedures? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
8.   Conclusion for the examination of  
applications for international protection  
at land or maritime borders, or in the  
territorial sea  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
III.   Human rights obligations beyond EU  
maritime borders (high seas and  
the territorial sea of third states) . . . . . . .55
1.   Duty to examine an application  
for international protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
1.1  Contiguous zone of an EU state . . . . . . . . . 55
1.2   Remaining high seas and foreign  
territorial sea  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
1.2.1   Obligations arising from EU secondary law . 56
1.2.2   Obligations arising from the prohibition  
of refoulement in the Geneva Refugee  
Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
1.2.3   Obligations stemming from the prohibitions  
of refoulement in the European Convention  
on Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
1.2.3.1   The principle of non-refoulement  
as expression of a duty to protect  . . . . . . . 61
 
Content
91.2.3.2    The extra-territorial applicability  
of the ECHR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
1.2.3.2.1   Effective control over a territory  
as an element forming the basis for  
juris-diction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
1.2.3.2.2   Nationality of a ship as an element  
forming the basis for jurisdiction . . . . . . 62
1.2.3.2.3   Acts of officials attributable  
to the State Party as an element  
forming the basis for jurisdiction . . . . . . 63
1.2.3.2.4   Effective control over a person as  
an element forming the basis  
for jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
1.2.3.2.5   Prohibition on the circumvention of 
human rights obligations as an element 
forming the basis for jurisdiction . . . . . . 64
1.2.3.3   Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
1.2.4   Obligations stemming from  
the prohibitions of refoulement  
in the UN human rights treaties . . . . . . . . . 65
1.2.5   The right to leave, the right to seek  
asylum, and the principle of good faith . . . 67
2.   Implementation of border controls  
in conformity with human rights . . . . . . . . 69
3.   Conclusions for border and migration  
control measures beyond state borders . . . 69
Part 5:  
Human rights liability in common action . . .71
I.   The EU as a Union based on fundamental  
rights: duties to adopt legal norms . . . . . 71
1.   Human rights liability and distribution  
of responsibilities in the supra-national EU . . 71
1.1   Prohibition of explicit or implicit  
permission under EU law for actions  
in violation of fundamental rights . . . . . . . 73
1.2   EU legislature’s positive duties to adopt  
legal norms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.   Regulatory gaps in EU secondary law  
in violation of fundamental rights . . . . . . . 75
2.1   Procedural guarantees in border  
procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.2   Legal remedy against the rejection  
of asylum applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.3   Obligations beyond state borders stemming 
from the principle of non-refoulement  . . . 77
2.4   Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
II.   Joint action with third countries:  
no release from human rights  
responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78
List of Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  82
Media Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Content
10
Introduction
Although only a small percentage of migrants seek 
entry to the European Union (EU) through the external 
maritime border, dramatic pictures and reports of refu-
gee boats on the Mediterranean shape the idea of the 
situation at the robustly secured external border of the 
EU. Non-governmental organisations keep statistics on 
persons who have lost their lives in the attempt to 
reach Europe.1 The UN High Commissioner for Refu-
gees reminds that persons requiring international pro-
tection because they face persecution, torture or inhu-
mane treatment in their country of origin must be 
enabled access to protection in the EU2; in light of cur-
rent events in the Mediterranean, he has compared 
Europe with the Wild West, where a human life no 
longer has value.3
Which human rights obligations must be observed in 
border protection? Who is responsible: “the EU”, the in -
dividual EU states on the external border,  the EU-Agency 
for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders (FRONTEX)? Additionally, special 
questions arise for human rights protection in connec-
tion with the protection of maritime borders. How can 
it be prevented that thousands of people drown in the 
attempt to reach the EU? How can such small island 
states as Malta manage the onslaught? How should 
persons be handled who are intercepted on high seas? 
How can it be guaranteed that persons in need of 
international protection find access to the EU? How 
must an EU border management policy look that is in 
conformity with human rights? Who is responsible for 
human rights and refugee protection when EU and 
non-EU states conduct joint control measures? In 
November 2006 the European Commission presented 
a Communication on “Reinforcing the management of 
the European Union‘s Southern Maritime Borders”. 
From this it is evident that there is disunity within the 
EU over which obligations arise from EU fundamental 
rights and international human rights and refugee law, 
and how these obligations relate to the international 
law of the sea.4
This study5 should contribute to clarifying the obliga-
tions for border management arising from human 
rights and maritime law. This will include treatment of 
general human rights obligations that are also appli-
cable for border controls at land borders and airports. 
Additionally, the study examines the special questions 
of human rights and maritime law that arise in con-
nection with the protection of maritime borders. The 
human rights obligations for migration-control mea-
sures conducted on the dry land of a third state will 
not be addressed.
As a basis for later legal analysis, the first part of the 
study will present current border problems and occur-
rences, principally on the basis of press reports and 
reports of non-governmental organisations.
The second part of the study gives an overview of the 
status of the EU border management strategy’s develop-
ment and that of EU secondary law in connection with 
management of the EU’s external border.
Parts three and four provide an analysis of legal obli-
gations for the EU and its Member States. Part three 
1  UNITED for Intercultural Action, European network against nationalism, racism, fascism and in support of migrants and 
refugees (2007): List of 8855 documented refugee deaths through Fortress Europe. http://www.united.non-profit.nl/pdfs/
actual_listofdeath.pdf [accessed on 9 July 2007].
2 See, for example, UNHCR (2007c), pp. 8-9.
3 The Independent (28 May 2007).
4 EU, European Commission, COM (2006) 733, paras. 31-35.
5  Parts 4 and 5 of this study were pre-published in English in July 2007; see Weinzierl (2007). Based on that excerpt, the 
German Institute for Human Rights published a policy paper on the topic in September 2007; see Weinzierl (2007a).
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describes the obligations arising from the internation-
al law of the sea. Part four contains an analysis of 
human rights obligations for the management of the 
EU’s external border. This analysis is conducted by 
applying the standards of fundamental and human 
rights; namely the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR), EU fundamental rights and UN human 
rights treaties by which the EU or its Member States, 
respectively, are bound. The Geneva Refugee Conven-
tion, as the fundamental body of regulations for refu-
gee protection binding both the EU6 and its Member 
States, is naturally also a standard for consideration. 
Existing EU law is measured against these standards.
Part five of the study deals with the question of who 
bears responsibility for human rights protection when 
several states conduct joint actions of border or migra-
tion control, or rescue at sea. On the one hand, it will 
be examined whether next to the Member States’ obli-
gations arising from international law, the EU has its 
own obligation to enact norms protecting human 
rights with respect to border and migration controls. 
On the other hand, an object of the examination is 
whether, or under which pre-conditions, the EU and 
its Member States carry a share of the legal responsi-
bility for human rights violations committed in the 
course of joint actions with non-EU states.
6  See article 63(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (EC).
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Currently at EU level, draft guidelines are being deve-
loped that are supposed to clarify the obligations 
regarding persons encountered in interception, control 
and rescue measures at and beyond the EU’s southern 
maritime border. The guidelines are the subject of dis-
cussions in the Council of the EU and the European 
Commission.
In the background to this are pre-border migration 
controls, which are already being conducted on the 
basis of the EU border management strategy developed 
in the Council. Such pre-border migration controls 
beyond state borders also take place in the framework 
of joint EU operations that are coordinated by the EU 
border protection agency, FRONTEX.
Additionally, differences of opinion between Member 
States exist over human rights obligations with regard 
to persons picked up through interception, control and 
rescue measures beyond the EU’s external border.
From a human rights perspective, two fundamental 
sets of problems can be identified in connection with 
management of the EU’s external borders. One is the 
endangerment of the health and life of many migrants 
who are trying to reach the EU. There are daily media 
reports of deaths, especially at the southern maritime 
borders. In a legal regard, this set of issues is not exclu-
sively, but fundamentally formed by the international 
law of the sea, including its duty to rescue at sea.
The second problem concerns access to international 
protection in the EU. In many cases this is prevented, 
or at least made considerably more difficult. On the 
basis of the EU border management strategy and/or 
EU law, controlling and securing the borders has been 
bolstered, pre-border migration controls have been 
established in areas beyond the EU’s external border, 
and states of origin and transit have been integrated 
into migration control measures.
Reports of abuse in EU states and deportations in vio-
lation of international law affect the life and health 
of migrants as well as the realization of their possible 
right to international protection.
I. Life and health of migrants –  
rescue at sea
Rescue at sea also serves the protection of human 
rights, namely the right to life and freedom from bod-
ily harm of those affected. However, the duty under 
the law of the sea to rescue shipwrecked persons must 
be clearly differentiated from the legal obligations 
arising from human rights law. Differences exist both 
in regard to the subject and the extent of the legal 
obligations, as well as in regard to those who are obli-
gated. In many cases, however, it is the rescue of ship-
wrecked persons from distress that is prerequisite to 
the ability of the rescued persons later to claim rights 
flowing from human rights law, for example a claim to 
asylum or other international protection.
1. Implementation of the duty under the law of 
the sea to rescue at sea 
Despite fundamentally undisputed obligations with 
regard to rescue at sea, in practice there are deficits 
in the implementation of this duty.
This study comes to the conclusion that the legal obli-
gations regarding rescue at sea are fundamentally 
undisputed. However, there is disunity over the impor-
tant question of whether in choosing the place of safe-
ty to bring rescued persons, criteria of human and refu-
gee rights should be applied, or whether it suffices that 
temporary accommodation and basic medical care are 
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guaranteed at the place of safety. For the human rights 
analysis of this question, which concerns access to 
international protection, see details below in II 1.1.
There are two basic causes for why in many cases pri-
vate vessels do not carry out rescue at sea. First is the 
overburdening of private ship owners, who in taking 
aboard shipwrecked persons can expect large financial 
losses, especially if coastal states in the region cannot 
agree on where on land the shipwrecked persons may 
disembark. Second is the uncertainty of ship masters 
in the face of criminal trials against crews who rescued 
shipwrecked persons in accordance with their duty 
under the international law of the sea and brought 
them to land without entry papers. Under the interna-
tional law of the sea, the responsibility for the enfor-
cement of the duty to conduct rescue at sea lies with 
the states. Additionally, the states concerned have the 
duty under international law to agree as fast as possi-
ble on which ports the vessels concerned will be 
allowed to enter. In the coordination and cooperation 
of the states concerned, the statutory goal is to carry 
out the disembarkation of the rescued persons as 
quickly as possi ble with minimum diversion from the 
planned route.
In practice, the required coordination among EU states 
with regard to port of safety and the rapid rescue of 
shipwrecked person by state border-control or rescue 
vessels is poor. This can fundamentally be attributed 
to the overburdening of such EU Member States as 
Italy and Malta at the EU’s maritime borders. The over-
proportional burden on these states under EU law 
together with the lack of an internal EU burden-sha-
ring system often results in actual overburdening, and 
in any case a reduction in political will to pick up ship-
wrecked persons and people seeking protection. Addi-
tionally, disunity over obligations regarding persons 
encountered beyond maritime borders who are seeking 
international protection hinders joint actions of EU 
Member States in the FRONTEX framework that could 
contribute to the saving of lives and providing of persons 
in need of protection with such protection in the EU.
Among steps to support the implementation of the 
international duty to rescue at sea, and therefore the 
saving of many human lives, legislative measures could 
be taken up at EU level. Especially conceivable would 
be regulation under EU law with regard to criminal 
immunity to rescuers, obligations arising from the 
human and refugee rights of persons seeking protec-
tion beyond state borders, and the development of a 
reliable, internal EU system of burden sharing.
2. Formation of state services for rescue at sea 
and sea monitoring
The international law of the sea obligates states to 
establish search and rescue centres in dedicated zones. 
On the exact formation and form of coast and sea 
monitoring, as well as the rescue services within the 
search and rescue zones, the international law of the 
see provides no binding guidelines.
Although indications of far-reaching radar and satellite 
surveillance of the Mediterranean exist, little is known 
about the – in part, certainly military – structures of 
this surveillance. Information on the position of vessels 
in distress gained through surveillance can provide a 
starting point for duties to rescue, which are grounded 
in the international law of the sea and human rights 
law. Currently, the extent to which the locating of ves-
sels in distress leads to rescue at sea is unclear. In this 
context, creating transparency with regard to surveil-
lance structures would be of crucial importance. Ques-
tions that must be clarified at EU level are the extent 
of human rights obligations to protect and duties to 
rescue in connection with the planned creation of a 
European coast guard and a European Surveillance 
System for Borders.
II. Access to international protection
1. The requirements of human rights  
and EU fundamental rights 
1.1 Applications for international protection made  
in the territorial sea or at land or maritime borders
Persons seeking international protection in the territo-
rial sea7 or at maritime borders8, independent of the 
7  The territorial sea falls under the sovereignty of the coastal state. The territorial sea of Spain, France, Italy, Malta, Cyprus,  
and for the most part those of Germany, is twelve nautical miles wide, while that of Greece are six nautical miles wide.
8  The maritime borderline of a state divides its territorial sea and the adjacent high seas.
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situation and the form of protection sought, are to be 
handled the same as persons who apply for protection 
on land. This arises from Article 3 of the EU-Asylum 
Procedures Directive9 and the prohibitions of refoule-
ment. The principle of non-refoulement forbids the 
expulsion, deportation, rejection or extradition of a 
person to a state in which he or she would face threats 
of elementary human rights violations. Different prohi-
bitions of refoulement derive from international cus-
tomary law, EU fundamental rights10, the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), Article 33(1) of 
the Refugee Convention, Article 3(1) of the UN Con-
vention against Torture (CAT)11 and from Articles 6 and 
7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR). In this respect, states are also obligated 
to examine whether the said dangers pose a threat 
through chain deportation. 
From the validity of the principle of non-refoulement 
at the border there arises a basic obligation to allow 
entry to the person concerned, at least for the purpose 
of examining his or her application, and to guarantee 
his or her right to remain. A right to remain that pro-
tects the applicant’s elementary human rights in effect 
can only be guaranteed within the state’s territory. This 
is also the assumption of the EU-Asylum Procedures 
Directive, which, as a rule, grants applicants the right 
to remain in the Member State, at its border, or in its 
transit zone until their applications are examined.
Against the background of the principle of non-
refoulement, other approaches would be theoretically 
conceivable only where and insofar as a country exists 
that accepts the applicant, and in which none of the 
discussed elementary violations of human rights 
threaten the applicant. This constellation corresponds 
to the safe third-country concept in the variant of so-
called “super-safe countries”, which, taking the Ger-
man example of a third-country arrangement as a 
model, has found entry into the Asylum Procedures 
Directive. UNHCR and international literature in the 
field remain very critical of the conformity of such 
third-country arrangements with international law – 
especially against the backdrop of jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) that requires 
an individual examination of each application for 
international protection. In any case, however, the repre-
sentatives of the Member States in the Council have 
not yet succeeded in assembling a binding list of such 
super-safe third countries as foreseen by the Asylum 
Procedures Directive because currently no states out-
side the EU exist that fulfil the requirements for the 
necessary safety of the third country and are not 
already attached to the Dublin system. Therefore, on 
no account is return or rejection to a third country 
outside of the EU without any examination of the 
application currently under consideration. With a view 
to the Mediterranean neighbours and West African 
states, this also will not change in the medium-term.
International Human and EU fundamental rights 
require that the enforceability of the non-refoulement 
principles be secured through procedural law and 
rights to effective legal remedy. Especially required 
then, are a thorough, individual, and substantive exami-
nation of the application for international protection; 
the right to legal representation; the right to contact 
the UNHCR; and an effective legal remedy with sus-
pensive effect that enables a stay in-country pending 
a decision on the remedy. Because from a human rights 
perspective the severity and potentially irreversible 
nature of the harms through expulsion are decisive, 
there is no room for a limitation of the guarantees of 
procedure and legal remedy at the border.
For practical reasons, these requirements for proce-
dures and legal remedy can not be observed on a ship. 
For that reason, if applications for international pro-
tection are submitted at the maritime border or in the 
territorial sea of a coastal state, the applicants are to 
be allowed disembarkation and a stay on dry land 
pending a decision on legal remedy.
1.2 Human rights obligations beyond EU maritime 
borders (high seas and territorial sea of third states) 
The establishment of pre-border and migration con-
trols in areas beyond state borders at sea is part of the 
EU border management strategy. They are implemented 
by individual Member States and in joint operations, 
including those involving multiple EU states and/or 
third states, coordinated by the EU border control 
agency FRONTEX.
Member States have different interpretations of which 
obligations arise from human and EU fundamental 
9  Directive 2005/85/EC on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status 
(Asylum Procedures Directive), (OJ (2005) L 326. p. 13).
10  See Art. 19 (1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
11  Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
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rights in interception, control and rescue measures 
beyond state borders. For this question that is funda-
mental for persons seeking protection having access 
to international protection, the European Commission 
and apparently the Council plan to develop guidelines 
without binding legal character; these are currently 
being negotiated at EU level. This study examines 
which obligations exist in interception, control and 
rescue measures arising from human rights and EU 
fundamental rights. Of central importance in this, the 
Geneva Refugee Convention, the ECHR and the UN 
human rights treaties are reference norms.
Weighty arguments exist for the acceptance of the 
validity of the principle of non-refoulement deriving 
from the Refugee Convention in situations of intercep-
tion, control and rescue measures beyond state bor-
ders. The arguments exist in the wording, as well as 
the Refugee Convention’s object and purpose. As the 
international organisation for the defence and promo-
tion of the Refugee Convention, the UNHCR also sup-
ports this argumentation. There is no legally relevant 
common practice and legal view among States Parties 
and no unambiguous historical interpretation that 
would lead to the exclusion of extra-territorial validity.
The prohibition of refoulement found in the Refugee 
Convention is not applicable for persons who are still 
in the territorial sea of their state. But in this respect, 
prohibitions of refoulement stemming from the human 
rights treaties can be applied.
The ECHR and the UN human rights treaties are appli-
cable on ships engaged in border protection or official 
rescue at sea, also those moving beyond their own ter-
ritorial sea. From this arises a duty of the states to 
respect all of the rights contained in these treaties.
Thus the actions of officials on ships may not lead to 
human rights violations. In light of problems encoun-
tered in practice, it must especially be pointed out that 
beyond the duty of rescue at sea under the law of the 
sea, migration controls may not be carried out in such 
a way as to bring harm to people – for example through 
collisions with small refugee boats or through driving 
unseaworthy boats out to high seas. EU Member States 
are bound in all of their measures by the prohibition 
on discrimination, so that the differentiated treatment 
of migrants, for example on the basis of their ethnic 
or social origin, is in violation of human rights. This 
obligation stemming from the prohibition on discrimi-
nation arises from the Schengen Borders Code, EU fun-
damental rights, ICERD12, and the international law of 
the seas.
In connection with persons in need of international 
protection13, the commitments from the prohibitions 
on refoulement in the Refugee Convention, the ECHR, 
the UN human rights treaties and EU fundamental 
rights are particularly important. These prohibitions of 
refoulement are also applicable on high seas and in 
the territorial sea of third countries. The extra-territo-
rial application of the human rights treaties can arise 
from the jurisdiction in situations of interception, con-
trol or rescue measures. This jurisdiction may be based 
on the nationality of the state ship, the accountabi lity 
of actions of officials, effective control over persons, 
and/or the prohibition on the circumvention of human 
rights obligations. The prohibitions of refoulement 
must be secured in accordance with the general guar-
antees of procedure and legal remedy arising from the 
human rights treaties. This requires, for example, a 
thorough examination of whether a danger of human 
rights violations threatens in other states. Additio nally, 
a crucial requirement is the suspensive effect of a legal 
remedy against the rejection of applications for inter-
national protection. This cannot be ensured on a ship, 
which, in the absence of adequately safe third coun-
tries, means that protection seekers must have access 
to a procedure in an EU state that examines their need 
for protection.
The liability of states is grounded in the action that 
causes the danger of human rights violation. Therefore 
not every omission beyond state borders triggers liabili ty. 
The Refugee Convention and the international human 
rights treaties do not give rise to a general duty to pro-
vide every person encountered at sea access to state 
territory for the examination of their applications for 
international protection. However, they prohibit expo-
sing people to grave violations of human rights through 
actions beyond state borders. Return or rejection to a 
country in which the life or freedom are threa te ned, 
or the danger of torture or inhuman or degra ding  treat-
ment or punish ment exists, is thus forbidden. In this, 
ECHR states are bound by the previously described 
standards for procedural law and legal remedy, just as 
these apply at the border. 
12 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
13 Asylum and other subsidiary forms of international protection.
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When government ships carry out rescues at sea in 
accordance with their commitments stemming from the 
international law of the sea, they are bound by the obli-
gation of the law of the sea to bring those shipwrecked 
to a place of safety. The bringing of those shipwrecked 
to a place of safety is an action that also must be 
measured against the prohibitions of refoulement. This 
means that rescued persons, too, may not be brought 
to third countries without first having their applications 
for international protection examined in an EU state.
Duties also exist with regard to mixed groups of migrants 
who are not on a state ship, but are encountered in 
the course of border and migration controls, or actions 
of rescue at sea. It is recognised that, as a rule, boats 
also contain persons in need of international protec-
tion, though not exclusively. In light of this fact, 
grounds always exist to assume that the escorting or 
towing back of a boat to states outside the EU could 
result in grave violations of human rights. Thus it is 
incompatible with human rights for state ships engaged 
in border protection or rescue at sea to force ships with 
migrants to sail to third countries.
If government ships of an EU state are located near 
harbours of origin on the southern Mediterranean or 
West African coast, collaboration in emigration controls 
can additionally represent a violation of the human 
right to leave and the right to seek asylum. Further-
more, with regard to the access to refugee protection 
thus thwarted, a violation of the commitment to inter-
pret the Refugee Convention in good faith can exist.
2. EU secondary law’s lack of conformity  
with fundamental rights
This study examines the conformity of relevant EU 
secon dary law with the above-mentioned demands of 
human rights and EU fundamental rights. The result of 
this examination is that the EU acquis regulates the 
aforementioned human rights requirements only 
incompletely, and in some points explicitly or implicit-
ly even permits actions of the EU Member States in 
violation of fundamental rights.
The Asylum Procedures Directive obligates the Member 
States to examine applications for international pro-
tection made in the territorial sea, at the border and 
during controls in the contiguous zone. As a rule, the 
Directive guarantees the right of applicants to remain 
in-country pending an examination of the application, 
as well as fundamental procedural guarantees.
Articles 35 (border procedures) and 39 (right to an 
effective remedy) of the EU-Asylum Procedures Direc-
tive are contrary to EU fundamental rights. Article 35 
allows the Member States to maintain border proce-
dures that from a human rights perspective have com-
pletely inadequate procedural guarantees. Article 39 
contains the principle that applicants have effective 
legal remedy before a court or tribunal. But the direc-
tive leaves to national regulation by the Member States 
the form of legal remedy, including its suspensive 
effect and concomitant right to stay in the territory 
until a decision has been reached on the legal remedy. 
It would be impermissible both according to interna-
tional law, and with regard to EU fundamental rights, 
according to EU law – if the Member States actually 
reduce procedural guarantees in border procedures to 
the minimum intended in the Directive, and do not 
provide for the suspensive effect of a legal remedy. 
The EU acquis does not contain further provisions on 
how to deal with applications for international protec-
tion made during interception or search and rescue 
measures beyond state borders. The Asylum Procedures 
Directive has no application beyond state borders, with 
exception of the contiguous zone. The Schengen Bor-
ders Code is also applicable beyond state borders but 
contains only a reference to the rights of refugees and 
persons seeking international protection, especially 
with regard to non-refoulement. The obligations of the 
Member States deriving from those rights are not pre-
scribed. At the same time, while the Borders Code 
anticipates that a right of appeal against denials of 
entry must be guaranteed, it determines that such a 
right of appeal has no suspensive effect. This provision 
conflicts with EU fundamental and human rights as far 
as it is applicable to persons seeking international pro-
tection who are encountered beyond state borders 
 during pre-border controls. 
3. The EU legislature’s duties to adopt  
legal norms 
There is a fundamental and human rights obligation 
to provide to persons seeking protection, taken up at 
or beyond state borders at sea, access to a procedure 
in an EU state that examines their need for protection. 
The human rights of the protection seekers must be 
secured through procedural rights and a legal remedy 
with suspensive effect. At the same time, EU funda-
mental and human rights prohibit the escorting or 
towing back of boats with a mixed group of migrants 
on board to states outside the EU, because this could 
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result in grave violations of human rights. Although 
EU law regulates border protection and refugee law 
and the EU border management strategy foresees pre-
border migration controls, EU law does not regulate 
this obligation. Rather, it even or explicitly or implicit-
ly permits actions in violation of EU fundamental and 
human rights. The duty to regulate in this regard, arising 
from EU fundamental rights, lies at the feet of the EU 
legislature. Due to the tightly interlocking actions of 
the Union and Member States in border protection and 
the functional distribution of responsibility to overbur-
de ned EU border states, adequate protection of funda-
mental rights can only be efficiently guaranteed through 
regulation under EU law.
4. Joint action with third countries:  
no release from human rights responsibility
If Member States are conducting joint border and 
migration controls with third countries, this raises the 
question of responsibility for possible human rights 
violations. The actions of one state’s organs are only 
attributable to another state when these organs are 
made available to the other state in such a way that 
the other state exercises exclusive command and con-
trol, and when the actions of these state organs appear 
to be the sovereign actions of the other state. For joint 
patrols with third countries in the territorial sea and 
contiguous zones of these third countries, such effec-
tive control by other states does not exist. For this, the 
contractual transfer of individual control rights to 
which only the coastal states are entitled is insuffi-
cient. Thus EU states in these cases remain fully 
responsible for human rights violations.
It is also significant that, even when a state’s action 
itself does not violate human rights, international law 
provides for human rights responsibility if the action 
constitutes an act of abetting a violation of human 
rights on the part of another state. Such an abetting 
act that triggers responsibility exists if the assistance 
is offered in knowledge of the circumstances of the 
violation of international law, and the abetting act 
supports the main action of the primarily acting state. 
Such abetting acts can include the provision of infra-
structure and financing, but also such political actions 
as declarations, assurances and the conclusion of con-
tracts that support an act that violates international 
law. In this connection, joint patrols in the territorial 
sea of third countries and the support and advising of 
third countries must be considered critically, as these 
especially can constitute the abetting of violations of 
the right to leave. Additionally in this regard, the exter-
nal dimension of the migration strategy must be con-
sidered critically. The exercise of political pressure on 
issues of migration control or the granting of financial 
or technical assistance in border control can possibly 
support the treatment of migrants in violation of 
human rights, and in ways that are foreseeable. This is 
especially true when assistance is given to states that 
are recognised as having an particularly low standard 
for human rights protection and an inadequate asylum 
system. 
EU-primary law defines the objective of developing and 
consolidating of the rule of law, and respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms as an objective of 
the EU’s external policies. Therefore, in the external 
migration strategy as a whole, the EU interest in easing 
its burdens should not be at the fore, but rather, along 
with the battle against causes for flight, support for 
systems of human rights and refugee protection in 
countries of origin and transit. Creation of an interna-
tional burden-sharing system should ensure that the 
EU and its Member States take on the burdens of inter-
national protection to a degree that corresponds to 
their strong economic position.
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Part 1: 
Problems relevant to human rights  
in current practice
I. Multitude of deaths in the attempt  
at entry
In the attempt to reach EU territory, many migrants14 
at sea in recent years have gone missing or met their 
ends.15 People also die in attempting entry at land bor-
ders. Among others, deaths are documented resulting 
from use of force16, suffocation in lorries, cargo holds 
of airplanes or in containers17, and cases of drowning 
in attempted crossings of border rivers.18 According to 
reports, deadly incidents at the EU’s maritime borders 
in 2006 occurred primarily off the coasts of Spain and 
Italy, but also in Greece and Malta. In 2006, 1,167 dead 
or missing were documented for the Canary Islands 
and the Spanish mainland coast.19 If, however, one 
considers undocumented cases, according to estimates 
for 2006, around 6,000 people lost their lives in the 
crossing to the Canary Islands, or went missing.20
Over the course of 2006, over 31,000 migrants are 
reported to have arrived in the Canary Islands: more 
than six times as many as in 2005.21 It is reported that 
over the first nine months of 2006, 16,000 people 
reached the island Lampedusa through Libya.22
1. Distress at sea and inadequate rescue at sea 
through state search and rescue services
There are various reasons why so many migrant boats 
encounter distress at sea and are not rescued in time. 
From reports of incidents at sea, it follows that 
migrants’ boats are often not seaworthy or are over-
loaded. Most deadly accidents in the Mediterranean 
and Atlantic occur therefore due to unseaworthy boats 
that technically are poorly equipped and have no (ade-
quate) possibilities for navigation.
Additionally, migration routes have changed and are 
becoming ever-riskier. For example, after controls in -
creased in the Straits of Gibraltar, now many refugee 
boats start for the Canary Islands from Mauritania, the 
coasts of Cape Verde, Senegal, or even from The Gambia, 
Guinea or Guinea-Bissau.23 A shift in routes can also 
be discerned for migration from Libya to Italy. There, 
bolstered controls in the Strait of Sicily led to a shift 
of the route over the Greater Gulf of Sidra.24 Evasive 
routes lengthen the distances that boats must travel, 
and therefore increase the danger of accident and 
death for their passengers.
14  Migrants arriving by sea in the EU are male and between the ages of 20 and 30 in 80% of cases. EU, Council of the European 
Union, Doc. No. 11490/1/03, CIVIPOL study, p. 15.
15  There are no official statistics on deaths. For the organisation UNITED’s collection of deaths, see: UNITED for Intercultural 
Action, European network against nationalism, racism, fascism and in support of migrants and refugees (2007). For source, 
see footnote 1, above.
16  Amnesty International (2006), p. 418. According to this report, a migrant was killed when the Spanish border patrol,  
the Guardia Civil, fired rubber bullets at migrants.
17  Der Tagesspiegel (11 May 2001). On 15 February 2007 the body of a young African was found in the landing gear compart-
ment of an airplane: Migration Policy Group (2007), p. 7.
18 German Bundestag (2005), printed paper 16/22.
19  This according to the Spanish human rights organisation APDHA (Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de Andalucía). In 2005 
the organisation documented 368, and in 2004 289 dead or missing. For the statistics from 1997-2006, see APDHA (2007).
20 See APDHA (2007); tageschau.de (28 December 2006); BBC News (28 December 2006); PRO ASYL (2006).
21 BBC News (22 January 2007); For statistics on the first nine months of 2006, see Human Rights Watch (2007), p. 384.
22  Human Rights Watch (2007), p. 381. At the same time, it should be considered that only 10% of illegal migrants reached Italy 
by sea. Most who are in the country illegally entered legally by land and over-stayed their visas: Financial Times  
(7 August 2006).
23 See Meijers Committee (2006), p. 3; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (14 November 2006), p. 3.
24 Meijers Committee (2006), p. 3.
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25  SIVE (Sistema Integrado de Vigilancia Exterior), the so-called integrated system for exterior observation, is an electronic 
observation system used at the EU’s maritime external borders, primarily on the Spanish coast, to locate boats attempting to 
reach EU territory. Therefore the observation measures serve foremost migration control. The system consists of static radar 
towers with a reach of ten kilometres and mobile units that can be sent to specific locations if needed, either to intercept the 
located boat or rescue its passengers if they are in distress. See also: Navas (2006) or the official website of the Guardia Civil, 
the Spanish border patrol: http://www.guardiacivil.org/prensa/actividades/sive03/localizacion.jsp [accessed on  
25 January 2007].
26  For example, a five-metre-long wooden boat could not be located by SIVE because of its size. Kanaren Nachrichten  
(13 November 2006).
27 Navigational Information over Telex.
28 Bierdel (2006), p. 117.
29  An indication of NATO activities extending to immigration control in the course of the Mediterranean counter-terrorism 
operation “Active Endeavour” can be found in the Small Request Regarding the Results of Operation Endeavour filed by the 
fraction DIE LINKE, German Bundestag (2006), BT Document 16/3238.
30 See EU, European Commission, COM (2006) 773, para. 24; COM (2004) 65, paras. 1.1, 2.1.2, and 2.4.
31 Part 3(III)(1).
32 UNHCR (23 May 2007); The Independent (28 May 2007).
33  Deutsche Welle (29 May 2007).
34 The Independent (28 May 2007).
35 See below, Part 3 (II).
Such state surveillance systems as SIVE25 that are used 
to track illegal immigrants along the Spanish coast are 
reportedly unreliable in finding smaller boats.26 This 
can lead to migrants not only using dangerous routes, 
but also resorting to dangerous, unseaworthy, small 
boats.
On the other hand, from a number of reports there are 
also indications that information obtained by observa-
tion systems about the position of refugee boats often 
is not used for rescue of the boat’s passengers. Reports 
on the exact position of small refugee boats in distress 
are supposed to be repeatedly sent through the shipping 
broadcaster NAVTEX.27 These NAVTEX reports warn of 
collisions, but do not urge the rescue of shipwrecked 
persons.28 It is possible that these reports result in pri-
vate vessels giving wide berth to the relevant positions 
to avoid the dangers of an accident rather than sea 
rescue attempts by private or government vessels. Little 
is known about the structures and extent of satellite 
surveillance of the Mediterranean. However, it should 
be regarded as probable that the Mediterranean is very 
extensively observed by satellite and that such military 
structures as NATO play a role in this.29
Because the EU is planning the gradual development 
of a common European Surveillance System for Bor-
ders (EUROSUR)30, the question of whether all avail-
able information about shipwrecked persons is also 
actually used for rescue at sea will have to be clarified 
at the European level. On the coastal states’ duty to 
rescue within the search and rescue zone, see below.31
Recently there have been some cases where state 
search and rescue or border-patrol missions saved 
shipwrecked persons only very belatedly, or not at all. 
For example, in May 2007 a Maltese military airplane 
discovered a boat with 53 persons 80 miles south of 
Malta. According to official sources, the ten-metre-
long boat was over-filled and the passengers were in 
clear distress. Among other indications, it could be seen 
that they were attempting to bail inflowing water from 
the boat with canisters. The airplane returned to its base. 
A patrol boat sent to the location hours later could no 
longer find the boat with the shipwrecked persons.32
Around that same time there was an accident in which 
a Maltese fishing vessel did not let shipwrecked per-
sons on board in order not to endanger a valuable tuna 
catch. According to reports, the shipwrecked persons 
were able to save themselves by clinging to nets used 
in raising tuna at sea. The ship master informed Maltese 
officials. Nevertheless the affected persons drifted for 
over 24 hours in the sea between Libya and Malta. The 
two states could not come to agreement over the juris-
diction for the rescue of the shipwrecked persons. In 
the end, these persons were rescued by the Italian 
navy.33 This incident moved the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees to remark that Europe is 
like the Wild West, where a human life no longer has 
value.34
2. Private parties’ omission to undertake rescue 
at sea and unsuccessful rescue at sea
When a vessel is in distress, not only state, but also 
private vessels have a duty under international law to 
save the shipwrecked persons; this will be examined 
in detail later.35 There are indications that in several 
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cases this duty has been disregarded.36 This may not 
only be because merchant vessels offering rescue at 
sea, or their ship masters, must fear that the rescue 
operation would lead to considerable delays; such delays 
for merchant vessels generally result in considerable 
financial burdens.37 The introduction of criminal char-
ges against the crews of vessels who have performed 
rescue at sea only to later find themselves accused of 
smuggling of migrants – such as the case of the Cap 
Anamur in 200438 or the indictment of Tunisian fisher-
men in Italy in 200739 – also sends a negative signal 
and reduces the willingness of private vessels to under-
take rescues.40 Additionally, disputes over the responsi-
bility and the refusal of coastal states to permit vessels 
with rescued persons on board to dock contributes to 
a hesitance on the part of ship masters and a reduction 
in willingness to engage in a rescue operation.41
Rescue at sea also involves an inherent risk of accident. 
For example, there are reports of an incident in 2006 
in which a refugee boat off of the Canary Islands collided 
with a vessel attempting sea rescue at sea, and sank.42
3. Cases of death in border controls at sea
There also occur rights violations and cases of death 
in the practice of border controls at sea. For example, 
a report by Statewatch contains statements from sur-
vivors of a boat that sank off of the coast of Maurita-
nia in August 2006, as they attempted to reach the 
Canary Islands from the coast of Senegal.43 According 
to the statements, the accident occurred after the 
Spanish coast guard diverted the boat from its course.44 
Press reports, also based on the statements of survi-
vors, tell of an incident in which Greek border patrol 
36  It happens that rescued migrants report that several vessels passed by their boats without stopping or offering assistance.  
See Van Selm/Cooper (2006), p. 28; Der Stern (18 August 2004).
37  Regarding the costs of a rescue mission in 2001 off of the Australian coast, see Røsæg (2002), pp. 46-47. There is also a 
danger that insurance companies might no longer cover the costs of multiple rescue missions in the long term.
38  The Cap Anamur picked up shipwrecked persons and had to wait 11 days for permission to dock in an Italian harbour. See also 
below, Part 1(II)(1). The trial of a part of the crew of the Cap Anamur began on 27 November 2006 in Italy; they are accused 
of smuggling migrants. For additional information on this trial, see the website of one of these crew members, Elias Bierdel: 
http://www.elias-bierdel.de/ [accessed on 6 July 2007].
39  Borderline-Europe News (31 August 2007).
40  Also in this vein is the Council of Europe’s fear that prohibitions or delays in the disembarkation of shipwrecked persons could 
reduce willingness to undertake rescue at sea. Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly (2006), Doc. No. 11053, para. 22.
41 On the consequences for the practice of shipping, see Deutschlandfunk (27 November 2006).
42  Milborn (2006), p. 47.
43 Maccanico (2006).
44  Maccanico (2006).
45  Regarding this incident, see Süddeutsche Zeitung (28 September 2006), p. 1; Der Tagesspiegel (30 September 2006);  
SWR online (26 September 2006); Die Presse (28 September 2006).
46  Maccanico (2006).
47  ECtHR Admissibility Decision of 11 January 2001 (Xhavara and Others v Italy and Albania), Application No 39437/98.  
More details on this decision are discussed below in Part 4(III)(1.2.3).
agents supposedly dumped over 30 persons into the 
ocean in August 2006. It is reported that several per-
sons drowned, whilst others were able to save them-
selves by reaching the Turkish mainland.45 A spokes-
person for the Turkish foreign ministry and Turkish bor-
der officials are quoted as saying that cases in which 
the Greek coast guard secretly brings migrants back 
into Turkish waters would become more frequent. 
There have also been deadly accidents in border con-
trols along the Italian coast. Following a collision 
between an Italian navy vessel and a boat with 
migrants near Lampedusa, ten people reportedly died 
and 40 were missing.46 A decision of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) handled a similar case. 
In that case, an Italian military vessel collided with a 
re fugee boat in the course of a sea blockade conduc-
ted by Italy and Albania.47
II. Non-existent or inadequate examina-
tion of applications of persons needing 
protection
States along the external borders of the EU are con-
fronted by mixed migration flows. That means that 
among the people arriving by land or sea, there are 
those in need of international protection, as well as 
those who have left their homes for other reasons. In 
practice the difficulty arises in identifying those in 
need of protection and those seeking protection, in 
order to enable their access to relevant procedures and 
protection. The following describes developments that, 
in practice, endanger the access of many to protection, 
or make it impossible.
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1. Forbidding entry to ports following rescue 
operations at sea
In many cases, a coastal state has denied entry into 
coastal waters or into port for private vessels that have 
rescued persons from distress at sea and sought to 
bring those rescued to land. In Europe, this became 
known in connection with the case of the Cap Anamur 
in 2004.48 After the Cap Anamur picked up 37 ship-
wrecked persons, it was denied docking at an Italian 
port for 11 days. Italy’s argument for the denial was its 
claim that Malta, which had just joined the EU, held 
responsibility to take in the shipwrecked persons.49
In July 2006, a Spanish fishing vessel that had picked 
up 51 shipwrecked persons had to wait for six days for 
permission to dock at a Maltese port. Malta initially 
denied entry to the port with the argument that the 
rescue operation was performed outside of its territo-
rial sea, and that Libya held jurisdiction for accepting 
those rescued.50 Only following the conclusion of an 
agreement between Spain, Malta and Andorra on the 
proportional admittance of the persons concerned 
could the boat enter.
A further report comes from Mauritania, which denied 
the entry of shipwrecked persons. The vessel in distress, 
the Marine I, with around 400 migrants on board, was 
towed by a rescue vessel of the Spanish coast guard 
to the coast of Mauritania, where it was supposed to 
be handed over to officials there.51 Mauritania rejected 
acceptance with a reference to the responsibility of 
the state from which the vessel had launched to sea. 
It was also claimed that Spain bore responsibility 
because according to Mauritania, the vessel had been 
intercepted in Spanish coastal waters.52 The rescue 
vessel was allowed entry to Mauritania several days 
48  Such cases do not only arise at the external borders of the EU. Also much discussed in academia is the so-called Tampa 
incident of 2001, in which Australia denied entry into its territorial sea of a Norwegian freighter that had picked up over 400 
shipwrecked persons in international waters near the Australian Christmas Islands because Australia considered Singapore to 
have jurisdiction. The several-day-long delay resulted in high costs for the Norwegian shipping company. For the facts of the 
case, see UNHCR (2006), The state of the world’s refugees , p. 41.
49  For information regarding the Cap Anamur, see Bierdel (2006); for an extensive legal treatment of the incident, see Rah 
(2005), pp. 276-286, with further references.
50  Regarding this incident, see Human Rights Watch (2007), p. 382; Maccanico (2006); BBC News (21 July 2006); Council of 
Europe, Parliamentary Assembly (2006), Doc. No. 11053, para. 22.
51 Der Standard (9 February 2007), BBC News (12 February 2007); CNN.com (7 February 2007).
52  The humanitarian news and analysis service of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (IRIN)  
(9 February 2007).
53 Der Standard (9 February 2007).
54  See below, Part 3(III), para. 2.2.3.
55  In Italy, these reception camps are called “temporary stay and assistance centres” or “identification centres”. For more on the 
reception camps, see, among others: Amnesty International (2006), p. 226.
56 For more detail, see Human Rights Watch (2006a); Andrijasevic (2006).
57  OSCE (2006), p. 215.
58 EU, European Parliament, Resolution, Doc. No. P6_TA(2005)0138.
later only after negotiation of a compromise between 
Spain and Mauritania. In exchange for taking in the 
rescued persons, the compromise consisted of Spain’s 
agreement to financial support for border security, and 
an agreement regarding future dealings with the ship-
wrecked persons.53
These incidents occurred shortly after an amendment 
to the relevant International Conventions on the Safe-
ty of Life at Sea and Maritime Search and Rescue took 
effect, which will be discussed later in greater detail. 
At this point, it should only be noted that the amend-
ment especially aimed at avoiding disputes over juris-
diction for the taking in of shipwrecked persons, and 
at putting into concrete terms and strengthening 
states’ responsibilities regarding cooperation in distress 
at sea.54
2. Collective expulsion without examination of 
an application for international protection
Where migrants have reached the territory of an EU 
state, in many cases, states have strived for their return 
as quickly as possible. In this context, irregular migrants 
have regularly been detained or kept in reception 
camps.55 Reports of mass expulsions to third states 
from such reception camps are predominantly known 
from Italy.56 The Organisation for Security and Coope-
ration in Europe (OSCE), relying on information from 
the Italian interior minister, reports that of 3,000 per-
sons arriving in Lampedusa between September 2004 
and March 2005, Italy sent 1,647 back to Libya and 
126 back to Egypt on the basis of bilateral agreements. 
In part, this happened without the required inspection 
of asylum applications on an individual basis.57 Both 
the European Parliament58 and the United Nations 
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High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)59 con-
demned the Italian expulsions to Libya due to the prob-
lematic human rights situation in Libya. According to 
a report by the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for 
Human Rights, these expulsions were carried out with-
out individual examination, were non-transparent, and 
were not subject to any independent control.60 Reports 
of collective expulsions from Spain also exist.61
3. Forced return to insecure third states on the 
basis of readmission agreements or informal 
arrangements
Not only cases of collective expulsion, but also indi-
vidual expulsions to countries of origin or transit on 
the basis of readmission agreements or informal 
arrangements with third states can be problematic 
from a human rights perspective, and for multiple rea-
sons. This is especially true when the human rights 
situation in the target country is poor, and the target 
country does not have a developed system of refugee 
protection with adequate legal remedy.
Human rights organisations primarily have criticised 
returns from Italy to Libya62 and from Spain to Moroc-
co. Libya has not ratified the Geneva Refugee Conven-
tion and does not have well-ordered asylum proce-
dures. Additionally, UNHCR has no official status there. 
Representatives of the EU mission in Libya were noti-
fied in 2005 that Libya does not recognise the presence 
of refugees on its territory because migrants staying 
in Libya are supposedly exclusively economic migrants.63 
Expulsions from Libya are reported to have been carried 
out in part with Italy’s financial support.64 According 
to Human Rights Watch, the Italian government in 
59 UNHCR (18 March 2005).
60 Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights (2005), para. 171.
61 Amnesty International (2005) and (2006a).
62 Regarding the refugee situation at the southern border of Italy, see the report Gleitze/Schulz (2006).
63 EU, Council of the European Union, Doc. No. 7753/05, p. 52.
64 Ibid, pp. 59, 61-62.
65 Human Rights Watch (2007), p. 381.
66 Human Rights Watch (2006b), p. 364; Open letter by Moroccan, African and European associations (2007).
67 Regarding issues surrounding readmission agreements, see Cassarino (2007).
68  Human Rights Watch (2006a), pp. 117-118; EU, European Parliament, Doc. No. P6_TA(2005)0138; Council of Europe, 
Parliamentary Assembly (2006), Doc. No. 11053, para. 29.
69  See Der Standard (10 October 2006): “Spain is guaranteeing more development aid for African states that approve the return 
of illegal immigrants. This is provided for in two agreements that Madrid has concluded with the West African countries of 
The Gambia and Guinea. Accordingly, both countries are obligated to take in their citizens expelled from Spain.”
70  There is, however, no precise definition of the term “interception”. In its documents, UNHCR uses the following definition:  
“For the purpose of this paper, interception is defined as encompassing all measures applied by a State outside its national 
territory, in order to prevent, interrupt or stop the movement of persons without the required documentation crossing 
international borders by land, air or sea, and making their way to the country of prospective destination.” UNHCR (2000),  
Doc. No. EC/50/SC/CPR.17, para.10.
May 2006 reacted to the accusations and criticism by 
announcing that no longer would anyone be expelled 
to a state that had not ratified the Geneva Refugee 
Convention.65
According to further reports from Human Rights 
Watch, there have been repeated human rights viola-
tions in Morocco, one of the target states for expul-
sions from Spain. Migrants were reported to have been 
arbitrarily arrested and brought to the Algerian border 
in December 2006.66
Increasingly, readmission agreements are arranged 
informally. Such informal arrangements are usually 
neither made open to public nor are they subject to 
control by parliaments.67 This practice has been criti-
cised by human rights organisations as well as the 
Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly, the Euro-
pean Parliament, and UNHCR.68 In practice, the con-
clusion of such arrangements is frequently coupled 
with approval of financial assistance for the receiving 
countries.69
4. Interception: catching, turning back, divert-
ing and escorting back vessels
The catching, turning back, diversion and escorting 
back of vessels before they reach coastal waters are 
all measures that can be subsumed under the term 
“interception”.70
When vessels on high seas are caught and forcefully 
diverted from their route, or even escorted back to the 
country of departure in order to prevent entry to an 
EU state, those on the vessel seeking protection are in 
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practice refused access to asylum procedures and other 
procedures in which the need for protection is exami-
ned. Further, this action can have deadly consequen ces 
for those affected if they are forced to continue their 
journey in unseaworthy boats.
One of the practices covered by the EU migration strate-
gy71 is the refusal of vessels’ entry to coastal waters 
and/or their escorting back to ports of departure.72 
According to a report from Human Rights Watch, an 
Italian decree issued in July 2003 enables the Italian 
navy to pick up vessels arriving with migrants and refu-
gees and, where possible, force them back into the 
waters of the states of departure. This decree contains 
no instruction whatsoever regarding the identification 
of persons seeking protection.73 On the basis of this decree 
in 2004, migrants were intercepted in international 
waters and then handed over to the Tunisian navy.74
Not only in the various Member States are there regu-
lations and guidelines regarding the picking up and 
intercepting of vessels. At European level, the 2003 
programme of the Council anchored the interception 
of vessels as a method of immigration control to be 
strengthened.75 These guidelines already have been 
implemented in the course of multiple operations. 
FRONTEX coordinated one such operation, Operation 
Hera II. This served the joint observation of the area 
between the West African coast and Canary Islands, 
and the diverting vessels on the migration route. The 
operation’s goal was, “[…] to detect vessels setting off 
towards the Canary Islands and to divert them back to 
their point of departure, thus reducing the number of 
lives lost at sea. During the course of the operation more 
than 3,500 migrants were stopped from this dangerous 
endeavour close to the African coast.” 76 In future, opera-
tions at European level with the goal of intercepting 
and escorting back migrants, often carried out in coope-
ration with third states, are to be carried out with 
greater frequency. In the course of enforcing border 
protection along the southern maritime borders, great 
value is attached to such operations. For example, with 
regard to the planned European coastal patrol network, 
a study contracted by FRONTEX states: “The important 
issue for the network is to detect and intercept persons 
arriving to the Member States’ territory thus ensuring 
the saving of lives at sea, additionally to have an over-
view of the flows of persons entering or leaving the 
area.” 77
5. Maltreatment
Reports of non-governmental organisations on the 
maltreatment of intercepted migrants are not isolated 
cases. Amnesty International’s yearly reports for 2006 
and 2007, among other abuses, tell of poor medical 
care and attacks on migrants in Italian detention cen-
tres.78 Migrants interviewed in July 2007 told of torture 
at the hands of the Greek coast guard; these practices 
were reportedly used to extort statements about the 
travel route.79 A report of the Council of Europe’s Com-
mittee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) in September 
2007 following its visit to Malta offered clear criticism, 
especially of racist attacks by state officials and inade-
quate conditions of detention.80
6. Common emigration controls in states  
of transit and origin
Migration controls in the Mediterranean and Atlantic 
start already along the coasts and in the ports – and 
Council’s programme of 2003 explicitly foresaw this.81
71 See below, Part 2(II)(3).
72  Among others, Greece pursues this strategy. See EU, Council of the European Union, Doc. No. 11490/1/03, CIVIPOL Study,  
pp. 37-38.
73 Human Rights Watch (2006a), p. 113.
74  BBC News (4 October 2004): “[…] an Italian warship intercepted a wooden boat crammed with some 150 people in 
international waters off Lampedusa and summoned the Tunisian navy to escort it back to the North African coast.”
75  EU, Council of the European Union, Doc. No. 15445/03, paras. 30, bullet point 4, 31. See also EU, European Commission, COM 
(2006) 733, para. 33. The head of the European border protection agency, Ilkka Laitinen, stated in an interview: “In August and 
September, we tracked down 2,300 people in their boats in time and escorted them back.” Der Tagesspiegel (30 October 2006).
76 FRONTEX (19 December 2006).
77 EU, Council of the European Union, Doc. No. 12049/06, p. 3.
78 Amnesty International (2006), p. 226, Amnesty International (2007), p. 203.
79 Pro Asyl (2007).
80 Council of Europe, CPT (2007).
81 EU, Council of the European Union, Doc. No. 15445/03, paras. 25 a), 31.
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On the basis of bilateral agreements82 there are already 
joint patrols in these states involving officers from 
states of transit and origin together with those from 
EU Member States. In several cases, the joint patrols 
have been coordinated and organised by the EU border 
protection agency FRONTEX. Only a few examples of 
such joint operations will be listed here.83
Operation ATLANTIS, which was not coordinated by ■■
FRONTEX, furthered the common control of Spain 
and Mauritania over migration routes along the 
Mauritanian coast.84 This was the first joint patrol 
operation with EU financing that was completely 
executed on the territory of a third state.85
Operation NAUTILUS■■ 86 entailed patrols on the seas 
south of Sicily, Lampedusa and Malta between 5 and 
10 October 2006 with the goal of containing migra-
tion to Italy and Malta, mostly from Libya. Another 
aspect of the operation was the use of experts from 
Member States to identify migrants in order to ease 
return to their states of origin.87
Operation Sea Horse■■ 88 aimed to improve border con-
trol, the inter-state exchange on the control of mi -
gration streams, and a corresponding training of bor-
der agents, including those in states of transit and 
origin.89
In Operation Hera II, already discussed, Senegal and ■■
Mauritania were included. Cooperation with these 
third states rested on bilateral agreements with 
Spain.90 One point of emphasis of the controls car-
ried out at sea was the prevention of emigration 
from Mauritania.91
Operation Hera I accompanied and prepared the way ■■
for Hera II; the operations took in summer and 
autumn 2006. Its aim was the improved identifica-
tion of migrants in order to establish their countries 
of origin.92
Operation Hera III, which began in February 2007, ■■
is a continuation of its predecessor, Hera II. During 
this operation, joint air and sea patrols are to be 
carried out along the West African coast. Spain, Italy, 
Luxembourg and France are financing these mea-
sures. According to FRONTEX, the controls are to be 
implemented together with Senegal, aiming, “to 
stop migrants from leaving the shores on the long 
sea journey and thus reducing the danger of losses 
of human lives”.93 In advance of the operation mea-
sures, as in the preceding operation, a risk analysis 
is supposed to be carried out. In its course, aided by 
interviews conducted by experts from several Mem-
ber States with migrants reaching the Canary Islands, 
migration routes are to be traced and smugglers 
tracked down.94
The first phase of Operation Nautilus II took place ■■
in June and July 2007. The operation primarily served 
the observation of the routes from Libya to Malta 
and Sicily. The first phase of the operation unexpec-
tedly ended at the beginning of August.95 One reason 
given was financial. But apparently playing a large 
role in the course of the operation were a missing 
willingness on the part of Libya to take back inter-
cepted persons, and Malta’s complaint of lacking 
support from other EU states.96
Spanish authorities in particular use bilateral agree-
ments as the basis for their cooperation with such 
states as Senegal97 and Mauritania98, and also under-
take joint patrols in the territorial sea of these third 
states outside of EU operations. In similar fashion to 
readmission agreements or other agreements with pro-
visions for the return of a state’s own or foreign citi-
zens, Spain has also created incentives here for the 
conclusion of an agreement on the prolongation of 
joint controls. For example, as Senegal’s compensation, 
82  Bilateral agreements between Spain and Mauritania and Senegal formed the basis for the participation of both third states in 
Operation Hera: FRONTEX (19 February 2006).
83  For information on additional operations, see: http://www.frontex.europa.eu/ [accessed on: 6 July 2007]. For more on this set 
of issues, see also Parkes (2006).
84  Maccanico (2006).
85  Rodier (2006), p. 13.
86  FRONTEX (26 October 2006).
87  FRONTEX (26 October 2006).
88  Guardia Civil (1 March 2006).
89  Maccanico (2006). Participants in the operation were Senegal, Mauritania, Morocco, Cape Verde, and six EU states: Spain, 
Italy, Germany, Portugal, France and Belgium.
90  FRONTEX (19 December 2006).
91  EU, European Commission, COM(2006) 735, p. 18.
92  FRONTEX (19 December 2006).
93  FRONTEX (15 February 2007).
94  Ibid.
95  FRONTEX (6 August 2007).
96  See timesofmalta (25 June 2007); Süddeutsche Zeitung (5 July 2007); Deutsche Welle (4 August 2007).
97 See International Herald Tribune (5 December 2006); BBC News (5 December 2006).
98  Maccanico (2006).
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a programme of temporary migration for around 4,000 
Senegalese was approved.99 Italy also reportedly has 
issued 60,000 seasonal work visas for Tunisians to 
secure Tunisia’s border and coastal controls.100 At the 
same time, financial and technical assistance for the 
enforcement of border protection is granted.101 Through 
these measures, third states are supported in tracking 
down migrants through observation measures and 
controls, and stopping them already at emigration. 
Amnesty International reports that in 2005 Libyan 
authorities claimed to have prevented 40,000 people 
from reaching other states from Libya.102
99   See International Herald Tribune (5 December 2006); BBC News (5 December 2006). On the concept of temporary migration 
at EU level, see below, Part 2(II)(2.4). On the human rights requirements for programmes of temporary migration, see 
Follmar-Otto (2007).
100  EU, Council of the European Union, Doc. No. 11490/1/03, CIVIPOL Study, pp. 38-39.
101   See, for example, with regard to Italy’s technical support for Libya: EU, Council of the European Union,  
Doc. No. 7753/05, pp. 59-60.
102  Amnesty International (2006), p. 304.
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Part 2: 
Management of the EU’s common external  
border: strategies and legal development
I. Fundamental elements of EU migration 
strategy
 
The development of the protection of the EU’s external 
border stands in the context of the EU migration strate-
gy, without whose consideration a human rights 
evaluation of the EU’s border manegement is hardly 
possible. The efficiency of the protection of the EU’s 
external borders did not first become a main focus of 
EU migration strategy with the spectacular arrival of 
refugee boats over the Mediterranean.103 With the 
abolishment of internal borders between the Member 
States in the EU, the protection of its common exter-
nal border had already become a fundamental main 
focus of EU migration strategy from the beginning 
of the 1990s.104 A common migration strategy had 
become necessary because after the abolishment of 
internal borders in the EU, the co-existence of unique 
national regulations on refugee protection was no 
longer sensible. Henceforth, an application for asylum 
in the EU was only to be examined by one Member 
State, and at the same time, it was to be assured 
that every application for international protection 
would actually be examined somewhere in the EU. 
Additionally, it had to be guaranteed that protection 
at the EU’s external border would compensate for the 
security deficit resulting from the abolishment of 
internal borders.
Fundamental characteristics of the EU migration strategy, 
as they can be found in relevant Council documents105 
from the beginning of the 1990s until today, are:
harmonising control of access to Member States’ ■■
state territory, especially through a common visa 
regime and unified rules for controls at the EU’s 
external border; 
the harmonisation of procedural and substantial ref-■■
ugee law within the EU, initially only through com-
mon regulations in some areas of asylum law, but 
since 1999 through an comprehensive Community 
legislation. Primarily worth mentioning in this con-
text are the Dublin system for determining respon-
sibility for examining an asylum application made 
in a Member State106, the introduction of rules on 
safe countries of origin and safe third countries, as 
well as accelerated asylum procedures107 and the 
directives on minimum standards in asylum proce-
dures (Asylum Procedures Directive108), minimum 
standards for the recognition and status of refugees 
and other persons requiring international protection 
(Qualification Directive109) and minimum standards 
103   See, for example, EU, European Council (2006), pp. 6-ff., 10; German Federal Government (2007), “Europe Succeeds 
Together”, 1 January – 30 June 2007 (Presidency Programme), p. 19. 
104   See the report of EU ministers responsible for immigration, accepted by the European Council in 1991, Doc. SN 4038/91. 
105   See, for example, EU, Report from the Ministers responsible for immigration from 3 December 1991, Doc. SN 4038/91; EU, 
European Council (1999); EU, European Council (2004): Hague Programme. 
106   EU, Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member 
States of the European Communities of 15 June 1990 (Dublin Convention) (OJ (1997) C 254, p.1) and EU, Council of the 
European Union Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determin-
ing the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-
country national (Dublin II Regulation) (OJ (2003) L 50, p.1). 
107   See EU, Ministers responsible for immigration (1992), “London Resolutions” and Directive 2005/85/EC on minimum 
standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status (Asylum Procedures Directive).
108  Directive 2005/85/EC.
109   Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or 
stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection 
granted (Qualification Directive) (OJ (2004) L 304, p.12).
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on reception conditions for asylum seekers (Recep-
tion Directive110);
the absence of a comprehensive system for the dis-■■
tribution of burdens that arise through the reception 
of persons seeking protection and the implementa-
tion of the protection of the EU’s external border; 
and an emphasis on the external dimension of ■■
migration policy. The external dimension of migra-
tion policy is especially realised through cooperation 
with states of origin and transit with respect to the 
readmission of their own and foreign nationals (for 
example, by conclusion of a readmission agree-
ments), and through fighting the causes of migra-
tion pressure.
II. Status of Developments
1. Control of access to state territory
1.1 Documents entitling entry
Control over access for third country nationals111 to 
the EU has, by now, become extensively regulated 
through EU law. Citizens of practically all states that 
are countries of origin for migration and flight are sub-
ject to visa requirements regulated by EU directive for 
stays up to three months. Apart from a few exception-
al regulations, Member States have not agreed on 
common regulations under EU law on access for citizens 
of third states to the EU for longer stays, for example 
to take up employment. Regulations only exist for such 
special groups as following family members112 and stu-
110   Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers in 
Member States (Reception Conditions Directive) (OJ (2003) L 31, p. 18). 
111  These are persons without citizenship of an EU State.
112   EU, Council of the European Union, Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification (Family 
Reunification Directive) (OJ (2003) L 31, p. 18).
113   See, for example, EU, European Commission, COM (2001) 386. The European Commission is planning further proposals on 
immigration of highly qualified persons, seasonal workers, those moved within a company, and paid trainees. See EU, 
European Commission, COM (2005) 669.
114   The Schengen Implementing Convention (SIC) was agreed in 1990 and came into force in 1993. In 1999 the Treaty of 
Amsterdam brought the Schengen acquis into Union law, and has since then undergone further development according to 
the rules of EU law.
115   EU, Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a 
Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (OJ (2006) L 
105, p.1).
116  Article 23 SIC.
117   See, for example, EU, Council of the European Union, Directive 2001/40/EC of 28 May 2001 on the mutual recognition of 
decisions on the expulsion of third country nationals (OJ (2001) L 149, P.34); Council Decision 2004/573/EC of 29 April 
2004 on the organisation of joint flights for returns from the territory of two or more Member States, of third-country 
nationals who are subjects of individual removal orders (OJ (2004) L 261, P.28); Article 23 of the Prüm Treaty.
118   Article 26(1) SIC. See also EU, Council of the European Union, Directive 2004/82/EC on the obligation of carriers to 
communicate passenger data (OJ (2004) L 261, p. 24).
119   Article 26(2) SIC.
dents.113 Overall, Member States have been extremely 
restrictive in handling access to the EU for longer-term 
stays.
1.2 Control and observation measures at the EU’s 
external border, returns
Detailed, binding provisions under EU law regarding 
the carrying out of controls at border crossing posts 
and other observation along the EU’s external border – 
including land and sea borders as well as airports – are 
laid out especially in the Schengen acquis114, as further 
developed through the Schengen Borders Code.115 
Member States have obligated themselves as a rule to 
expel persons without a valid residence permit116; return 
policy is bound by common regulations and common 
implementation.117
1.3 Pre-border controls: immigration and emigration 
controls
Various measures also based on the Schengen acquis 
serve to prevent migrants without valid papers from 
arriving at the EU’s external borders in the first place. 
Such measures are also called “non-arrival measures”. 
Non-arrival measures dating back to the Schengen 
acquis include:
the obligation of carrier companies to transport back ■■
passengers without valid travel documents;118
the criminal penalising of carrier companies trans-■■
porting passengers without valid travel docu-
ments;119
the deployment of document advisors, coordinated ■■
among the Member States, to train EU foreign mis-
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sions, carrier companies, as well as border guard 
officials in countries of origin and transit on Schengen 
standards. Cooperation of EU Member States in this 
area can be intensified on the basis of new provi-
sions in the Prüm Treaty, which will be included in 
EU law.120
The aforementioned measures are of particular rele-
vance for human rights and refugee law because – if 
one considers them together with the visa requirement 
for citizens of countries causing flight – they consi-
derably impede access to asylum processes and other 
forms of international protection in EU states, and in 
many cases render it impossible.
2. The concept of integrated border management
Since the European Commission presented its Commu-
nication on the development of integrated manage-
ment of the external borders of the Member States of the 
European Union121 on the request of the 2002 European 
Council, a concept of integrated border management 
has developed122 with the following characteristics:
2.1 Increasing coordination of operational coopera-
tion among the Member States and more regulation 
under EU law: FRONTEX, etc.
The deepening of European cooperation in the area of 
border management occurs through the preparation 
of common strategies, and also through the enactment 
of legal provisions that are binding for all Member 
States. Both are leading to the point that the actions 
of Member States in border protection and border 
management are determined ultimately by EU law and 
guidelines, even when actions are conducted in national 
responsibility. However, the implementation of protec-
tion of the EU’s external border is the duty of those 
states lying along the external border.
In addition to these European standards for national 
border guard authorities, in recent years, operational 
cooperation in the conduct of border protection mea-
sures has been increasingly coordinated. On 1 May 2005, 
the European border protection agency FRONTEX123 
took up its work; whilst it has no operational powers 
itself, it is tasked with supporting the operational 
cooperation of the Member States, both operationally 
and technically.
The 2007 regulation on Rapid Border Intervention Teams 
and amending the FRONTEX regulation represented a 
meaningful, qualitative step towards the Europeaniza-
tion of protection of the common EU external border.124 
Namely, the regulation provides for the deployment of 
officials from an expert pool to other Member States for 
common border protection operations, pilot projects, 
and rapid intervention teams. In the framework of these 
mixed teams, officials are bound by the instructions 
and the law of the host Member State and by Com-
munity law. Through an application submitted by a 
Member State, the agency decides on a rapid interven-
tion, not the Member States themselves. Portions of 
the financing and equipping are realised at Commu-
nity level and during the operation, officers wear an 
armband with the EU insignia. This multiple interlocking 
of national and European levels in the implementation 
of border protection is an innovation, and a departure 
from the previous principle that implementation of 
border protection exclusively lies with the Member 
States. The consequences of this Europeanization for 
overall human rights responsibility will be discussed in 
greater detail below.125
2.2 E-borders: the importance of information 
systems and biometrics
The use of modern information technology is of par-
ticular importance in the revamped border manage-
ment strategy. Especially important in this regard are 
120  See Articles 20-22 of the Prüm Treaty. The international treaty of Prüm on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, 
particularly in combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration was signed on 27 May 2005 by Belgium, 
Germany, Spain, France, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and Austria. In the meantime, Finland, Italy, Portugal and Slovenia 
also have submitted their acts of accession to the treaty, which has been in force for Germany since 23 November 2006;  
by decision of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 15 February 2007, the treaty will be included in EU law.
121  EU, European Commission, COM (2002) 233.
122  See, for example, EU, Council of the European Union, Doc. No. 13559/06; EU, European Commission, COM (2006) 735; EU, 
European Commission, COM (2006) 733; EU, Council of the European Union, Annex to Doc. 15801/06 (Press 341), 
Integrated Border Management; EU, Council of the European Union, Doc. No. 13926/06, Integrated Border Management. 
Strategy deliberations.
123  EU, Council of the European Union, Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency  
for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union 
(FRONTEX Regulation). See Fischer-Lescano / Tohidipur (2007).
124  Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of 11 July 2007 establishing a mechanism for the creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams 
and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 as regards that mechanism and regulating the tasks and powers of 
guest officers (OJ (2007) L 199, p.30).
125  See below, Part 5(I)(1).
Management of the EU’s common external border: strategies and legal development
II. Status of Developments2
29
the further development of the Visa Information Sys-
tem and the Schengen Information System II, as well 
as the uploading of biometric data into these systems, 
which is currently being implemented.126 
2.3 Border management as an interface with police, 
law enforcement agencies and secret services
Among the tasks of FRONTEX is carrying out general 
and special risk analyses. The agency is supposed to 
exchange information with the Member States and to 
cooperate with Europol and other relevant institu-
tions.127 The linkage of risk analysis, collection of crimi-
nal-political knowledge, investigation and prosecution 
of cross-border criminal acts, and cooperation with 
na tio nal intelligence agencies128 forms a part of the con-
cept of so-called “integrated border management”.129
2.4 The external dimension of border management
External aspects of the EU migration strategy initially 
focussed on approaches to fighting the causes of 
migration on the one hand, and the conclusion of 
readmission agreements with countries of origin and 
transit on the other. Meanwhile, measures in third 
states and cooperation with neighbouring countries 
are the first two of a four-step model for controlling 
access130, and therefore of border management. This 
inclusion of the external dimension in the system of 
controlling access substantively means that protection 
of the material border is no longer in the foreground, 
but rather the goal of making the border unreachable 
for people without valid travel documents. Logically, 
existing non-arrival measures have been bolstered and 
a search for new non-arrival measures continues. These 
are aimed at protection of what the Council of the EU 
calls the “virtual border”131, which is shifting and can 
lie far beyond the material EU external border.
Among other things, this shift can be explained by the 
change in political circumstances brought about by 
the EU’s eastern enlargement and the partial move in 
migration pressure to the southern maritime borders. 
In the 1990s it was still possible to declare the EU’s 
126  See, for example, European Commission, COM (2006) 402.
127 Articles 11, 13 of the FRONTEX Directive. On this topic, see also EU, Council of the European Union, Doc. No. 12304/06.
128 See Holzberger (2006), pp. 59 ff.
129 EU, Council of the European Union, Doc. No. 13926/06, p. 4.
130 EU, Council of the European Union, Doc. No. 13926/06, p. 4.
131  EU, Council of the European Union, Doc. No. 15445/03, para. I(1).
132  Articles 27 and 26 of the Asylum Procedures Directive.
133 See Cassarino (2007).
134 On human rights requirements for temporary or circular migration, see Follmar-Otto (2007).
135 EU, European Council (2007), p. 9; EU, Council of the European Union, Doc. No. 6193/1/07, p. 2.
neighbours as safe third countries, even though already 
at that time it meant accepting deficiencies in refugee 
protection. This meant that asylum seekers, once they 
had arrived in an EU state or requested protection at 
the border, could be expelled or rejected to neighbour-
ing states following a rudimentary examination of the 
asylum application, or none at all. Whilst the 2004 EU 
Asylum Procedures Directive132 on included the con-
cept of safe third countries in two different variants, 
until now it has still not been possible to identify safe 
third countries that could be placed on the EU list fore-
seen in this directive. The Council has therefore aban-
doned indefinitely the goal of approving a list of safe 
third countries. Also significant is that relevant transit 
states to which refugees and other migrants could be 
returned have shown very limited willingness to con-
form to the wishes of the EU States regarding readmis-
sion and cooperation on border protection measures 
that conform to Schengen standards. Whilst central 
and eastern European accession states could be gran-
ted the lifting of visa requirements for their citizens and 
the prospect of accession as “compensation” for their 
willingness to cooperate, this is not the case for neigh-
bouring Mediterranean states and African states. Cor-
respondingly, the negotiation of readmission agree-
ments has been extremely difficult for the EC and 
Member States, and even the observance of existing 
agreements becomes insecure as soon as the number 
of persons to be returned becomes too large. For this 
reason the EU and its Member States have recently 
relied on informal arrangements that awaken concerns 
about the rule of law and human rights because they 
usually are totally non-transparent and thus with-
drawn from any democratic or legal control, or human 
rights scrutiny.133
On the basis of a German-French initiative, in February 
2007 the Council decided to further develop the con-
cept of temporary migration134 and open up the possi-
bility of offering third states quotas for temporary 
worker migration of their own citizens as an incentive 
for cooperation.135 Of note is that the EU’s goal, as it 
has been for years, is the conclusion of readmission 
agreements with third states that obligate not only the 
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readmission of their own citizens, but also of for eigners.136 
Such obligations place a considerable burden on transit 
states lying along migration routes to the EU. Exceed-
ing a state’s absorption capacity, also measured by 
economic strength, has negative consequences for the 
human rights protection of affected men, women and 
children – especially in states with poorly deve loped 
systems of refugee and human rights protection.
3. Developments concerning the EU’s southern 
maritime external border, especially: “interception”
The reinforcement of border protection and manage-
ment along the EU’s southern maritime borders is a 
current focus of EU policy. In June 2003 the European 
Commission was presented with a feasibility study it 
had commissioned on the control of the EU’s maritime 
borders, called the CIVIPOL study137 after the contrac-
ting company that wrote it. Consequently, in Novem-
ber 2003, the Council agreed on a programme to com-
bat illegal immigration at the maritime borders of EU 
Member States.138 In October 2006, the Council adopted 
conclusions on the reinforcement of the external mari-
time border139 and in November 2006 the European 
Commission presented a communication on the rein-
forcement of the management of the southern mari-
time border.140 Multiple points of focus, wit various 
weighting, arise from these documents.
First, a strengthening of FRONTEX is demanded. This is 
in regard to finances and the equipping of personnel, 
as well as the ability to respond in crisis situations. 
These are to be secured through the creation of 
ad equate procedures.
Second, cooperation with third states at several levels 
should be strengthened and deepened. This should 
include implementation of technical and organisational 
support for surveillance of third states’ coasts through 
a strengthening of joint patrols and joint measures on 
the identification and return of persons.141 
Third, it is planned to improve border surveillance 
through the establishment of a strong coastal patrol 
network – a kind of precursor to a real European coast 
guard – and the creation of European Surveillance Sys-
tem for Borders (EUROSUR). According to the Commis-
sion’s intentions,142 in the medium-term EUROSUR 
should encompass, among other things, a combination 
of Europe-wide radar and satellite surveillance.
Fourth, guidelines should be worked out on dealing 
with vessels “carrying, or suspected of carrying, illegal 
immigrants bound for the European Union.” 143 Behind 
this is the Council’s goal144 of intercepting such ships, 
where possible, already on high seas, inspecting them, 
and thus preventing entry to the EU of persons with-
out entry papers. Insofar as possible, vessels should 
already be controlled in their ports of departure.145
Intercepting and inspecting vessels on high seas would 
require an amendment of the international law of the 
sea. The Commission is currently working on a pro-
posal146 to amend the Palermo Protocol against the 
Smuggling of Migrants, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organised 
Crime147, as recommended by the CIVIPOL study.148 
Among other issues, questions of cooperation in border 
control and combating illegal immigration were topics 
in the high-level Euro-African meetings of Rabat149 
and Tripoli150 during 2006.
In its communication on southern maritime borders of 
November 2006, the European Commission made very 
clear that in this matter there is still no unity on fun-
damental questions of human rights and refugee pro-
tection. One thing not clear is “the extent of the States‘ 
136 EU, Council of the European Union, Doc. No. 6193/1/07, p. 2. 
137 EU, Council of the European Union, Doc. No. 11490/1/03, CIVIPOL study.
138 EU, Council of the European Union, Doc. No. 15445/03.
139 EU, Council of the European Union, Doc. No. 13559/06.
140 EU, European Commission, COM (2006) 733.
141  EU, Council of the European Union, Doc. No. 15445/03, para. 30; EU, European Commission, COM (2006) 733, para. 45.
142 EU, European Commission, COM (2006) 733, para. 24.
143 EU, European Commission, COM (2006) 733, para. 33.
144 EU, Council of the European Union, Doc. No. 15445/03, paras. 14-22; Council, Doc. No. 13559/06, para. 5(2).
145 EU, Council of the European Union, Doc. No. 15445/03.
146 Written information from the European Commission of 27 February 2007.
147  Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime, UN Doc. A/55/383.
148 EU, CouncilEU, Council of the European Union, Doc. No. 11490/1/03, CIVIPOL study, p. 75.
149 Euro-African Ministerial Conference, Rabat, 10-11 July 2006, Action Plan, paras. 3-4.
150 Joint Africa-EU Declaration on Migration and Development, Tripoli, 22-23 November 2006.
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protection obligations flowing from the respect of the 
principle of non-refoulement, in the many different situ-
ations where State vessels implement interception or 
search and rescue measures. More specifically, it would 
be necessary to analyse the circumstances under which 
a State may be obliged to assume responsibility for the 
examination of an asylum claim as a result of the appli-
cation of international refugee law, in particular when 
engaged in joint operations or in operations taking 
place within the territorial waters of another State or 
in the high sea.” 151 Additionally, it is unclear which EU 
Member States are responsible for the granting of 
international protection following rescue at sea or the 
interception of a vessel.152 The European Commission 
intends to raise the relevant legal issues in all appro-
priate ad hoc forums, especially of the Council.153 With 
the publication of a contracted study in June 2007, the 
European Commission touched on human rights as well 
maritime-law questions in connection with border 
management154, taking a first step towards clarifica-
tion of the difficult legal situation. However, this study 
focuses on the international law of the sea and leaves 
open fundamental questions of human rights. Its results 
are currently being discussed in the Council.
151  EU, European Commission, COM (2006) 733, para. 34.
152 EU, European Commission, COM (2006) 733, para. 33.
153 EU, European Commission, COM (2006) 733, para. 35.
154 EU, European Commission, SEC (2007) 691.
155 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. For further information, see: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/index.htm.
156 On all of these, see, for example, European Commission (2006) 735, para. 3(1).
4. Fora for the implementation of the external 
dimension of the migration and border-
management strategy
For many years migration issues have been a firm com-
ponent of EU foreign policy. Important fora for the 
external dimension of general EU migration policy, and 
specifically the external aspects of the border protec-
tion strategy, are: the EU Neighbourhood Policy, 
EUROMED155, political dialogue with the African Union, 
the Euro-African conferences already mentioned, and 
political dialogue with individual states, in part on the 
basis of association and partnership agreements. Of 
increasing importance in future will be the position of 
the EU in the UN High Level Dialogue on Migration and 
Development.156 Dialogue with third states also always 
includes the subjects of the connection between migra-
tion and development, human rights questions, as well 
as the raising of capacity for refugee protection.
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Part 3: 
Legal obligations for border management  
stemming from the international law of the sea
Among the generally recognised principles of interna-
tional law is that every state is allowed to control 
access of foreign citizens to its territory. However, this 
law, which is an expression of territorial sovereignty, 
does not apply in absolute terms.157 State sovereignty 
is limited by the state’s obligations arising from agree-
ments under international law or international cus-
tomary law. Further legal obligations arise from national 
constitutions and national law. Arising from jurispru-
dence of national highest courts158 and also the Court 
of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ)159, state 
actions regarding border protection and management 
are also, as a rule, bound by judicial control.
With regard to developments in EU border management 
strategy and the practice of Member States described 
above, this chapter will examine which guidelines for 
border management at the EU’s maritime external bor-
der are contained in the international law of the sea.
I. The jurisdiction of a Flag State over  
a vessel
On high seas, a vessel travelling under a state’s flag 
lies under the exclusive jurisdiction of this Flag State.160 
In the territorial sea and the contiguous zone, the juris-
diction of the Flag State is limited by the sovereign 
rights of the coastal state in these zones, described 
below. The Flag State may not have territorial sovereign-
ty over a vessel because the vessel is not part of a terri-
tory, but the Flag State does enjoy legal sovereignty 
over the vessel. The Flag State’s jurisdiction is described 
as a bundle of international rights and duties.161 As a 
consequence, national law of the Flag State is valid for 
disputes relating to this vessel, and the state may grant 
this vessel diplomatic immunity.162 In accordance with 
article 94 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), the Flag State not only has the right to exer-
cise its jurisdiction, but also the duty to effectively 
exert jurisdiction and control in managerial, technical 
and social matters. The Flag State’s obligations in fun-
damental and human rights arise from national law, 
international human rights conventions, and where 
extant, from applicable EU law. Especially for the exis-
tence of obligations from international human rights 
treaties, the existence of legal sovereignty is a funda-
mental criterion.163
II. The right to exercise coercive meas-
ures in the various maritime zones
In implementing border and migration controls, there 
is a question of the extent to which government ships 
are authorised to exercise coercive measures over other 
vessels. The international law of the sea undertakes a 
division of maritime waters into internal waters, the 
157 Grabitz (1992), p. 441. 
158  See German Federal Constitutional Court: Judgment of 14 May 1996, Reference No 2 BvR 1938, 2315/93 (third-country 
arrangements), paras. II and III(1)-III(2) and German Federal Constitutional Court: Decision of 24 October 2006, Reference 
No 2 BvR 1908/03 (denial of entry of a religious leader), in with the Federal Constitutional Court examined denials of entry 
against the measure of fundamental rights.
159  See ECJ: Judgment of 25 July 2002, Case C-459/99 (MRAX / Belgium), in which the ECJ considers the deportation of a 
spouse of an EU citizen who is a citizen of a third state on the basis of secondary Community law.
160 See Article 92 of UNCLOS.
161  Caron (2000), p. 401.
162 Caron (2000), pp. 400, 403-404.
163 For more on this, see below, especially Part 4 (III)(1.2.3.2).
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164  Article 8 of UNCLOS. According to Article 5 of UNCLOS, the basis line is normally identical with the low-water line marked 
by the average low tide. Along coasts that have a very irregular line, the basis line is calculated in accordance with article 7 
of UNCLOS by connecting two points jutting out from the coast line. Gloria (2004), para. 51(2).
165 Gloria (2004), para. 51(8).
166  One nautical mile is 1,852m. States have the right to claim a coastal zone of 12 nautical miles, but are not obligated to do 
so. Even within the EU the practice is not uniform. For example, Greece claims 6 nautical miles of territorial sea. EU, European 
Commission, SEC (2007) 691, p. 11, para. 4(2)(2), footnote 14.
167  This means that this zone my might extent 12 nautical miles beyond the territorial sea (article 33(2) of UNCLOS). This is the 
case for most EU Member States, but also here there is no uniform practice. Heintschel von Heinegg / Unbehau (2002), 
appendix 16, p. 202.
168 See article 86 of UNCLOS.
169 Gloria (2004), para. 51(1).
170   For detail on the topic of the existence of innocent passage for vessels with migrants, refugees, and/or other persons in 
need of protection, see Rah (2005), p. 279; Pallis (2002), pp. 329-364; Jaguttis (2005), pp. 90-128; Barnes (2004),  
pp. 47-77; Goodwin-Gill / McAdam (2007), pp. 272-275.
171   On the dispute over whether the territorial sea comprises a part of territory, see: Graf Vitzthum (2006), chapter 2, paras. 106-115.
172 Sharma (2000), p. 819.
173 Kimminich / Hobe (2004), p. 440.
174 Article 17 of UNCLOS states that “ships of all States” enjoy the right of innocent passage.
175 If the boat is unseaworthy, there exists a duty of rescue at sea. See below, Part 3 (III).
territorial sea, and the high seas. Special rules apply in 
parts of the sea like straits, archipelagic waters, and 
the contiguous zone. A different legal regime applies 
in each of these parts of the sea. This section will 
examine the extent to which, under international law, 
states may undertake migration controls in the various 
zones: internal waters, their own territorial sea, high 
seas, and the coastal waters of third states.
Waters landward of the baseline count as internal 
waters.164 Ports also count as internal waters.165 The 
territorial sea connects directly with internal waters, 
and in accordance with article 3 of UNCLOS, every 
coastal state may claim a territorial sea of up to 12 
nautical miles166 seaward of the baseline. The next 
zone, the so-called contiguous zone, stretches to a 
maximum distance of 24 nautical miles from the base-
line.167 The contiguous zone is a part of the high seas. 
The terms high seas or international waters denote the 
zone outside of internal waters and the territorial sea.168
1. Internal waters
In internal waters, the coastal state enjoys full juris-
diction.169 Thus the coastal state enjoys full rights of 
control over vessels that enter this zone. This means 
that migration and border patrol is completely permis-
sible. Foreign vessels may be controlled in this area, 
and, if necessary, their arrival in ports prevented.
2. Territorial sea
In accordance with UNCLOS, the territorial sea also 
falls under state sovereignty. This is limited, however, 
by the right of innocent passage in accordance with 
articles 2(3) and 17 of UNCLOS.170 Independent of the 
exact legal qualification of the territorial sea,171 the 
state is entitled to consider the territorial sea as part 
of its territory.172 The border between territorial sea 
and high seas is the dividing line between the jurisdic-
tional sphere of the coastal state’s legal order and the 
jurisdictional sphere of the provisions of the interna-
tional law of the sea that apply in the absence of a 
state’s jurisdiction on the high seas.173 Therefore the 
area of the territorial sea and the people on it are fun-
damentally subject to the coastal state’s jurisdiction, 
which is only limited by the right of innocent passage. 
The coastal state may not exercise any jurisdictional 
measures, including controls of a vessel or preventing 
the vessel’s passage, if the vessel seeks innocent pas-
sage in the territorial sea outside of the internal waters. 
It may only do so if passage is non-innocent. The right 
of innocent passage as an important component of the 
freedom of navigation belongs to the Flag State. Ves-
sels without a flag have no right of innocent passage.174 
Small boats with migrants and refugees seeking to reach 
the EU over the Mediterranean often sail without a 
flag. Without prejudice to considerations of human 
rights obligations, under the international law of the 
sea such boats can be stopped, controlled, and possibly 
diverted out of the territorial sea.175
According to article 19 UNCLOS, passage is innocent 
when it does not prejudice the peace, order or security 
of the coastal state. Vessels that are sailing under a 
flag can have their passage denied when the traversing 
vessel is unloading persons in violation of the coastal 
state’s entry laws. However, the international law of the 
sea does not stipulate which measures can be taken 
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against a vessel carrying on board persons in need of 
protection and/or voluntary migrants, who have no 
valid entry documents. As will be presented later176 in 
detail, the EU Asylum Procedures Directive and the EU 
Qualification Directive are, however, applicable in the 
territorial sea. From this and the prohibitions of 
refoulement under international law, the coastal states 
are obligated to examine applications for protection 
made by people in territorial sea. For this purpose, 
coastal states must also allow the disembarkation of 
persons seeking protection.
The coastal state has sovereignty over its own territo-
rial sea. Therefore, to the extent that the EU or indi-
vidual EU Member States want to undertake monitoring 
measures and controls in the coastal waters of the 
southern Mediterranean neighbours, this is only possi-
ble on the basis of agreements under international 
law.177 In practice, joint controls are currently being 
conducted with Mediterranean neighbours that are not 
Member States of the EU. Even if through such agree-
ments under international law single rights of the 
coastal state’s control can be transferred to EU Member 
States, this does not absolve the Member States of 
existing obligations arising from fundamental and 
human rights and the Geneva Refugee Convention so 
long as these human rights obligations do not violate 
the principle of innocent passage and thus restrict the 
coastal state’s sovereignty.178
3. Contiguous zone
The contiguous zone is part of the high seas in which 
the freedom of navigation applies.179 Therefore, as a 
rule, the coastal state does not enjoy sovereignty in 
the contiguous zone. However, in accordance with arti-
cle 33(1) of UNCLOS, it may exercise the controls 
neces sary to enforce its customs, fiscal, immigration 
or sanitary laws, and to punish violations of these. In 
this, according to an explanation of the International 
Law Commission, the term “immigration” in article 
33(1) also incorporates “emigration”.180
Because a vessel in the contiguous zone is not yet in 
the territorial sea of a state, the allowable necessary 
controls must be restricted to approaching the vessel 
for examination and preventing its entry into the terri-
torial sea. As a rule, the exercise of more extensive 
coercive measures, such as its detention or escorting 
to a harbour, are unnecessary in the sense of article 33 
of UNCLOS and therefore disallowed.181 Also of note is 
that controls in the contiguous zone that do not serve 
to prevent entry into the adjacent territorial sea, but 
rather to prevent leaving the territorial sea into the 
contiguous zone and the high seas beyond, could repre-
sent a violation of the human right to leave.182 Further, 
there exist for the states conducting the controls 
duties arising from the principle of non-refoulement 
under international law.183
4. High seas
In international waters, on high seas, the freedom of 
navigation reigns.184 This principle is a component of 
freedom of the high seas and means that every state 
has the right to sail vessels under its flag on the high 
seas. With this, navigation should be equally accessi-
ble to all states. Coercive measures against vessels are, 
as a rule, forbidden. Vessels on high seas are subject 
solely to the Flag State’s jurisdiction.185 Freedom of 
navigation, however, only applies to vessels under a 
flag, which is, as already mentioned, not the case for 
many small refugee boats.
On high seas, migration and immigration controls may 
not be conducted against vessels sailing under a flag. 
This means that vessels also generally may not be 
stopped, boarded, forced to turn around, or escorted. 
Ships without a flag may also be stopped and control-
led on high seas.186 
176 Part 4(II).
177 EU, European Commission, SEC (2007) 691, p. 14.
178 For greater detail, see below, Part 4(III).
179 Articles 86 and 87 of UNCLOS.
180  Nordquist (1993), p. 274, para. 33.8(d). The International Law Commission (ILC) consists of 34 formally independent 
international law experts. The UN General Assembly tasked it with developing draft treaties, and with them the further 
development of international law, including the law of the sea. Heintschel von Heinegg (2004), para. 16(50).
181   EU, European Commission, SEC (2007) 691, p. 15. On the authority to conduct controls in the contiguous zone,  
see also: Graf Vitzthum (2006), chapter 2, paras. 188-193; Pallis (2002), pp. 353-354.
182 See below, Part 4 (III)(1.2.5).
183 See below, Part 4 (III).
184 The freedom of navigation is anchored in international customary law and in article 87, 90 and 92 of UNCLOS.
185 For detail on the freedom of navigation, see Wolfrum (2006), chapter 4, paras. 10-15 and 25-29.
186 See article 110(1)(d) of UNCLOS.
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187  Except for Morocco, all North African Mediterranean neighbours are treaty parties. Of the coastal states of north-western 
Africa, Guinea-Bissau has not ratified the protocol.
188 EU, European Commission, SEC (2007) 691, p. 20.
189  Written information from the European Commission of 27 February 2007. See EU, European Council, Doc. No. 11490/1/03, 
CIVIPOL study, pp. 60, 72. In the framework of a communication from 2006, the Commission called on all Member States to 
ratify this protocol, as well as all African states. EU, European Commission, COM (2006) 733, para. 32. Ratification of the 
supplementary protocol is a prerequisite for its possible amendment.
190 See in greater detail below Part 4 (III)(1.2.5).
191  Part 3(III).
192  On the handling of mixed migratory movements, see UNHCR (2007b): Addressing Mixed Migratory Movements: A 10-Point 
Plan of Action.
193 See below, Part 4.
194  Article 98(2) of UNCLOS; International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979 (SAR), annex, chapter 2; 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), annex, chapter V, regulation 7(1).
195  The most recent amendment of the SOLAS Convention established a detained definition of distress location and rescue services: 
“The performance of distress monitoring, communication, co-ordination and search and rescue functions, including provision 
of medical advice, initial medical assistance, or medical evacuation, through the use of public and private resources 
including co-operating aircraft, ships, vessels and other craft and installations.” SOLAS, annex, chapter V, regulation 2(5).
196 For detail on the extent of this obligation, see Pallis (2002), pp. 330f.
Article 110(1) of UNCLOS provides that in the excep-
tional case of a treaty between the interfering state 
and the Flag State, a ship of the Flag State may be 
stopped and boarded. In such treaties, the Flag State 
confers authority to the controlling state to take mea-
sures against its vessels.
The multilateral Protocol against the Smuggling of 
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organised 
Crime of 2000 (Palermo Protocol) contains, for example, 
provisions allowing stopping and boarding, however 
only following the Flag State’s individual approval, and 
this, naturally, only if the Flag State also has ratified 
the protocol.187 The direct exercise of coercive measures 
against vessels transporting illegal immigrants without 
individual approval of the Flag State is not allowed 
under the international law of the sea.188 The European 
Commission is currently developing recommendations 
for amending the international law of the sea in order 
to allow the direct exercise of coercive measures for 
purposes of combating illegal immigration.189
A further exception to freedom of navigation is the 
right of hot pursuit, as provided for in article 111 of 
UNCLOS. Accordingly, coastal states may pursue vessels 
until reaching high seas. Hot pursuit is only allowed, 
however, if there is reason to believe that the vessel 
has breached the laws of the coastal state. Because 
hot pursuit must begin whilst the vessel is in the inter-
nal waters, the territorial sea or contiguous zone, the 
only cases imaginable, in which hot pursuit can serve 
as justification for coercive measures in combating 
illegal immigration are those, in which the aim of a mea-
sure is to prevent leaving. Yet human rights limitations 
on emigration controls, as already discussed, must be 
observed.190
These exceptions represent the set of circumstances 
under which coercive measures may be exercised against 
foreign vessels on high seas: necessary controls in the 
contiguous zone; a vessel’s lack of nationality or doubts 
about its nationality; the consent of the Flag State, for 
example in the form of a treaty; and hot pursuit.
However, in the case of distress at sea, international 
law provides not only a right, but a duty to intervene.191 
There have been many reports in which either rescue 
at sea has been used as a pretext to escort vessels back 
to their ports of departure, or in which ship masters of 
unseaworthy vessels have refused rescue by govern-
ment vessels of certain nationality, whose rigid hand-
ling of refugees is known.
The existence of mixed migratory movements192 raises 
the question in regard to human and refugee rights of 
how it can be guaranteed that persons in need of pro-
tection are not brought back to states in which they 
are susceptible to the danger of persecution or chain 
deportation. The relevant obligations under EU and 
human rights law will be discussed later.193
III. Rescue at Sea
1. Surveillance of sea, search and rescue services
States have a further duty to establish and maintain 
search and rescue facilities in designated regions in 
order to guarantee safety at sea.194 The relevant con-
ventions provide that a state must undertake necessary 
monitoring, communication and operational measu-
res195 and reach agreements to guarantee196 rescue at 
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sea “around its coasts”.197 This duty is not limited to 
the states’ territorial sea, but extends beyond.198 How-
ever, the arrangement and form of the search and res-
cue obligations in its search and rescue zones is left 
to the discretion of each state.199 The division of the 
world’s oceans in search and rescue zones was con-
ducted within the framework of the International Mari-
time Organization (IMO).200 In this, the responsible 
states each determined themselves how far their own 
“area of responsibility”201 extends.
The duty to undertake rescue services also does not 
contain a legal obligation to conduct one particular 
form of monitoring. This means that there is no explicit 
duty, for example, to conduct patrols. How rescue 
actions are shaped is up to the state’s discretion. The 
limit on discretion is the goal of protection in the SAR. 
If a state receives knowledge of distress at sea within 
its SAR-zone, then in any case it is obligated to launch 
a rescue mission.202
Of importance in this context is that, according to 
experts, the Mediterranean is extensively surveilled not 
only by radar, but also by satellites that can deliver 
high-resolution images, which also make recognisable 
small refugee boats in distress. Practitioners report 
repeatedly receiving NAVTEX communications that 
serve to prevent collisions containing the exact posi-
tions also of small refugee boats.203 Information on the 
position of vessels in distress across the entire Medi-
197 SOLAS, annex, chapter V, regulation 7(1).
198  The following formulation in the SAR convention argues in favour of this: “The delimitation of search and rescue regions  
is not related to and shall not prejudice the delimitation of any boundary between states.” SAR, annex, chapter 2,  
para. 2.1.7.; see also Pallis (2002), p. 335.
199 See Barnes (2004), p. 54.
200  See the IMO website: “Following the adoption of the 1979 SAR Convention, IMO‘s Maritime Safety Committee divided the 
world‘s oceans into 13 search and rescue areas, in each of which the countries concerned have delimited search and rescue 
regions for which they are responsible.” http://www.imo.org/conventions/contents.asp?doc_id=653&topic_id=257#3 
[accessed on 20 February 2007].
201   SOLAS, annex, chapter V, regulation 7(1): “Each Contracting Government undertakes to ensure that necessary arrangements 
are made for distress communication and co-ordination in their area of responsibility and for the rescue of persons in 
distress at sea around its coasts. These arrangements shall include the establishment, operation and maintenance of such 
search and rescue facilities as are deemed practicable and necessary, having regard to the density of the seagoing traffic 
and the navigational dangers and shall so far as possible provide adequate means of locating and rescuing such persons.” 
[emphasis added by the authors].
202   SAR, annex, chapter II, para. 2.1.1.: “On receiving information that any person is, or appears to be, in distress at sea, the 
responsible authorities of a Party shall take urgent steps to ensure that the necessary assistance is provided.
203 Bierdel (2006), p. 117.
204 See article 98 of UNCLOS. This duty is also a matter of international customary law. See Pallis (2002), pp. 333-334.
205  Article 98(1) of UNCLOS:  
1. Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as he can do so without serious danger to the ship, 
the crew or the passengers: 
(a) to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost;  
(b) to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, if informed of their need of assistance, in so far 
as such action may reasonably be expected of him;
206  SOLAS, annex, chapter V, regulations 7 and 33.
207   SAR, annex, chapters 1.3.2. and 2.1.10.
208  Article 10 of the International Convention on Salvage.
terranean, made possible by extensive radar and satel-
lite surveillance, can provide a starting point for duties 
to rescue, which are grounded in the law of the sea 
and human rights law. Apparently there is no public ly 
accessible information on which and to what extent 
Member States conduct satellite-supported surveil-
lance of the Mediterranean, the extent to which sur-
veillance takes place in the NATO framework, and 
how additional information paths work. In order to 
con cretely define protection and rescue obligations 
arising from the law of the sea and human rights law, 
first  the monitoring structures would have to be made 
 public.
2. Duty to rescue at sea
The duty of rescue at sea is expressly anchored in inter-
national law of the sea.204 The UNCLOS provides that 
every state must obligate the master of each vessel flying 
its flag to assist every person encountered in distress at 
sea and help them to safety as quickly as possible.205 On 
the one hand, this duty relates to the states whose duty 
it is to ensure that rescue at sea is carried out. But the 
masters of private vessels and government ships who 
must conduct rescue at sea are also especially obliga ted. 
These duties are also anchored in additional internatio-
nal treaties, especially the SOLAS Convention206, the SAR 
Convention207 and the International Convention on Sal-
vage.208 Additionally, guidelines are provided by the 
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209  The International Maritime Organisation is a specialised agency of the United Nations seated in London that took up its 
work in 1959. The organisation is responsible for determining a legal framework including the areas of vessel safety, maritime 
safety, and sea pollution, and creating technical regulations in these regards. Conventions or regulations, including those 
for maritime safety, are developed in a specialised committee structure. 167 Member States are represented in the 
organisation. For detailed information, see: www.imo.org.
210   IMO (2004), Maritime Safety Committee, Resolution MSC 167(78), annex 34. These guidelines were developed and passed 
by the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), the most important technical committee of the IMO, in the course of the amendment 
process of the convention. Substantively, the MSC deals with questions of maritime safety, including search and rescue of 
shipwrecked persons. The MSC is responsible for the development of guidelines in the area of vessel security. Further, on the 
basis of resolutions of the IMO Assembly, an expanded committee passes amendments to conventions on vessel security, for 
example the SOLAS Convention or the SAR Convention. In such cases, membership is expanded to include the parties to 
each convention, even if these are not IMO Member States. The committee is a collection of government representatives, 
mostly experts in maritime issues, from all 167 IMO member stateMember States. Therefore, accepted guidelines can be 
taken as indications of the treaty parties’ opinio iuris.
211   On the special situation of persons in need of protection and refugees at sea, see the documents of the UNHCR, which has 
dealt with the issue since the 1980s, especially in reaction to refugee movements in the South China Sea at the time. In 
multiple resolutions, the Executive Committee has emphasised the obligation to conduct rescue at sea and simultaneously 
pointed to the special requirements of persons in distress at sea who are also in need of protection. See: Conclusions of the 
UNHCR Executive Committee: (1980), Conclusion No 20 (XXXI); (1981) Conclusion No 23 (XXXII); (1982) Conclusion No 26 
(XXXIII); (1983), Conclusion No 31 (XXXIV); (1984), Conclusion No 34 (XXXV); (1985), Conclusion No 38 (XXXVI); (2003), 
Conclusion No 97 (LIV). See also UNHCR (19 March 2002); Additionally, the UNHCR together with the IMO developed joint 
guidelines for rescue at sea of migrants and refugees: UNHCR/IMO (2006). The Executive Committee is also planning 
conclusions on rescue at sea that likewise go into the problem of persons at sea in need of protection, and which could 
sensibly complement the conclusion of 2003: UNHCR (16 January 2007).
212   See above, Part 1, paras. (I)(1), (I)(2), and (II)(1).
213   SAR, annex, chapter 1, para. 1.3.13. This definition corresponds to the meaning of distress under international customary 
law. See von Gadow-Stephani (2006), p. 343.
214   The CIVIPOL study contracted by the Council recommends adopting a more expansive interpretation of the provisions of 
international law on rescue at sea, so that they are applicable not only in cases of acute distress, but also with regard to 
the mere existence of an unseaworthy boat. EU, CouncilEU, Council of the European Union, Doc. No. 11490/1/03, CIVIPOL 
study, p. 57.
215   UNHCR (2003), Executive Committee, Conclusion No 97 (LIV).
216   On the dispute over whether the duty to rescue at sea also applies in the territorial sea, see: Pallis (2002), pp. 335-338.
217   Article 98(1)(a) of UNCLOS.
218   SAR, annex, chapter 1, para. 1.3.2.
IMO209 regarding the handling of shipwrecked persons 
that further detail the obligations of states and private 
persons.210 The UNHCR has also formulated resolutions 
and recommendations, especially with regard to the 
rescue at sea of refugees and other persons in need of 
protection.211
Problems existing in practice in connection with res-
cue at sea have already been presented above.212 The 
failure of private vessels and government ships to 
undertake rescue at sea and the coastal states’ denial 
of permission to enter safe harbours are problems 
based on poor implementation of unambiguously exis-
ting obligations under the law of the sea, not on a lack 
of clarity about legal obligations.
2.1 Prerequisites of the duty to engage in rescue at sea 
The duty of rescue exists in instances of distress at sea. 
The SAR Convention defines the term distress as “[a] 
situation wherein there is a reasonable certainty that a 
vessel or a person is threatened by grave and imminent 
danger and requires immediate assistance.” 213 If there 
is no distress, there exists no duty to rescue, but also 
no right to board or escort a vessel, or take up other 
measures.214 As a rule it violates international law to seize 
a vessel on high seas that is not in distress. The UNHCR 
Executive Committee also differentiates clearly between 
rescue at sea and the interception of vessels, affirming 
in one Conclusion that vessels responding to persons 
in distress at sea are not engaged in interception.215
In cases of distress, all vessels – whether private or 
public – in all maritime zones216 are obligated to res-
cue if they receive knowledge of a vessel’s distress and 
rescue can reasonably be expected of them. This means 
that the ship master’s duty to engage in rescue at sea 
is far-reaching and fundamentally unconditional, 
although its limit exists where the rescue vessel and 
crew themselves are endangered by the rescue.217 
2.2 Substance of the duty to engage in rescue at sea
2.2.1 Guaranteeing provision of basic needs
If a vessel is in distress, rescue measures must be under-
taken. Rescue is defined as “an operation to retrieve 
persons in distress, provide for their initial medical or 
other needs, and deliver them to a place of safety”.218 
Initially, rescuers are supposed to provide first aid and 
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basic needs.219 It should be emphasised that rescue 
should be guaranteed to all people in distress. This was 
underscored through the incorporation into the trea-
ties of an explicit prohibition of discrimination. In 
accordance with these, the treaty parties are obligated 
to guarantee assistance to all people, without regard 
to nationality, their status, or the circumstances in 
which they are found.220 This means that it is not 
allowable to differentiate whether shipwrecked per-
sons come from a country of origin of flight and migra-
tion, or whether they are presumed to have entry papers 
or not. 
2.2.2 Transit to a place of safety
The duty to rescue includes transit to a place of safety. 
The term “place of safety”, however, is not defined in the 
treaties. According to the definition of the IMO’s Mari-
time Safety Committee (MSC), a place of safety is 
where the rescue action ends, meaning where the life 
of the affected person is no longer in danger. Such a 
place should also be where the rescued person’s basic 
needs are met, including nourishment and medical 
care.221 The place of safety can be a place in the Flag 
State, the rescuing vessel’s next regular port of call, or 
the port most quickly reachable.222 In multiple Conclu-
sions, the UNHCR Executive Committee has taken up 
the question of which criteria should be used to deter-
mine a place of safety. Normally the next regular port 
of call should be seen as a place of safety.223 If refu-
gees and others in need of protection are among the 
rescued, it must be avoided that shipwrecked persons 
needing protection are brought to a country in which 
219   SOLAS, annex, chapter V, regulation 33(1).
220  “Parties shall ensure that assistance be provided to any person in distress at sea. They shall do so regardless of the national-
ity or status of such a person or the circumstances in which that person is found.” [emphasis added by the authors]. This 
prohibition of discrimination has been explicitly in place since the latest amendment of the SAR and the SOLAS. SAR, annex, 
chapter 2, para. 2.10.; SOLAS, annex, chapter V, regulation 33(1). [Emphasis added by the authors].
221   For the definition, see: IMO (2004), Maritime Safety Committee, Resolution MSC.167(78), annex 34, para. 6.12.
222  The rescuing vessel can not be seen as a place of safety. See: IMO (2004), Maritime Safety Committee, Resolution MSC.167(78), 
annex 34, No. 6.13.: “An assisting ship should not be considered a place of safety based solely on the fact that the survivors 
are no longer in immediate danger once aboard the ship. An assisting ship may not have appropriate facilities and equipment 
to sustain additional persons on board without endangering its own safety or to properly care for the survivors. Even if the 
ship is capable of safely accommodating the survivors and may serve as a temporary place of safety, it should be relieved of 
this responsibility as soon as alternative arrangements can be made.”
223  In this sense, the UNHCR Executive Committee already concluded in 1981: “In accordance with established international 
practice, supported by the relevant international instruments, persons rescued at sea should normally be disembarked at 
the next port of call. This practice should also be applied in the case of asylum seekers at sea. In cases of large scale influx, 
asylum seekers rescued at sea should always be admitted, at least on a temporary basis.” UNHCR (1981), Executive Committee, 
Conclusion No 23 (XXXII).
224  IMO (2004), Maritime Safety Committee, Resolution MSC. 167(78), annex 34, para. 6.12.
225  UNHCR / IMO (2006): Rescue at Sea, A guide to principles and practice as applied to migrants and refugees, p. 10. See also: 
UNHCR (2002): Background note on the protection of asylum-seekers and refugees rescued at sea, para. 31.
226  See likewise: UNHCR (2002): Background note on the protection of asylum-seekers and refugees rescued at sea, para. 17: 
“The master will not have to be aware of the nationality or status of the persons in distress and cannot reasonably be 
expected to assume any responsibilities beyond rescue. The identification of asylum-seekers and the determination of their 
status is the responsibility of State officials adequately trained for that task.”
they face a danger of human rights violations or chain 
deportation. Thus the MSC guidelines of the IMO 
regarding the choice of the place of safety state:
“The need to avoid disembarkation in territories where 
the lives and freedoms of those alleging a well-founded 
fear of persecution would be threatened is a conside-
ra tion in the case of asylum-seekers and refugees 
recovered at sea.” 224
Further, the UNHCR and IMO give the ships’ masters 
practical information that should be noted as soon as 
a shipwrecked person applies for asylum. Accordingly, 
the ships’ masters should not only inform the next Res-
cue Coordination Center, but also contact the UNHCR. 
Additionally, the ships’ masters should not take these 
shipwrecked persons to the country of origin from 
which they have fled, and not transmit any personal 
information about the affected persons to this state, 
or to persons who could pass along this information.225
2.2.2.1 Private vessels
If persons seeking protection are among the ship-
wrecked on board a private vessel, the master of the 
ship as a private person is neither competent nor 
responsible for the processing of applications for pro-
tection. The master of a ship is solely obligated to bring 
these people to a place of safety in the sense of the 
law of the sea. It can not be expected of a ship master 
that he takes additional responsibility for those saved 
beyond the rescue.226
Legal obligations for border management stemming from the international law of the sea
III. Rescue at Sea3
39
Even if there is no duty of the ship master under the 
law of the sea to incorporate the threat of persecution 
for an individual at such a place into his decision, in a 
current information brochure on the practical imple-
mentation of rescue at sea, the UNHCR and IMO re -
commend: “While the ship master is not responsible to 
determine the status of the people on board, he needs 
to be aware of these principles.” 227 In the IMO guide-
lines already cited above, this statement is even clearer: 
“The need to avoid disembarkation in territories where 
the lives and freedoms of those alleging a well-founded 
fear of persecution would be threatened is a considera-
tion in the case of asylum-seekers and refugees at sea.“ 228
2.2.2.2 Government ships
Even though the duty to conduct rescue at sea equally 
applies to government ships and private vessels, the 
legal situation for rescue by government ships diver-
ges from that of rescue by private vessels. The master 
of a government ship also lacks the competence and 
responsibility to decide on applications for interna-
tional protection.229 However, as soon as government 
ships230 rescue shipwrecked persons, they assume sove-
reign tasks and in addition to the duty to rescue at sea, 
they are subject to obligations arising from human 
rights and refugee law. From a human rights perspec-
tive, which is laid out in detail below 231, taking rescued 
persons to a place of safety is an action that must be 
measured against the principle of non-refoulement 
under international law.
2.2.3 Duty of coastal states to allow entry into the 
territorial sea and ports
The coastal state’s sovereignty over its territorial sea 
is limited by its humanitarian obligations. Among these 
obligations grounded in international customary law 
belongs allowing entry to port for a vessel that is in 
distress and sailing through the territorial sea trying 
to find assistance.232
227  UNHCR / IMO (2006)
228  IMO (2004), Maritime Safety Committee, Resolution MSC. 167(78), Anlage 34, Ziff. 6.17.
229  With regard to the commander of a German warship, see: Heintschel von Heinegg (2006), chapter 7, para. 78.
230  This can include vessels for border guards as well as state rescue vessels.
231   See below, Part 4.
232  EU, European Commission, SEC (2007) 691, p. 12.
233  On this, with additional references, see: Graf Vitzthum (2006), chapter 2, para. 49. Even though the UNCLOS itself provides no 
mention of access to ports in cases of distress, the right of access for ships in distress is a matter of international customary 
law. However, the right to an emergency port is not unlimited. If the coastal state is in serious danger, it is possible to suspend 
it. These exceptions affect, for example, nuclear-powered vessels in distress.
234  Against the assumption of an homogenous state practice, see: Røsæg (2002), pp. 58-59; For another view: von Brevern /
Bopp (2002), p. 842: “The duty of port states to tolerate the disembarkation of persons rescued from distress at sea is 
implicitly contained in the regulations substantiating the duty of ship masters and states to rescue. At least, however,  
this regulation has been substantiated at the latest through constant, widespread state practice.” This duty is surely in 
reference to the next planned port of call. von Brevern / Bopp (2002), p. 849.
If a private or government ship has picked up ship-
wrecked persons in accordance with its obligations 
under the law of the sea, then the possibility for the 
rescuing vessel to enter a port and disembark the res-
cued persons is a necessary prerequisite to success-
fully ending the rescue. Allowing entry to the port and 
the disembarkation of those rescued has the important 
purpose of unburdening ship masters of primary 
responsibility as soon as possible. This is especially 
important for the ship masters` efficient and actual 
exercise of the rescue obligation because the rescued 
persons are normally in need of quick medical assist-
ance and care, and fear of delay and financial loss lowers 
the willingness to rescue.
The international law of the sea and relevant conven-
tions still have not produced a clear duty to tolerate 
disembarkation of a vessel that has picked up ship-
wrecked persons except in the case of an emergency 
for the rescuers themselves.233 Whether in this regard 
homogenous state practice and opinio iuris exist is 
disputed.234 The latest amendment of the SOLAS and 
SAR conventions created greater legal clarity regard-
ing the states’ duties. In both conventions the following 
regulation used the same wording:
“Contracting Governments shall co-ordinate and co-
operate to ensure that masters of ships providing assist-
ance by embarking persons in distress at sea are released 
from their obligations with minimum further deviation 
from the ships’ intended voyage, provided that relea-
sing the master of the ship from the obligations under 
the current regulation does not further endanger the 
safety of life at sea. The Contracting Government respon-
sible for the search and rescue region in which such 
assistance is rendered shall exercise primary responsi-
bility for ensuring such co-ordination and co-operation 
occurs, so that survivors assisted are disembarked from 
the assisting ship and delivered to a place of safety, taking 
into account the particular circumstances of the case 
and guidelines developed by the Organization. In these 
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235  SOLAS, annex, chapter V, regulation 33(1-1); SAR, annex, chapter 3, para. 3.1.9 [emphasis added by the authors].  
The amendments to the SOLAS and SAR conventions were accepted in May 2004 and took effect on 1 July 2006.
236  Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic of 9 April 1965 (FAL) (BGBI. 1967 II, p. 2434) The amendment 
to the convention was approved on 7 July 2005 and took effect on 1 November 2006.
237  “The amendment will require public authorities to facilitate the arrival and departure of ships engaged in the rescue of 
persons in distress at sea in order to provide a place of safety for such persons.” www.imo.org 
It should also be mentioned here that the IMO is preparing additional guidelines, an “Explanatory Manual” on the FAL 
convention, which should, among other things, serve to ease disembarkation. Note also developments and plans at the  
EU level: EU, Council of the European Union, Doc No 7045/07.
238  The term “shall” is used in the annex to the SAR convention, “to indicate a provision, the uniform application of which by 
all Parties is required in the interest of safety of life at sea.” SAR, annex, chapter 1, para. 1.1. [emphasis added by the authors].
239  As already mentioned elsewhere, the MSC passed corresponding guidelines simultaneously to the amendments of the 
conventions: IMO (2004), Maritime Safety Committee, Resolution MSC. 167(78), annex 34.
240  Arguing against an obligation: von Gadow-Stephani (2006), p. 360, who speaks against an obligation of the parties to the 
convention. See also: IMO (2004): Persons rescued at sea – more guidance to be developed. In: IMO News 2004,  
No 3, p. 11: “While the Contracting Government responsible for the search and rescue region in which such assistance is 
rendered shall exercise primary responsibility for providing a place of safety OR ensuring that a place of safety is provided, 
the meeting agreed with the views of the majority of Member States who spoke at MSC that this does not oblige that 
Government to disembark the persons rescued in its territory.”; Also critically: Rah (2005), p. 278, footnote 12.
241   UNHCR (30 June 2006), press release.
242  The assumption is put forward in Røsæg (2002), p. 66.
243  SAR, annex, chapter 2, para. 2.10., SOLAS, annex, chapter V, regulation 33(1).
244  See below, Part 4.
cases the relevant Contracting Governments shall 
arrange for such disembarkation to be effected as soon 
as reasonably practicable.” 235 
Beyond the SOLAS and SAR conventions, the Conven-
tion on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic 
of 9 April 1965 (FAL)236 was also correspondingly 
amended and now codifies an obligation on the sim-
plification of disembarking shipwrecked persons.237
With the SOLAS and SAR amendments, several con-
crete duties238 were codified:
There now exists a legal obligation to co-ordinate ■■
and co-operate with the goal of finding a place of 
safety with the least possible diversion from the 
planned route.
The primary responsibility of the states in the search ■■
and rescue zone and the goal of disembarkation as 
quickly as possible is explicitly established. This 
means that states in a search and rescue region are 
obligated to agree on a port of call as quickly as 
possible for the benefit of the shipwrecked persons. 
Of note here is that the state duty to undertake res-
cue at sea expands along with increasing monito-
ring of the zone.
The duty exists to guarantee disembarkation “as ■■
soon as possible”.
States are obligated to observe guidelines developed ■■
in the framework of the IMO.239
The aforementioned legal changes still do not make 
possible an unambiguous definition of a “place of safety” 
in a particular case, and the final permission to disem-
bark still lies at the discretion of coastal states. This 
discretion, however, is clearly limited. An holistic view of 
these obligations provides a clear and relatively narrow 
legal framework for states’ discretion.240 The UNHCR 
therefore especially welcomed the amendment of the 
SOLAS and SAR conventions. The UNHCR interprets the 
amendment in such a way that states should be obligated 
to allow mooring by their captains without delay.241 
This result also naturally applies to refugees and other 
shipwrecked persons in need of protection. In practice, 
however, there is a danger that shipwrecked persons 
who are not refugees are more likely to receive per-
mission for disembarkation because coastal states 
shrink from their burden to examine the desire for pro-
tection.242 However, such a refusal or delay in disem-
barkation due to the (refugee) status of the persons 
rescued would not be compatible with the new, explicit 
prohibition of discrimination243 inserted into the rele-
vant conventions. If a vessel with rescued persons 
seeking protection is at the maritime border or in the 
territorial sea in order to seek protection in the coastal 
state, a duty to allow entry arises from the Geneva 
Refugee Convention and the human rights treaties.244
2.3 Securing the duties of private persons to 
undertake rescue at sea
State duties extend beyond a guarantee of rescue at 
sea by vessels in the service of the state. It is addition-
ally demanded of states that they enforce the private 
persons’ duty to rescue. However, the UNCLOS itself 
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245  Doris Peschke, Churches Commission for Migrants in Europe (CCME) during a panel discussion at the 7th Berlin symposium 
on refugee protection, June 18th 2007.
246  Røsæg (2002), p. 51.
247  UNHCR (1983), EC/SCP/30; See also Pallis (2002), p. 340. The idea of financial support and covering the costs of successful 
rescue measures is also based on the provisions of the International Convention on Salvage. Chapter III, which regulates the 
rights of the salvagers, and article 12(1) explicitly state that successful salvage operations justify a claim to a salvage 
reward. According to article 13(1) of the Convention on Salvage, this reward should create an incentive to undertake 
salvage operations.
contains no guidelines or modalities for the enforce-
ment of the duty to rescue at sea.
Fundamental to the enforcement of private persons’ 
duty to rescue would be that the crews of vessels 
engaging in rescue do not have to reckon with crimi-
nal consequences, as this has a deterrent effect. In this 
regard, it has been suggested245 that EU law should 
codify that aiding and abetting entry is not of rele-
vance to criminal law when it serves to protect the life 
and limb of migrants.
Additionally, there are various proposals on how one 
could better implement the duty to rescue. Among 
these, it has been pointed out that control instruments 
similar to flight data recorders in aeroplanes could be 
installed in vessels, so that a case of intentional failure 
to rescue could be more easily proved.246 Practitioners 
support the idea of financial support for vessel owners 
and insurance companies who carry the burden of res-
cue at sea. They point to the UNHCR programmes as 
practiced in the 1980s. In the course of these pro-
grammes, the master of the rescue vessel was paid a 
monetary sum for each rescued person.247
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248  See above, Part 3 (II)(4).
249  Regulation (EC) 562/2006 (Schengen Borders Code).
250  European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, see above Part 2 (II)(2).
251   See Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of 11 July 2007 establishing a mechanism for the creation of Rapid Border Intervention 
Teams and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 as regards that mechanism and regulating the tasks and 
powers of guest officers (OJ (2007) L 199, p.30).
Part 4: 
The demands of human and EU fundamental 
rights for the management of the European 
Union’s External Borders
The examination of demands of human and EU funda-
mental rights for the EU and its Member States will be 
conducted in three steps. First, chapter I will explain 
the criteria. Chapter II will examine which obligations 
exist directly at the land or maritime border and within 
the territorial sea, which counts as state territory.
Against the background of current developments in 
the area of EU border management strategy, including 
the planned movement toward pre-border controls 
beyond state frontiers, chapter III deals with the human 
rights obligations of EU states in actions at sea beyond 
the EU’s external border. On one hand, this section dis-
cusses the human rights obligations that apply on high 
seas, where the freedom of navigation applies. On the 
other hand, it discusses obligations in dealing with 
persons encountered in the course of migration con-
trols with EU participation who are in the territorial sea 
of third states, namely the southern Mediterranean 
neighbours and North African states. The obligations 
of the EU and its Member States from EU fundamental 
and human rights pertaining to persons encountered 
beyond the EU’s maritime borders are independent of 
the question of whether a migration control measure 
is even admissible on high seas under the law of the 
sea.248 The human rights obligations for migration-
control measures conducted on the dry land of a third 
state will not be addressed.
Each of the chapters will begin by examining which 
relevant provisions for human rights protection are 
contained in existing EU secondary law. Then it will 
examine which obligations arise from international 
human rights law and EU fundamental rights. Possible 
discrepancies between the obligations stemming from 
EU fundamental rights and EU secondary law will be 
taken as the basis for the following part 5 of the study, 
in order to answer the question of whether there exists 
a need for regulation under EU law.
I. Criteria
In the management of the EU’s external border, the 
actions of Member States tightly intertwine vertically 
and horizontally with the actions of the European 
Community (EC). Member States thus carry out border 
control in accordance with the Schengen Borders 
Code249 and the rest of the Schengen acquis that is 
binding under EU law. They are supported in this by 
the EU border-protection agency FRONTEX.250 The 
planned transformation of the FRONTEX regulation on 
the formation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams fur-
ther entwines vertically the national and EU levels. This 
is because the decision on deployment of the Rapid 
Border Intervention Teams, as well as portions of their 
financing and equipping, will be realised at the Com-
munity level. Additionally, deployments are to be based 
on a mission plan agreed by FRONTEX and a host Mem-
ber State. National officials are to be provided with a 
special FRONTEX badge and an armband with the 
insignia of the European Union. The amendment to the 
FRONTEX regulation foresees the delegation of sove-
reign powers among Member States. Officers in action 
are to be bound by Community law and the law and 
instructions of a host Member State, but remain under 
the disciplinary law of their home Member State.251
Therefore criteria for human rights must consider EU 
fundamental rights as well as the obligations of Mem-
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ber States deriving from national fundamental rights 
and international human rights conventions. The ques-
tion of whether national or EU fundamental rights 
apply is thus not of purely academic consequence, 
because this determines whether judicial control is 
exercised through national courts or through the Court 
of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ). In proble-
matic cases, supra-national judicial control through 
the ECJ can indeed lead to different results than those 
reached by national judicial control, which to a greater 
extent can be influenced by the political situation – 
for example in an overburdened state along the EU’s 
external border. In addition, according to the views 
presented here, EU fundamental rights can obligate the 
EU legislator to clearly regulate human rights require-
ments.252 The extent to which EU fundamental rights 
are decisive depends on two factors. The first factor 
pertains to the answer to the question of who is imple-
menting the action being judged and which law the 
action is based on. As a second factor, the answer to 
the legal question of the circumstances under which 
EU fundamental rights are also binding on Member 
States is decisive. 
International human rights obligations deriving from 
UN human rights conventions253 and the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) are clearly of sig-
nificance. This is both because the Member States are 
bound by these treaties, and because the UN human 
rights conventions and the ECHR254 serve as a legal 
reference for the European Court of Justice in the 
determination of EU fundamental rights as general 
legal principles of EU law. The European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) also draws on the UN human 
rights conventions in the interpretation of the ECHR. 
Additionally, through primary law, EU Member States 
as well as the Union are bound by the Geneva Conven-
tion Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Con-
vention).255 This chapter will therefore first use as cri-
teria the human rights treaties under international law, 
especially the ECHR as well as the Refugee Conven-
252  See above Main Findings, point II (4) and below Part 5(I).
253  See especially International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD); Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC).
254  One need only see Court of Justice: ECJ: Judgement of 27 June 2006, Case C-540/03, in which the Court expressly takes 
into account not only the ECHR, but also the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.
255  Article 63, EC. Note also the reference to the Refugee Convention in Article 18 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
256  Part 3(II)(2).
257  With exception of the Straits of Gibraltar.
258  EU, European Commission, SEC (2007) 691, p. 11, footnote 14; Heintschel von Heinegg / Unbehau (2002), p. 13.
259  Articles 2(3) and 17 of UNCLOS.
tion. Simultaneously, it will deal with the corresponding 
development of EU fundamental rights.
The relevant parts of EU secondary law that contain 
provisions on the protection of human and refugee 
rights will be presented and measured against the crite-
ria for fundamental and human rights discussed above.
II. The examination of applications for 
international protection made in the 
territorial sea or at land or maritime 
borders
As presented above256, the territorial sea falls under 
state sovereignty and therefore the jurisdiction of the 
coastal state. Insofar as coastal states claim this sove-
reignty, they are entitled to treat the territorial sea as 
part of their state territory. The territorial sea of Spain257, 
France, Italy, Malta, Cyprus, and for the most part those 
of Germany, is twelve nautical miles wide, while that 
of Greece is six nautical miles wide.258 Jurisdiction in 
this zone is only restricted by the right of innocent pas-
sage.259 The right of innocent passage serves to enable 
peaceful sea travel and ultimately provides room for 
international customary law’s provision that jurisdic-
tion on a ship derives from its flag. The obligations of 
legislation or human rights in this zone are not limited, 
unless this is specifically provided for, or there is a colli-
sion with the jurisdiction of the Flag State. 
1. Duty to accept and examine applications for 
international protection in accordance with the 
Asylum Procedures Directive
Persons seeking international protection in the territo-
rial sea or at maritime borders, independent of the 
situation and the form of protection sought, are there-
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fore to be handled the same as persons who apply for 
protection on land. Article three of the Asylum Proce-
dures Directive260 obligates Member States to accept 
“applications for asylum made in the territory, inclu-
ding at the border or in the transit zones of the Mem-
ber States.” 261 A study commissioned by the European 
Commission has confirmed the applicability of the Asy-
lum Procedures Directive, the Qualification Directive 
and the Dublin II-regulation262 in the territorial sea.263 
From this applicability of EU asylum law follows a duty 
to give persons intercepted or rescued the possibility 
to apply for international protection. The applicability 
of the Dublin II-regulation results in the responsibility 
of the coastal state through whose territorial sea the 
person seeking protection has entered, as long as there 
are no grounds for the responsibility of another EU 
state. This regulation of EU law corresponds to a con-
clusion of the UNHCR Executive Committee from 2003, 
according to which the main responsibility for conside-
ration of all protection needs for persons in distress 
in tercepted by ships lies with the state in whose terri-
torial sea the interception occurs.264
According to the Asylum Procedures Directive, every 
request for international protection is considered an 
application for asylum, as long as the person concerned 
does not expressly request another form of protection 
that can be applied for separately.265 Of particular note, 
subsidiary protection in accordance with Articles 2(e), 
2(f), 15, and 18 of the Qualification Directive is con-
sidered another form of protection.266 An individual 
right to subsidiary protection arises if the person con-
cerned is threatened by serious harm through the 
death penalty or execution; through torture or inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment; or through 
serious and individual threat to life or person by reason 
of indiscriminate violence in situations of international 
or internal armed conflict. If national law does not 
provide its own procedure for granting subsidiary pro-
tection, then the application for protection must be 
260  Directive 2005/85/EC on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status.
261   Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Asylum Procedures Directive.
262  EU, Council of the European Union Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the 
Member States by a third-country national (OJ (2003) L 50, p.1. 
263  EU, European Commission, SEC (2007) 691, pp. 13 ff.
264  UNHCR, Executive Committee, Conclusion No 97 (2003).
265  Second sentence of Article 2(b) of the Asylum Procedures Directive.
266  Council Directive 2004/83/EC (Qualification Directive).
267  See Art. 19 (1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
268  Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
269  UN, HRC CCPR/C/78/D/829/1998 (2003): No. 829/98 (Judge / Canada). See Schäfer (2004).
seen as an application for asylum, and the existence 
of the relevant threats to the applicant must be judged 
in those terms.
2. Duty to accept and examine applications for 
international protection in accordance with the 
non-refoulement principle
The obligation also to accept and examine applications 
for protection at the border deriving from the Asylum 
Procedures Directive is the expression of international 
law’s non-refoulement principle. It is valid whether land 
or maritime border, and without regard to whether the 
person seeking protection is in possession of entry 
papers. The lack of papers entitling entry is the normal 
case for people in need of protection; that lies in the 
nature of the flight for citizens requiring visas coming 
from states that cause them to flee.
The principle of non-refoulement forbids the expulsion, 
deportation, rejection or extradition of a person to a 
state in which he or she would face threats of elemen-
tary human rights violations. Different prohibitions of 
refoulement derive from international customary law, 
EU fundamental rights267, the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), Article 33(1) of the Refugee 
Convention, Article 3(1) of the UN Convention against 
Torture (CAT)268 and from Article 6269 and 7 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR). Differences among these prohibitions of 
refoulement exist with regard to the human rights vio-
lations against which they aim to protect (e.g. protec-
tion against torture or protection of the right to life), 
and with regard to the personal scope of application. 
Complementing these, Article 4 of the ECHR’s Fourth 
Optional Protocol forbids the collective expulsion of 
aliens and therefore requires individual examination 
of each decision on expulsion.
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Because the protection of fundamental human rights 
counts among the peremptory norms of international 
law,270 the prohibition of expulsion or rejection in the 
case of a threat to such elementary human rights can 
be seen also as part of the ius cogens.271 Of note for the 
development of international law is the further deve-
lopment of prohibitions of refoulement in the UN human 
rights conventions by their treaty bodies272 and the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).273 Increasingly 
from the beginning of the 1990s, states have expressly 
recognised the validity of prohibitions of refoulement 
from the human rights conventions.274 Thus the prohi-
bitions of refoulement set forth in Article 3(1) of the UN 
Convention against Torture and Article 3 of the ECHR 
especially have gained importance. Among other places, 
this development has found its expression in the conclu-
sions of the UNHCR Executive Committee.275 It is accom-
panied by the anchoring of forms of subsidiary protec-
tion in the national law of States Parties to the Refugee 
Convention and in the law of the European Union.
The practice of European states, as unanimously deter-
mined in the literature,276 points to the application of 
the non-refoulement principle not only for persons in 
a country’s interior, but also for those at its borders. 
According to overwhelming scholarly opinion, this 
270   Frowein (1992), p. 67.
271   Doehring (1999), p. 211. In this regard see also UNHCR, Executive Committee, Conclusion No 22 (1981); further references 
are found in Goodwin-Gill / McAdam (2007), pp. 216 and 218, footnote 86.
272  Human Righs Committee (HRC) for the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); Committee against 
Torture (CAT) for the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT); 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) for the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD); 
Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) for the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).
273  Discussed in greater detail below, II 3.
274  For further information and citations on this development, see Goodwin-Gill / McAdam (2007), pp. 217, 220-221.
275  UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No 103 (2005)(m) and 99 (2004).
276  See Hailbronner (1989), p. 39; Hailbronner (1995), pp. 371-372 ; Hofmann (1987), p. 2039; Hailbronner (2000), p. 439; 
Maassen (1997), pp. 66-70; Meierhofer (1998), p. 62; Zimmermann (1994), pp. 56-74; beyond Europe, see Goodwin-Gill 
(1996), pp. 123-124.; Noll (2000), p. 432; Coleman (2003), p. 43.
277  Hailbronner (1989), p. 39; Hailbronner (1995), pp. 371-372; Hailbronner (2000), p. 439; Henkel (1996), p. 152; Kälin / Künzli 
(2005), pp. 490-491.; Meierhofer (1998), p. 62; for other views, see Kokott (1996) and Maassen (1997), pp. 74-75, both of 
which reference Article 33 of the Refugee Convention. For the validity of the non-refoulement principle at the border 
stemming from Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, see also German Federal Constitutional Court: Judgement of 14 April 1992, 
Reference Number 1 C 48/89 (Carrier Sanctions), margin note 14 and Federal Constitutional Court: Judgement of 14 May 1996, 
2 BvR 1938, 2315/93 (Third-Country Arrangements), para. C I 5 d and e, in which the act of denying entry is measured 
against the criteria of Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR.
278  Article 3(b) of the Schengen Borders Code.
279  With regard to the UN Convention against Torture: UN, Committee against Torture (1999), Doc. A/53/44, Nos. 137-148; UN, 
Committee against Torture (2006), Doc. A/61/44, p. 26. With regard to the UN International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD): UN, Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (2003), Doc. A/58/18 69 
para. 408. In relation to the ICCPR: Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 15 (1986), No 5.
280  UNHCR, Executive Committee, Conclusion No 6(c) (XXVIII) (1977); Conclusion Nos. 15(b) and 15(c) (1979); Conclusion No 85 
(1998), Conclusion No 99 (2004).
281   See Goodwin-Gill / McAdam (2007), pp. 215-216 and Hathaway (2005), pp. 279 ff., each with further references. Exceptions 
to this principle can only arise if a safe third country is available in which the application for protection of the person 
concerned can be examined.
practice establishes – at least in the circle of EU states – 
an agreement regarding the fact that the non-refoule-
ment-principle is valid at the border and includes a 
prohibition of chain deportation.277 This legal view has 
found expression in Article 3(b) of the Schengen Bor-
ders Code that took effect in 2006, which specifies that 
immigration controls are to be conducted “without 
prejudice to […] the rights of refugees and persons 
requesting international protection, in particular as 
regards non-refoulement.”278 Of relevance beyond the 
circle of EU states, this legal view emerges from the 
decisions, commentaries and conclusions of the UN 
human rights conventions’ treaty bodies279 and those 
of the UNCHR Executive Committee.280 Insofar there 
is unanimity that while the principle of non-refoulement 
does not entail a general right to admission, it at least 
includes a basic duty to temporarily admit the person 
concerned for the purpose of examining his or her pro-
tection needs and status.281
UNHCR, the Council of Europe’s Human Rights Com-
missioner and non-governmental organisations criti-
cise, however, that access to a state’s territory – and 
with it to protection – is in practice often hindered by 
measures aimed at fighting illegal immigration that 
are used without differentiation for all migrants, 
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including refugees.282 For this reason UNHCR has recom-
mended to the Portuguese European Union Presidency 
(July through December 2007) that it take up the issue 
of guaranteeing elementary rights, including the right 
to access asylum procedures.283
3. Especially: Implicit prohibitions of refoulement 
in accordance with the ECHR 
The jurisprudence of the ECtHR284 has significantly bol-
stered the principle of non-refoulement, especially on 
the basis of Article 3 of the ECHR, the prohibition of 
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment. The ECHR grants individual rights, which after 
exhaustion of local remedies remain open to legal 
recourse at the ECtHR through individual application 
in accordance with Article 34 of the ECHR. As a human 
rights treaty, the ECHR standardises not just the mutual 
obligations of states, but also the rights of the individual. 
According to Article 1 of the ECHR, the Contracting par-
ties shall secure “to everyone within their jurisdiction 
the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Con-
vention.” This clear reference to the individual and to the 
protection of individual human rights as the primary pur-
pose and objective285 of the treaty has implications for the 
interpretation of the ECHR. This is because according to 
the rules of international law, purpose and objective fun-
damentally determine the interpretation of international 
treaties.286 The treaty parties to the ECHR are bound by 
the ECHR as it has been given concrete effect through the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR.287 Article 32(1) of the ECHR 
empowers the ECtHR to authoritative and authentic inter-
pretation and further development of the ECHR.288 
282  Most recently, see UNHCR, Note on International Protection from 13 September 2001, A/AC.96/951; Thomas Hammarberg, 
“Seeking asylum is a human right, not a crime“, speech delivered on 30 October 2006. 
283  UNHCR´s recommendations for Portugal´s 2007 European Union Presidency, July-December 2007 from 15 June 2007, No 2.
284  For a comprehensive study on the relevant case law of the ECtHR see Mole (2007).
285  See para. 2 of the preamble of the ECHR and Article 1 of the ECHR.
286  Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).
287  Grabenwarter (2005), p. 98; Ress (2004), p. 630.
288  See Papier (2006), p. 1.
289  ECtHR: Judgement of 7 July 1989 (Soering / United Kingdom), Application No 14038/88, para. 91; Judgement of 30 October 
1991 (Vilvarajah and Others / United Kingdom), Application Nos 13163/87, 13165/89, 13447/87, 13448/87, para. 103;  
Judgement of 17 December 1996 (Ahmed / Austria), Application No 25964/94; Admissibility Decision of 7 March 2000  
(T. I. / United Kingdom), Application No 43844/98.
290  ECtHR: Judgement of 11 July 2000 (Jabari / Turkey), Application No 40035/98, para. 38 with further references.
291   Alleweldt (1996), p. 15, Frowein / Peukert-Frowein (1996), Article 3, para. 18; Grabenwarter (2005), p. 139; Mole (1997), p. 13.
292  ECtHR: Judgement of 7 July 1989 (Soering / United Kingdom), Application No 14038/88, paras. 89-91; Judgement of 4 
February 2005 (Mamatkulov and Askarov / Turkey), Application Nos 46827/99, 46951/99, para. 67: “In so far as any liability 
under the Convention is or may be incurred, it is a liability incurred by the extraditing Contracting State by reason of its 
having taken action which has as a direct consequence the exposure of an individual to proscribed ill-treatment.”
293  ECtHR: Judgement of 7 July 1989 (Soering / United Kingdom), Application No 14038/88, para. 113.
294  ECtHR: Judgement of 18 February 1991 (Moustaquim / Belgium), Application No 12313/86; Judgement of 2 August 2001 
(Boultif / Swizerland), Application No 54273/00; Judgement of 10 July 2003 (Benhebba / France), Application No 53441/99; 
Judgement of the Great Chamber of 9 October 2003 (Slivenko and Others / Latvia), Application No 48321/99. On the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR, see Thym (2006).
The ECtHR derives an implicit non-refoulement prin-
ciple especially from Article 3 of the ECHR:289
“However, it is well established in the case-law of the 
Court that expulsion by a Contracting State may give 
rise to an issue under Article 3, and hence engage the 
responsibility of the State under the Convention, where 
substantial grounds have been shown for believing that 
the person in question, if expelled, would face a real risk 
of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 in 
the receiving country. In these circumstances, Art. 3 
implies the obligation not to expel the person in ques-
tion to that country.“ 290
With this jurisprudence the ECtHR does not rely on 
an assumption that the expelling or returning state 
is responsible for the violation of rights in the receiv-
ing country. Rather, the non-refoulement principle 
is derived from the danger to a certain legally protect-
ed interest, in regard to which a duty to protect falls 
to the state in question.291 The point of departure for 
the legal judgement is therefore the action directly 
attributable to the state that exposes the person con-
cerned to the danger of a violation of the legally pro-
tected interest, and is thus an action that incurs liabil-
ity in accordance with the ECHR.292 The ECtHR has 
derived a duty to protect from especially grave infringe-
ments of fundamental rights through deportation, 
expulsion or extradition not only from Article 3 of the 
ECHR, but also from Article 2 (right to life) and Article 
6 (right to a fair trial293). Prohibitions of expulsion 
can also arise from Article 8 of the ECHR (right to 
respect for family and private life294) and from Article 
34 of the ECHR (right of individual application to the 
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ECtHR295). In accordance with the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR, the prohibition of extradition or expulsion in 
the face of threatening danger in the sense of Article 
3 of the ECHR arises from joint consideration of Arti-
cles 3 and 1 of the ECHR. The duty to protect therefore 
applies to all persons subject to the jurisdiction of a 
State Party.296 Although it has not yet been expressly 
decided by the ECtHR, legal scholars assume that the 
principle of non-refoulement deriving from Article 3 
of the ECHR also applies at the border.297 The activity 
of border guards in securing the border is clearly the 
fulfilment of a public task. In addition, according to 
the logic of the ECtHR in starting from the action 
through which the person concerned is exposed to a 
danger, there should be no difference if a person is 
exposed to torture because he or she has been deport-
ed from a country following illegal entry, or because 
he or she has been turned back at the border.298
From the ECtHR’s interpretation of the ECHR that takes 
as its starting point the individual’s need for protec-
tion, three pronounced lines of jurisprudence at the 
court regarding the principle of non-refoulement can 
be explained.
First, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence considers immaterial 
whether the danger threatening the person concerned 
directly or indirectly triggers the liability of state 
authorities in the receiving country.299 Article 3 of the 
ECHR also offers protection from the dangers of civil 
war, endangerment from private persons or groups not 
attributable to the state,300 or grave health risks inde-
pendent of existing responsibility of government 
295  ECtHR: Judgement of the Grand Chamber of 4 February 2005 (Mamatkulov and Askarov / Turkey), Application No 46827/99, 
46951/99, paras. 128, 129 – Violation of Article 34 of the ECHR through extradition during an active procedure before the ECtHR 
contrary to the recommendation of a provisional measure in accordance with Article 39 of the procedural code of the ECtHR.
296  ECtHR: Judgement of 17 December 1996 (Ahmed / Austria), Application No 25964/94, para. 39-40; ECtHR, Admissibility 
Decision of 7 March 2000 (T.I. / United Kingdom), Application No 43844/98, para. B8
297  Coleman (2003), p. 44; Hailbronner, (1999), pp. 617, 623; Maassen (1998), p. 108; Noll (2000), pp. 441-446; Ulmer (1996), 
p. 73, sees the issue as already having been settled by the ECtHR’s ruling in the Vilvarajah case; Vermeulen (2006), p. 427; 
Wiederin (2003), p. 43; and Ermacora (1994), p. 163.
298  Hailbronner, (1999), pp. 617, 623; Noll (2000), pp. 442-443.
299  ECtHR: Admissibility Decision of 7 March 2000 (T. I. / United Kingdom), Application No 43844/98, in reference to ECtHR: 
Judgement of the Grand Chamber of 29 April 1997 (H.L.R. / France), Application No 24573/94, paras. 39, 40.
300  ECtHR Judgement of 29 April 1997 (H.L.R. / France), Application No 24573/94, p. 163, para. 40; ECtHR Judgement of 17 
December 1996 (Ahmed / Austria), Application No 25964/94, paras. 43 ff.
301   ECtHR Judgement of 2 May 1997 (D. / United Kingdom), Application No 30240/96, para. 49. 
302   In this regard, for example: ECtHR Judgement of 2 May 1997 (D. / United Kingdom), Application No 30240/96, para. 49 with 
reference to older Judgements.
303  In favour: Kälin (1999), pp. 51-72; Frowein / Peukert-Frowein (1996), Article 3 of the ECHR, para. 23; Noll (2000), pp. 73 ff.; 
Zimmer (1998), pp. 115, 125; critical: Maassen (1997), pp. 117-124 and (1998), p. 115; German Federal Administrative 
Court, 9 C 38.96. For criticism of the open deviation of the German Federal Administrative Court from ECtHR jurisprudence, 
see Frowein (2002).
304  Rengeling / Szczekalla (2004), para. 859.
305  See Cassarino (2007).
306  ECtHR, Admissibility Decision of 7 March 2000 (T.I. / United Kingdom), Application No 43844/98.
authorities for these.301 Jurisprudence that the ECtHR302 
justifies with a requirement for the dynamic interpre-
tation of the ECHR has been assessed in different ways 
in literature and in German jurisprudence, including 
sharp criticism.303 However, the ECtHR has not devi-
ated from this jurisprudence. Through Article 19(2) of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, ECtHR jurispru-
dence for the EU is to be subsumed, so this argument 
has come to be regarded as trivial.304
Second, the liability of a State Party of the ECHR for 
the consequences of expulsion, deportation, or extra-
dition also extends to the danger of chain deportation. 
This means that prior to deportation, expulsion, or 
extradition, it must first be examined whether the 
receiving country will pass along the person to anoth-
er state in which he or she would be threatened by the 
dangers described. Even in the case of deportation to 
another signatory state of the ECHR, the deporting or 
expelling state must establish that the further transfer 
will not subject the person concerned to danger from 
an act that violates Article 3 of the ECHR. In view of 
planned or existing readmission agreements and infor-
mal arrangements305 on the readmission of third coun-
try nationals or the interception of shipwrecked per-
sons, it should be noted that according to the jurispru-
dence, ECHR-states cannot extricate themselves from 
their duty of examination, even through the conclu-
sion of international agreements on the distribution 
of responsibility for asylum procedures. This is also true 
even with regard to agreements arranged only among 
ECHR-states.306 In isolation, the fact that a state is 
willing to take back a person and formally fulfils the 
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requirements for protection from elementary violations 
of human rights, is not sufficient to negate the liabil-
ity of the expelling or extraditing state under the ECHR. 
Some draw the conclusion from this jurisprudence that 
safe third-country arrangements, absent a rebuttable 
presumption of the safety of the third country, violate 
the ECHR.307 
Third, the absoluteness of the prohibition of torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment from 
Article 3 of the ECHR also extends to the implicit non-
refoulement principle of the standard. As a result, 
weighing this against the possible threat to public 
security and order posed by the presence of a person 
in a given country is inadmissible.308 Accordingly, the 
danger of the looming overburdening of a state in the 
case of a mass wave of refugees also cannot serve to 
justify an expulsion, extradition, or deportation. Schol-
ars’ isolated instances of doubt about the absolute 
validity of the principle of non-refoulement at the bor-
der stemming from Article 3 of the ECHR, with a view 
to derived rights of access to territory and rights to 
remain,309 have no grounding whatsoever in ECtHR 
jurisdiction.
4. Duty to grant a right to remain pending  
the examination of the application
From the validity of the principle of non-refoulement 
at the border, as a rule, a basic obligation arises to 
allow entry to the person concerned, at least for the 
purpose of examining his or her application, and to 
guarantee his or her right to remain. A right to remain 
that protects the applicant’s elementary human rights 
in effectively can only be guaranteed within the state’s 
territory. This is also the assumption of the Asylum 
Procedures Directive, which, as a rule, grants appli-
cants the right to remain in the Member State, at its 
border, or in its transit zone pending the examination 
of the application.310
5. Exceptions to the duty to grant a right to 
remain pending an examination of the application 
in the case where a safe third country exists?
Against the background of the principle of non-
refoulement, other approaches would be theoretically 
conceivable only where and insofar as a country exists 
that accepts the applicant, and in which none of the 
discussed elementary violations of human rights 
threaten the applicant. This constellation corresponds 
to the safe third-country concept in the variant of so-
called “super-safe countries”, which, taking the Ger-
man example of a third-country arrangement as a 
model, has found entry into the Asylum Procedures 
Directive.311 Article 36(3) of the Asylum Procedures 
Directive establishes high requirements for the safety 
of the third country. Thus the third country must have 
ratified the ECHR and observe the legal provisions it 
contains, including the standards relating to effective 
legal remedies.312 The representatives of the Member 
States in the Council have not yet succeeded in assem-
bling a binding list of such super-safe third countries 
as foreseen by the Asylum Procedures Directive because 
currently no states outside the EU exist that fulfil the 
requirements and are not already attached to the Dub-
307   For example, see the presentation of the Viennese Provincial Government before the Austrian Constitutional Court, 
described in the judgement of the Constitutional Court on the Austrian asylum amendment of 15 October 2004, Reference 
No G 237, 238/03-35, p. 45.
308  ECtHR Judgement of 15 November 1996 (Chalal / United Kingdom), Application No 22414/93, para. 80: “The prohibition pro-
vided by Article 3 (art. 3) against ill-treatment is equally absolute in expulsion cases. Thus, whenever substantial grounds 
have been shown for believing that an individual would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 if 
removed to another State, the responsibility of the Contracting State to safeguard him or her against such treatment is 
engaged in the event of expulsion […]. In these circumstances, the activities of the individual in question, however undesir-
able or dangerous, cannot be a material consideration. The protection afforded by Article 3 is thus wider than that provided 
by Articles 32 and 33 of the United Nations 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees […]”.
309  Hailbronner (2007), Commentary on Article 18 of the German Asylum Procedures Law, para. 38.
310   Article 7(1) and 35(3)(a) of the Asylum Procedures Directive. It appears problematic insofar as Article 7(2) of the Directive 
holds open the possibility for Member States to make exceptions to this principle in the case of subsequent applications for 
asylum. In this regard, see, for example UNHCR (2005), p.10.
311   Article 36 of the Asylum Procedures Directive.
312   Article 36(2) of the Asylum Procedures Directive states:
  “A third country can only be considered as a safe third country for the purposes of paragraph 1 where:
  a) it has ratified and observes the provisions of the Geneva Convention without any geographical limitations;
  b) it has in place an asylum procedure prescribed by law;
   c) it has ratified the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and observes its 
provisions, including the standards relating to effective remedies; and
  d) it has been so designated by the Council in accordance with paragraph 3.”
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lin system.313 Therefore, on no account is return or 
rejection to a third country outside of the EU without 
any examination of the application currently under 
consideration. With a view to the Mediterranean 
neighbours and West African states, this also will not 
change in the medium-term.
Safe third-country arrangements without a rebuttable 
presumption of the safety of the third country enable 
rejection at the border without any examination of the 
application. Due to a dearth of current practical rele-
vance, the human rights conformity of such arrange-
ments will not be investigated here in detail. However, 
it should be noted that UNHCR took the position before 
the German Federal Constitutional Court that the cor-
responding provision in Article 16(a) of the Basic Law 
is in violation of international law,314 and it has never 
retracted this position. At the beginning of the EU har-
monisation process in 2000 the European Commission 
recommended, largely with a view to EU enlargement, 
that in the longer term the concept of safe third coun-
tries be reformed or abolished.315 The German Federal 
Constitutional Court considers a third-country arrange-
ment without a rebuttable presumption of the safety of 
the third country to be permissible so long as the 
adopted assessment of safety in the third country is 
accurate and exceptions are made for exceptional cir-
cumstances.316 Nevertheless, the international litera-
ture in the field remains very critical of the conformity 
of such third-country arrangements with international 
law317 – especially against the backdrop of ECtHR juris-
prudence that requires an individual examination.318
Yet some take the view that there is evidence for state 
practice in the fact that the third-country arrangement 
has become established in the EU Asylum Procedures 
Directive. In this opinion, according to the rules of 
international law, this state practice, in turn, must be 
drawn upon for the interpretation of the Refugee Con-
313   For example, Switzerland and Norway.
314   See the comments of UNHCR representative Koisser during the hearing in the German Bundestag on constitutional 
amendment, German Bundestag (1993), p. 30. UNHCR represented the view that the absence of the ability to rebut the 
presumption of the safety of a third country is not in line with the Geneva Refugee Convention also in the case on the 
amendment of the German Constitution before the Federal Constitutional Court. This fact is not revealed by the judgment 
of the Federal Constitutional Court, but rather by a later representation in Hailbronner (2000), p. 448, footnote 453.
315   EU, European Commission, COM (2000) 755, p. 8.
316   German Federal Constitutional Court: Judgement of 14 May 1996 (third-country arrangements), Reference No 2 BvR 1938, 
2315/93.
317   Zimmermann (1994), pp. 177-184; Wiederin (2003), p. 43; Goodwin-Gill / McAdam (2007), p. 400; Hathaway (2005),  
pp. 328, 329; Costello (2005), pp. 61 ff.
318  ECtHR: Admissibility Decision of 7 March 2000 (T. I. / United Kingdom), Application No 43844/98.
319  Hailbronner (2006), p. 724.
320  Article 31(3)(b).
321  Ipsen (1999), p. 119.
vention, which is unclear on the point.319 However, this 
view is unconvincing alone because the model of a 
third-country arrangement contained in the Asylum 
Procedures Directive has not been implemented for the 
legal reason that no safe third countries exist. Also 
weighing against this view is that according to Article 
6(2) of the EU Treaty, the EU is bound by EU funda-
mental rights, and Article 63 of the EC Treaty contains 
an obligation to enact EU secondary law in accordance 
with the Refugee Convention. It would be circular 
argumentation if one assumed that the shaping of EU 
secondary law could change or define the substantive 
legal criteria to which it is bound by EU primary law. 
In the scope of monitoring EU secondary law, the ECJ 
must consider the Geneva Refugee Convention. Thus, 
in future interpretation of the Refugee Convention 
binding for the EC is the ECJ’s responsibility. But nei-
ther the EU organs involved in legislating, nor the ECJ 
in its jurisprudence, have the right to develop their 
own, regional EU interpretation. Rather than a region-
al interpretation, as a minimum standard the EU must 
orientate itself to the international interpretation of 
the Refugee Convention and to the works of UNHCR.
Here it must be considered that according to the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) state prac-
tice can only be enlisted in the interpretation of a con-
vention if a unified practice of the States Parties can 
be determined, and which establishes the agreement 
of the parties regarding its interpretation.320 For the 
VCLT’s requirement of a uniform and common321 prac-
tice of the parties to the Refugee Convention, and of 
those to the ECHR, unity of practice among EU states 
would not alone suffice because the circle of States 
Parties is much broader for both. This is all the more 
so the case because a uniform and common use and 
practice of third-country arrangements among EU 
states would in effect mean a retreat of the EU states 
from burden sharing in the protection of refugees as 
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322   See para. 4 of the preamble of the Refugee Convention: “[…] considering that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy 
burdens on certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations has recognised the 
international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved without international co-operation.”
323   Heselhaus / Nowak-Heselhaus (2006), § 2, No 24.
324  EU, European Council (2007), Annex 1, para. 5. See also Articles I-9(2) and II-112(3) of the draft Treaty establishing  
a Constitution for Europe, signed in Rome on 29 October 2004.
325 Article 52 paragraph 3 of the EU Charta of Fundamental Rights.
326 Article 4(3) of the Qualification Directive.
327 Article 4(1) and 4(2) of the Asylum Procedures Directive.
328 Articles 10 and 12 of the Asylum Procedures Directive.
329  Regarding the conformity of this provision of the directive (Article 39(3) of the Asylum Procedures Directive) with 
fundamental rights, see the discussion in greater detail below, IV.1.2.2.
330   See Article 6(1) of the EU Treaty.
intended by the Refugee Convention.322 That this 
retreat would necessarily lead to a greater burden on 
other States Parties that do not belong to the EU, rath-
er argues against the assumption of a uniform and 
common practice.
As regards a possible violation posed by rules on safe 
third states against Article 3 of the ECHR in the form 
it has taken through the ECtHR, it should admittedly 
be considered that the ECJ does not rely on the ECHR 
as a source of law, but as a legal reference for EU fun-
damental rights, because the EU has not yet acceded 
to the ECHR. However, in its jurisprudence the ECJ has 
come to orientate itself directly to the jurisprudence 
of the ECtHR. In future, the jurisprudential coherence 
between the ECJ and the ECtHR will only be strength-
ened323 through a change in primary law, agreed in 
principle in June 2007.324 This anticipates the EU’s 
accession to the ECHR and legal force for the EU Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights, including its clause guar-
anteeing consonance with the ECHR as a minimum 
level of protection.325 In this respect, too, there is no 
room here for a “special interpretation” of the ECHR 
by the EU and its Member States.
6. Procedural guarantees and the right  
to effective legal remedy
The question of which procedural guarantees and legal 
redress must be granted when it comes to applications 
for international protection is of deciding practical 
importance for the implementation of border and 
migration controls, as well as for state operations of 
rescue at sea. For practical reasons, on a ship there can 
neither be special procedural guarantees, nor guaran-
tees implemented for legal remedies through inde-
pendent courts or other independent instances. If such 
obligations must be observed, the persons who are 
rendering an application for international protection 
in the territorial sea or at the sea border must there-
fore be allowed disembarkation and residence on dry 
land pending a decision on legal remedy.
According to the Asylum Procedures Directive, appli-
cations for international protection are to be examined 
individually,326 and in principle by a specialised asylum 
agency that offers a guarantee of competent and thor-
ough investigation of the application for internation-
al protection through the collection of relevant infor-
mation and the qualifications of its employees.327 In 
addition the Asylum Procedures Directive provides for 
other procedural guarantees, including: a personal 
interview, the use of an interpreter, the right of repre-
sentation through an attorney or other legal adviser,328 
and the right to contact UNHCR.
Beyond this, Article 39 of the Asylum Procedures Direc-
tive contains the principle that applicants have effec-
tive legal remedy before a court or tribunal. The direc-
tive leaves to national provisions of the Member States 
the form of legal remedy, including its suspensive 
effect and concomitant right to stay in the territory until 
a decision has been reached on the legal remedy.329
These and other procedural guarantees named in the 
Asylum Procedures Directive serve the implementation 
of the individual’s right to examination of the asylum 
application, contained in the Asylum Procedures Direc-
tive, as well as his or her right to protection from 
refoulement. Because they are necessary in assisting 
the person seeking protection in the implementation 
of his or her rights, they are in the first place an expres-
sion of the general principle of the rule of law, which 
is a founding constitutional principle of all EU Member 
States and also that of the EU.330 Additionally the pro-
cedural guarantees are an expression of the procedur-
al dimension of the protection of fundamental rights. 
The individual examination of applications is also pre-
scribed by Article 4 of the ECHR’s Fourth Optional Pro-
tocol, which forbids collective expulsion, and whose 
content also has been included in the EU Charter of 
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Fundamental Rights through Article 19(1). Inherent to 
every fundamental and human right is that the state 
that has a positive obligation to adopt appropriate 
measures, especially on procedural guarantuees, to 
enforce the substance of the right. The more severe 
the threatening human rights violation, the greater is 
the state’s duty to create appropriate procedural guar-
antees. The examination of applications for asylum and 
other applications for international protection also 
always serve protection from refoulement, and there-
fore from such severe human rights violations as 
infringement of life and freedom331 and torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.332 
Because these are the stakes, here there must be high 
standards for the form of procedural protection. These 
human rights requirements find their expression in the 
works of the UNHCR,333 multiple recommendations of 
the Parliamentary Assembly,334 the Committee of Min-
isters335 and the Human Rights Commissioner336 of the 
Council of Europe. Of crucial importance next to the 
procedural guarantees regarding the first-instance 
examination of an application for protection by the 
competent administrative agencies is the right to 
effective legal remedy that guarantees residence in the 
state territory until there is a decision on the legal 
remedy. This is underscored by the fact that in several 
EU states, 30-60 per cent of all asylum seekers are rec-
ognised as refugees only after examination of an ini-
tially negative decision.337
In the case Jabari / Turkey, in which a violation of Arti-
cle 3 of the ECHR by expulsion and deportation was at 
issue, the European Court of Human Rights found:
“In the Court´s opinion, given the irreversible nature of 
the harm that might occur if the risk of torture or ill-
treatment alleged materialised and the importance 
331   Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, Art. 6 ICCPR.
332   Article 3 of the ECHR, Article 7 of the ICCPR, Article 3 of the CAT, Article 19(2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
333   See especially: UNHCR (1979), Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, Executive Committee, 
Conclusion No 8 (XXVIII), Determination of Refugee Status (1977), and Conclusion No 30 (XXXIV) The Problem of Manifestly 
Unfounded or Abusive Applications for Refugee Status or Asylum (1983); UNHCR (2003), Aide Memoire; UNHCR (2005).
334   For example: European Council, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendations 1163 (1991); 1309 (1996); 1327 (1997); 1440 (2000).
335   Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation No R (94) 5; No R (98) 13; No R (98) 15.
336   See, for example: Thomas Hammarberg (30.01.2006): Viewpoint – Seeking asylum is human right, not a crime.
337   UNHCR (30.04.2004). UNHCR regrets missed opportunity to adopt high EU asylum standards.
338   ECtHR: Judgement of 11 July 2000 (Jabari / Turkey), Application No 40035/98, para. 50.
339  ECtHR: Judgement of 12 May 2000 (Khan / United Kingdom), Application No 35394/97 para. 44 ff.; Judgement of 5 February 
2002 (Cˇonka / Belgium), Application No 51564/99, para. 75. For further detail and analysis, see Grabenwarter (2005), pp. 350 ff.
340 ECtHR: Judgement of 3 September 2004 (Bati and Others / Turkey), Application No 33097/96 and 57834/00, para. 135.
341   ECtHR: Judgement of 5 February 2002 (Cˇonka / Belgium), Application No 51564/99, para. 75. 
342 ECtHR: Judgement of 8 July 2003 (Hatton and Others / United Kingdom), Application No 36022/97, para. 141-142.
343 See Wiederin (2003), pp. 39-43.
344 ECtHR: Judgement of 6 March 2001 (Hilal / United Kingdom), Application No 45276/99, para. 67-68.
345 ECtHR: Judgement of 11 July 2000 (Jabari / Turkey), Application No 40035/98), para. 40.
which attaches to Article 3, the notion of an effective 
remedy under Article 13 requires independent and rig-
orous scrutiny of a claim that there exist substantial 
grounds for fearing a real risk of treatment contrary to 
Article 3 and the possibility of suspending the imple-
mentation of the measure impugned.“ 338 
Article 13 of the Convention guarantees the availabil-
ity at national level of a remedy before a court or oth-
er independent and impartial body to enforce the sub-
stance of the Convention rights and freedoms.339 The 
authority whose decision is being reviewed may not 
decide in the procedure of review.340 The remedy must 
be effective in law and in practice. It has to deal with 
the substance of an “arguable complaint” under the 
Convention and to grant appropriate relief.341 An 
examination for violation of concepts of national law 
like irrationality, unlawfulness the law or inadmissi-
bility does not suffice.342 In connection with appeals 
of extraditions or expulsions in which a violation of 
Article 3 of the ECHR is alleged, the ECtHR requires an 
extremely thorough review.343 Furthermore, in isolated 
cases, the ECtHR has ruled in favour of the appellant 
on the question of the existence of an internal protec-
tion alternative. Also with regard to the credibility of 
the applicant’s allegation, it has come to a different 
conclusion than that of the respondent state.344 As 
far as the violation of such fundamental guarantees 
as the right to life from Article 2 and the prohibition 
of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment, the ECtHR has regarded particular deadline 
or form requirements for the remedy as violating the 
Convention.345 
Of particular importance is that in these cases the 
ECtHR has regarded the implementation of deporta-
tion as violating the Convention, and thus views as 
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compulsory the opportunity of suspensive effect of the 
legal remedy.346 
The right to an effective remedy in accordance with 
Article 13 of the ECHR presupposes an arguable com-
plaint. This precondition excludes appeals that are not 
adequately substantiated or improper. The ECtHR has 
not yet defined the requirement in the abstract347 and 
in the implementation of the obligation of Article 13 
of the ECHR has afforded ECHR states some discretion 
as to the manner in which they conform to their obli-
gations.348 But, also in a case where national law qual-
ifies an application for asylum or appeal as “manifestly 
unfounded”, an “arguable complaint” in the sense of 
Article 13 of the ECHR can apply, which must be exam-
ined on the merits. The ECtHR examines on the basis 
of each of possible ECHR right individually whether an 
appeal can be considered an “arguable complaint”.349
In their “Twenty Guidelines on Forced Return”, in 2005 
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
also confirmed the right to an effective legal remedy 
with a suspensive effect on a removal order.350
As a rule, expulsion without the guarantee of legal 
remedy with suspensive effect is not effective in prac-
tice and moreover makes it impossible for the person 
concerned realize the right to individual petition with 
the ECHR or a treaty body of the UN human rights 
treaties, especially if the danger of torture and inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment is realised 
following expulsion. Both the ECtHR and the UN Com-
mittee against Torture have determined that the 
absence of suspensive effect of a legal remedy can simul-
taneously amount to a violation of the individual right 
to file an application or petition with the ECtHR (Arti-
cle 34 of the ECHR) or the UN Committee against Tor-
ture (Article 22 of the UN Convention against Torture).351
346  See the Admissibility Decision of the ECtHR already cited above: Judgement of 11 July 2000 (Jabari / Turkey), Application No 
40035/98), para. 50, and most recently: Judgement of 11 January 2007 (Salah Sheek / Netherlands), Application No 1948/04, 
para. 153, ECtHR: Judgement of 26 April 2007 (Gebremedhin [Geberamadhien] / France), Application No 25389/05, para. 66.
347 Grabenwarter (2005), p. 355.
348 ECtHR: Judgement of 5 February 2002 (Cˇonka / Belgium), Application No 51564/99, para. 79.
349 ECtHR: Judgement of 20.6.2002 (Al-Nashif / Bulgaria), Application No 50963/99, para. 131-132.
350  Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers (2005), Twenty Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of Europe on forced 
return, guidelines 2 and 5.
351   See ECtHR: Judgement of 4 February 2005 (Mamatkulov and Askarov / Turkey), Application Nos 46827/99 and 46951/99, 
para. 102; UN, CAT (2006), Doc. A/61/44, p. 36.
352 For more detail, see Heselhaus / Nowak-Nowak (2006), para. 51; Brouwer (2005), pp. 221-222.
353 ECtHR: Judgement of 27 February 2007, Case C-354/04 P, para. 56.
354  On the obligation to carry out discretionary leeway in compliance with fundamental rights: ECJ: Judgement of 27 June 2006, 
Case C-540/03, paras. 22-23 and 105.
355 See below, Part 5(I)(2). For the application of the provision at the border see next chapter, (7).
There exists at EU level an EU fundamental right to an 
effective remedy before a tribunal352 that is also bind-
ing on Member States when they are implementing 
EU Law. Since the 1980s this has developed in the ECJ’s 
jurisprudence and also has been established in Article 
47(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The 
ECJ has just recently confirmed again its jurisprudence, 
according to which, “it is for the Member States and, 
in particular, their courts and tribunals, to interpret and 
apply national procedural rules governing the exercise 
of rights of action in a way that enables natural and 
legal persons to challenge before the courts the lawful-
ness of any decision or other national measure relating 
to the drawing up of an act of the European Union or 
to its application to them and to seek compensation for 
any loss suffered.” 353
Against the backdrop of ECtHR jurisprudence, the works 
of the UN Committee against Torture and the EU fun-
damental right to effective remedy, it is highly disturb-
ing that Article 39 of the Asylum Procedures Directive 
leaves to the national arrangements of Member States 
the form of the prescribed legal remedy, including its 
suspensive effect and attendant right to stay in the 
territory until a decision has been reached on the legal 
remedy. Because the legal appeal of the rejection of appli-
cations for asylum lies in the scope of application of EU 
fundamental rights, the Member States are bound by 
European as well as international law to construe their 
discretion in the arrangement of the legal remedy in such 
a way that national law enables remedies with sus-
pensive effect in conformity with fundamental rights, 
as described.354 National arrangements that envisage 
a legal remedy without the possibility of creating sus-
pensive effect are in any case irreconcilable with EU fun-
damental rights, the ECHR and the Convention against 
Torture. On the question of whether Article 39(3) of the 
Asylum Procedures Directive itself violates EU fundamen-
tal rights and what consequences this has, see below.355
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7. Admissibility of reducing procedural guaran-
tees and legal remedies in border procedures?
As a result of political compromise at the end of near-
ly five years of negotiations in the Justice and Home 
Affairs Council (JHA), the Asylum Procedures Directive 
contains a provision on special procedures for decid-
ing on asylum applications at the border or in transit 
zones.356 Special border procedures introduced after 1 
December 2005 must adhere to the essential proce-
dural guarantees that are contained in the general 
Chapter II of the Directive. But in such procedures, the 
application does not have to be examined by a spe-
cialised Asylum authority. According to the Directive, 
it suffices if the personnel of the competent authority 
have appropriate knowledge or necessary training that 
allows them to fulfil their duties in the implementa-
tion of the directive.357 The provision apparently intends 
to enable border guard authorities to examine asylum 
applications. In contrast to the otherwise responsible 
specialised asylum authorities, the authorities respon-
sible for the border procedure are not required to col-
lect and have available accurate and current informa-
tion from various sources, such as the UNHCR, about 
states of origin or transit. Rather, it suffices for these 
authorities to access general information needed to 
fulfil their task, through the asylum authority or in 
other ways.358
According to the Directive, the Member States may 
also maintain border procedures for deciding on per-
mission of entry.359 Also in these procedures, no spe-
cialised asylum authority must make the decision. 
Additionally, the Directive only prescribes rudimentary 
procedural guarantees (remaining in-country until the 
decision on the application, informing about rights and 
duties, use of an interpreter, interview by a person 
“with appropriate knowledge of the relevant standards 
applicable in the field of asylum and refugee law”,360 
and consultation with an attorney). According to its 
wording, in these cases the Directive grants no right 
356 Article 35 of the Asylum Procedures Directive.
357 Article 35(1) taken together with Article 4(1), 4(2)(e) and 4(3) of the Asylum Procedures Directive.
358 Article 8(3) of the Asylum Procedures Directive.
359 Article 35(2) of the Asylum Procedures Directive.
360 Article 35(3)(d) of the Asylum Procedures Directive.
361   For “normal” procedures, these guarantees are found in Articles 8(2)(a), 10(1)(c), 15(3) and 15(10)(e) in connection with 
Article 9(2) of the Asylum Procedures Directive.
362 Article 35(3) (at the end) of the Asylum Procedures Directive.
363 Article 35(3)(a) of the Asylum Procedures Directive.
364 Kokott (1996), p. 570.
365  ECtHR: Judgement of 25 June 1996 (Amuur / France), Application No 19776/92; German Federal Constitutional Court: 
Judgement of 14.05.1996, Reference No 2 BvR 1516/93.
366 ECtHR: Judgement of 26 April 2007 (Gebremedhin [Geberamadhien] / France), Application No 25389/05, para. 66.
to individual, objective and impartial examination of 
the application, no right to take up contact with the 
UNHCR, no right to legal representation, and no right 
to a written decision with advice on applicable legal 
remedies with regard to the denial of the application 
or refusal of admittance.361 The Directive prescribes 
only that the authority give (orally and in any lan-
guage) the factual and legal grounds for which it con-
siders the asylum application to be unfounded or inad-
missible.362 In border procedures, too, it lies with the 
Member States to regulate the suspensive effect of the 
appeal against such rejections.
As presented above, the principle of non-refoulement 
is also valid at the border. That permission of entry is 
to be decided in the border procedures maintained by 
Member States does not mean that in these cases the 
applicant finds himself or herself outside of the terri-
tory of the state in question. Also in border procedures, 
the Directive guarantees applicants a safe stay at the 
border or in a transit zone until there has been a deci-
sion on the application.363 This directly presupposes a 
stay in the state territory. Even if the respective national 
legal structure only envisages the stay at the border 
or in the transit zone for the determination on approval 
of entry, this does not affect the obligations of Mem-
ber States arising from the Refugee Convention and 
the human rights treaties to guarantee the persons in 
these areas the treaty rights to which they are entitled. 
Neither the transit zone of an airport nor other inter-
national zones are facilities in which a legal no-man’s 
land exists.364 In their decisions on airport procedures 
both the ECtHR and the German Federal Constitutional 
Court measure detention in the transit area against the 
ECHR and Constitution, respectively.365 In April 2004 
the ECtHR explicitely confirmed, that Art. 13 of the ECHR 
requires a remedy with automatic suspensive effect 
also in cases concerning the rejection of requests for 
leave to enter a country and asylum applications at the 
border366. In this case the ECtHR held that there had 
been a violation of Article 13 ECHR despite the fact, 
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that, following to an interim measure pursuant to Rule 
39 of the Rules of the ECtHR, the applicant had been 
granted leave to enter and refugee status later on. 
The UN Committee against Torture also has taken the 
express position that Article 3 of the UN Convention 
against Torture requires the suspensive effect of legal 
remedies.367 Additionally, the UN Human Rights Com-
mittee has confirmed that asylum applicants who are 
only in the country for the purpose of having their asy-
lum applications examined, also have a right to an effec-
tive appeal in accordance with Article 13 of the ICCPR.368
The lack of clearly regulated guarantees of legal rem-
edy in EU law with regard to denials of entry has been 
frequently criticised.369 Boeles, Brouwer, Woltjer and 
Alfenaar have presented a recommendation for a Euro-
pean legal arrangement for legal remedy, which goes 
far beyond refugee protection in its meaning.370
The procedural guarantees named above, which 
according to the Directive are not to be binding – for 
instance a decision by a specialised authority, the pos-
sibility of representation by an attorney, or contact 
with the UNHCR – are of critical importance for the 
realization of the right to international protection. The 
refusal of contact with the UNHCR also violates Arti-
cle 35 of the Refugee Convention, which obligates the 
States Parties to cooperate with the UNHCR, and to 
ease its task of overseeing the implementation of the 
Convention. Especially grave is the absence of a duty 
to issue written decisions on the applications for pro-
tection, and to accompany these with advice on appli-
cable legal remedies. This not only in effect makes it 
impossible to seek legal remedy in the Member State 
in question, but also thwarts the rights to individual 
367  See in the commentary to the French country report: “While noting that, following the entry into force of the Act of 30 
June 2000, a decision on the refoulement of a person (refusal of admission) may be the subject of an interim suspension 
order or an interim injunction, the Committee is concerned that these procedures are non-suspensive, in that the decision 
to refuse entry may be enforced ex officio by the administration after the appeal has been filed but before the judge has 
taken a decision on the suspension of the removal order (art. 3). The Committee reiterates its recommendation (A/53/44, 
para. 145) that a refoulement decision (refusal of admission) that entails a removal order should be open to a suspensive 
appeal that takes effect the moment the appeal is filed. The Committee also recommends that the State party should take 
the necessary measures to ensure that individuals subject to a removal order have access to all existing remedies, including 
referral of their case to the Committee against Torture under article 22 of the Convention.” (UN, Committee against Torture 
(2006), Doc. A/61/44, p. 36).
368  Article 13 of the ICCPR states: “An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present Covenant may be expelled 
therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall, except where compelling reasons of 
national security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the reasons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed 
by, and be represented for the purpose before, the competent authority or a person or persons especially designated by the 
competent authority.”
369 See Brouwer (2005); Cholewinski (2005).
370  Boeles / Brouwer / Woltjer / Alfenaar (2005).
371  See below, Part 5(I)(2).
petition contained in the ECHR and several UN human 
rights treaties.
In conclusion, human rights do not allow a downgrad-
ing of guarantees of procedure and legal remedy in 
border procedures. In this respect, very substantial 
doubts exist concerning the conformity of Articles 35 
and 39 of the Asylum Procedures Directive with EU 
fundamental rights. Next to the question of the sus-
pensive effect of the legal remedy it is especially 
 dubious that the Directive allows the Member States 
to maintain border procedures that from a human 
rights perspective have completely inadequate proce-
dural guarantees. It is in any case impermissible both 
according to international law, and, with regard to EU 
fundamental rights, according to EU law, if the Member 
States actually reduce procedural guarantees in border 
procedures to the minimum intended in the Directive, 
and do not provide for the suspensive effect of a legal 
remedy. The question of the conformity with EU Fun-
damental Rights of the Directive’s provisions them-
selves will be dealt with later.371 The form of procedural 
safeguards and legal remedies for applications for inter-
national protection that are submitted at the border 
is naturally not only of importance at maritime bor-
ders, but also for applications for international protec-
tion that are submitted at land borders or at airports.
8. Conclusion for the examination of applications 
for international protection at land or maritime 
borders, or in the territorial sea
As shown, the non-refoulement principle must also be 
respected at the border. International human and EU 
fundamental rights require that the enforceability of 
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the non-refoulement principle be secured through pro-
cedural law and rights to effective legal remedy. Espe-
cially required then, are a thorough, individual, and 
substantive examination of the application; the right 
to legal representation; the right to contact with the 
UNHCR; and an effective legal remedy with suspensive 
effect that enables a stay in-country pending a deci-
sion on the appeal. Because from a human rights per-
spective the severity and potentially irreversible nature 
of the harms through expulsion are decisive, there is 
no room for a limitation of the guarantees of proce-
dure and legal remedy at the border.
For practical reasons, the discussed requirements for 
procedures and legal remedy can not be observed on 
a ship. For that reason, if applications for internation-
al protection are submitted at the maritime border or 
in the territorial sea of a coastal state, the applicants 
are to be allowed disembarkation and a stay on dry 
land pending a decision on legal remedy.
III. Human rights obligations beyond  
EU maritime borders (high seas and  
the territorial sea of third states) 
This chapter will examine the obligations of EU Mem-
ber States in cases where vessels beyond EU maritime 
borders operate in border patrols or search and rescue 
missions carried out by the state, or on behalf of the 
state. This examination is prompted by the following 
current developments: first, the development of ele-
ments of EU border management strategy that are 
directed toward pre-border controls;372 second, reports 
and evidence proving that individual Member States are 
already undertaking such pre-border controls, which are 
also being coordinated by FRONTEX;373 and third, the 
fact that Member States apparently do not uniformly 
assess the question of human rights obligations in 
these situations, especially the existence of obligations 
stemming from the principle of non-refoulement.374
The operations whose conformity with human rights 
is especially in question are so-called interception 
372  See EU, Council of the European Union, Doc. No 15445/03, paras. 14-22; Council, Doc. No 13559/06, para. 5 No 2; EU, 
Council of the European Union, Doc. No. 11490/1/03, CIVIPOL study, p. 75. See above Part 2 (II) (3).
373 See above Part 1 (II) (4) and (6).
374 EU, European Commission, COM (2006) 733, para. 34. See above Part 1 (II) (3).
375 EU, European Commission, SEC (2007) 691, p. 20. See above Part 3 (II) (3) and (4).
376 See above Part 3 (II)(3).
measures, meaning the catching, turning back, diver-
sion, or escorting back of ships. Additionally, in con-
nection with pre-border controls, the general question 
arises whether beyond their state borders the Member 
States are bound by other fundamental and human 
rights in the implementation of border controls, for 
example the right to life and physical integrity. 
The examination of human rights obligations in the 
implementation of migration-control measures on 
high seas, including the contiguous zone, does not 
touch on the question of the admissibility of such con-
trols in accordance with international sea and mari-
time law. Any human rights obligations are binding on 
Member States regardless of the admissibility of those 
measures under international sea and maritime law. 
The exercise of coercive measures against ships under 
foreign flag in connection with border or migration 
controls on high seas is not compatible with current 
international sea and maritime law. In this respect, 
exceptions exist only for the contiguous zone, in which 
the coastal state may carry out limited rights of con-
trol in order to enforce observance of its immigration 
laws or to punish infringements of these.375
The examination assumes that in practice there is a 
mixed group of migrants on ships, so refugees and 
other persons in need of international protection, as 
well as other migrants who upon return to their coun-
try of origin would not face the danger of persecution 
or severe human rights violations. The examination 
also assumes that, in accord with current political real-
ity and legal situation, states outside of the EU that 
could be enlisted are not safe third countries in the sense 
of Article 36 of the Asylum Procedures Directive.
1. Duty to examine an application for interna-
tional protection
1.1 Contiguous zone of an EU state
The contiguous zone is part of the high sea, in which 
in principle of freedom of navigation applies.376 Accord-
ing to Article 33(1) of the UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea from 1982 (UNCLOS), the coastal state may 
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exercise the control necessary in the contiguous zone 
to enforce observance of its customs, fiscal, immigra-
tion or sanitary laws, or to punish infringement of 
these.
According to Article 3 of the Asylum Procedures Direc-
tive, all applications for asylum that are made “in the 
territory, including at the border or in the transit 
zones”,377 are to be examined. At the same time, all 
applications for international protection are to be con-
sidered applications for asylum, unless the applicant 
explicitly requests another kind of protection for which 
a separate procedure is available.378 For the examina-
tion of applications for international protection made 
in the contiguous zone or on high seas, the Directive 
does not contain clear guidelines. In this regard, the 
question is raised of whether the formulation “at the 
border” also incorporates such applications for inter-
national protection that are made at pre-border con-
trols. The linkage of the provision on the Directive’s 
scope of application with the term “territory” suggests 
a conclusion that in principle the Directive does not 
obligate Member States to examine applications for 
international protection on high seas or in the terri-
tory of third countries. Because, however, the Member 
States’ immigration controls, in accordance with their 
control rights in the contiguous zone, regularly take 
place along the maritime border – both in the territo-
rial sea and the contiguous zone – it must be assumed 
that the term “at the border” also includes the patrols 
of border protection ships or government ships involved 
in rescue at sea when they are in the contiguous zone. 
Therefore, according to the Asylum Procedures Direc-
tive, applications for international protection made in 
the contiguous zone are to be examined by the Mem-
ber States. In case the criteria for a right to interna-
tional protection, especially those provided for in the 
Qualification Directive, are fulfilled, this protection is 
to be granted for applications made in the contiguous 
zone just as for applications made on the state terri-
tory or in the territorial sea.
In conclusion, the Asylum Procedures Directive obli-
gates the Member States to examine applications for 
international protection made along the maritime bor-
ders, in the territorial sea and in the contiguous zone. 
377 Article 3 of the Asylum Procedures Directive.
378 Article 2(b) of the Asylum Procedures Directive.
379 See previous chapter.
380  EU, Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community 
Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (OJ (2006) L 105, p.1).
381  Article 3(b) of the Schengen Borders Code.
382 Article 13(3) of the Schengen Borders Code. On the non-conformity of this provision with fundamental rights, see below, Part 5.
These applications are to be examined and weighed 
according to the same criteria as applications made 
in-country or at a land border.
1.2 Remaining high seas and foreign territorial sea
This chapter will examine the obligations that exist for 
an act on high seas, including the contiguous zones 
and the territorial sea of southern Mediterranean 
neighbours and West African states.
1.2.1 Obligations arising from EU secondary law
The Asylum Procedures Directive has no application 
beyond state borders, with exception of the contigu-
ous zone.379 The Schengen Borders Code380, however, is 
also applicable to immigration controls that take place 
beyond the territorial sea and contiguous zone, on high 
seas or in the territory of third states.
The Schengen Borders Code applies to all persons who 
cross the external border of a Member State. According 
to the Code, immigration controls are to be carried out 
without prejudice to the rights of refugees and persons 
seeking international protection, especially with regard 
to non-refoulement.381 At the same time, while the 
Borders Code anticipates that a right of appeal against 
denials of entry must be guaranteed, it determines that 
such a right of appeal has no suspensive effect.382
The reference to the rights of refugees and persons 
seeking international protection represents a reference 
to the legal acts of EU law on asylum and refugee mat-
ters, for example the Asylum Procedures Directive, as 
well as to an obligation of the Member States under 
EU law to protect other human rights obligations, 
especially the principle of non-refoulement. Despite 
the absence of detailed guidelines in the Schengen 
Borders Code, both are encapsulated by the scope of 
EU fundamental rights, and therefore, subject to judi-
cial control by the ECJ.
As arises from the annexes to the Schengen Borders 
Code, the scope of application of the Borders Code 
includes controls of persons that are conducted beyond 
the state border. For example, to ease high-speed pas-
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senger train travel, the explicit possibility of conducting 
border controls in agreement with a third country, at 
train stations of that third country, is foreseen.383 With 
regard to controls at maritime borders, the Borders Code 
does not stand in the way of the conducting of border 
controls and the applicability of the Borders Code.
Annex VI of the Schengen Borders Code states:
“3.1. General checking procedures on maritime traffic 
3.1.1. Checks on ships shall be carried out at the port of 
arrival or departure, on board ship or in an area set aside 
for the purpose, located in the immediate vicinity of the 
vessel. However, in accordance with the agreements 
reached on the matter, checks may also be carried out 
during crossings or, upon the ship’s arrival or departure, 
in the territory of a third country.”
The provision is very open and at first glance not pre-
cisely formulated. From the placement of the commas 
in the first sentence (also present in the German and 
French versions) it arises, however, that the carrying 
out of border controls on board ship is not limited to 
the area of the port of arrival or departure. Rather, 
according to the wording, it is independent of the posi-
tioning of the ship in a certain maritime zone. A border 
guard ship could also be subsumed under the “area” 
(which is described as “Anlage” in the German version 
and “zone” in the French version) foreseen for the bor-
der controls in the first sentence. The second sentence, 
however, binds border controls during crossings or in 
the territory of a third country to “agreements reached 
on the matter,”, by which iit can be assumed is meant 
the international agreements on the law of the sea as 
well as bilateral agreements with coastal states out-
side of the EU. 
The Schengen Borders Code is therefore also applicable 
to immigration controls that take place beyond the 
territorial sea and contiguous zone, on high seas or in 
the territory of third states. But it makes the admis-
sibility of such border controls dependent on compat-
ibility with the provisions of international law. The pro-
visions of the Schengen Borders Code with which 
human rights obligations at border controls are con-
cerned384 are not differentiated according to where the 
border controls take place. Therefore the obligations of 
383 Annex IV, No 1.2.2. of the Schengen Borders Code.
384 Articles 3 and 6 of the Schengen Borders Code.
385  Goodwin-Gill / McAdam (2007), p. 246; Hathaway (2005), p. 335 ff.; Lauterpacht / Bethlehem (2003), p. 110-111;  
for other views, see, for example Maassen (1997), p. 97 who even denies any applicability of the principle of non-
refoulement stemming from the Refugee Convention at the border.
Member States under EU law, arising from the Schen-
gen Borders Code, to protect the rights of refugees and 
persons seeking international protection, especially 
with regard to non-refoulement, also extend to border 
controls conducted on high seas and the territorial sea 
of third states.
The reference in the Schengen Borders Code to obliga-
tions stemming from the principle of non-refoulement 
does not substantiate a new obligation, but rather simply 
refers to existing human rights commitments. Of deci-
sive importance therefore is what content the principle 
of non-refoulement, anchored in international law and 
in EU fundamental rights, has, and whether its desired 
effect is displayed on high seas, as well as in the con-
tiguous zones and the territorial sea of third countries 
if officials of the EU Member States are active there in 
the course of border protection or rescue at sea.
1.2.2 Obligations arising from the prohibition of 
refoulement in the Geneva Refugee Convention
Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention states:
“Prohibition of expulsion or return (‘refoulement’) 
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) 
a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of 
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened 
on account of his race, religion, nationality, member-
ship of a particular social group or political opinion.”
Whether the principle of non-refoulement in the Ref-
ugee Convention is also binding beyond state borders 
is controversial. In any case, the extra-territorial valid-
ity does not unambiguously emerge from the wording 
of the provision. However, the provision’s wording 
favours a broad interpretation, in that it not only for-
bids an expulsion, but also a “return”, and indeed “in 
any manner whatsoever”. A broad interpretation also 
includes, among other things, the set of circumstances 
of a rejection through an operation taken beyond the 
border.385 Also supporting an application independent 
of the place where the return is ordered is the fact that 
the formulation chosen refers to the forbidden return 
“to the frontiers of the territories” where dangers 
threaten, and not to the borders of the States Parties 
over which a return will occur.
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386 Article 31 of the VCLT.
387 See, for example, Lauterpacht / Bethlehem (2003), pp. 159-160.
388  See, for example, the case of toppled Argentinean dictator Peron, who fled to a foreign warship off Buenos Aires in 1956. 
For details on the whole episode, see Kimminich (1962), pp. 111 ff.
389 In this regard, see also Noll (2005), p. 552.
390  Senior employees of FRONTEX report that patrols in Libyan territorial sea have not been able to be carried out for lack of 
Libyan agreement. The patrols of border guard ships under the flag of an EU State in the course of a FRONTEX operation 
then had to take place outside of the Libyan territorial sea.
391   See below Part 4 (III)(1.2.3) and (III)(1.2.4).
392  Goodwin-Gill / McAdam (2007), p. 385.
Next to the ordinary meaning a determination inherits 
from its context, an international treaty, according to 
the VCLT, is to be interpreted in light of its object and 
purpose.386 Independent of whether one views Article 
33 of the Refugee Convention with the antiquated 
view as a mere duty of the state, through which a legal 
reflex of individual protection is triggered, or one takes 
a newer view along with UNHCR that Article 33(1) of 
the Refugee Convention attaches directly the character 
of individual protection, the purpose of the provision 
is the protection from severe human rights violations 
of the circle of persons concerned. An interpretation 
in accordance with the treaty’s purpose of refugee pro-
tection in general, and Article 33 of the Refugee Con-
vention in particular, would therefore suggest a choice 
of permissible interpretation within the confines of the 
wording that best enables the guarantee of protection.
Accordingly, an extra-territorial applicability would be 
especially presumed if the classic state function of border 
control is consciously and purposefully pre-placed 
beyond the maritime borders. In this context, the argu-
ment gains in importance that with the interpretation 
of a treaty in view of its objective and purpose, a pur-
poseful shift in state activity beyond state borders does 
not lead to a release from treaty duties.387
At most, alternatives could be valid if other internatio-
nal law, for example rules of international customary 
law on state sovereignty, opposed the extra-territorial 
application of the principle of non-refoulement. This 
could be the case were the grant of protection by a 
State Party of the Refugee Convention practiced in the 
territorial sea, and therefore in the territory, of another 
state without its approval. Such situations are dis-
cussed in older works on international law in connection 
with the granting of asylum to toppled dictators on 
foreign warships. These result in establishing that the 
particular Flag State has no right to grant asylum in 
foreign the territorial sea because the granting of pro-
tection there conflicts with the sovereign rights and 
interests of the coastal state.388
The set of circumstances in question today, however, 
is quite different in nature. Today, patrols, migration 
controls and operations of rescue at sea take place on 
high seas. In these cases, no foreign sovereign rights 
whatsoever conflict with application of the non-
refoulement principle because these don’t exist on high 
seas. Therefore there is no cause at all for restricted 
application of Article 33 of the Refugee Convention.389 
The second relevant set of circumstances in today’s 
practice is the following: one or more EU States, part-
ly in the framework of FRONTEX operations and in con-
formity with EU strategy on border protection, carry 
out border controls in the territorial sea of the neigh-
bouring southern Mediterranean countries or West 
African states. Such patrols or migration-control mea-
sures are neither legally nor practically possible with-
out the consent of the coastal state. As a rule, this 
consent is based on formal or informal arrangements 
under international law in the granting of privileges in 
return for the interception, control and rescue mea-
sures of EU states.390 Due to these agreements under 
international law, there exists, however no collision 
with the sovereign rights of the coastal state. More-
over, the granting of protection by EU-states also does 
not lie in opposition to the interests of neighbouring 
southern Mediterranean countries or West African 
states, but is rather in the interest of these states that 
are relatively poor in comparison to the EU, and in the 
best case have at their disposal a weakly developed 
system of refugee protection. Also in this regard there 
exists no cause for a restrictive interpretation of the 
Geneva Refugee Convention. In these situations the 
Refugee Convention is not applicable, however, to citi-
zens of the coastal state. This arises from the definition 
of the term “refugee” according to Article 1(A) of the 
Refugee Convention, according to which the person in 
question must have left his or her country to fall into 
the Convention’s scope of application. In this respect, 
it is important to note that the prohibitions on refoule-
ment stemming from the human rights treaties391 are 
also applicable if the person concerned has not (yet) 
left his or her country.392
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In opposition to an application of the principle of non-
refoulement beyond state borders, an historical argu-
ment is most commonly raised: that the acceptance of 
the validity of the principle of non-refoulement beyond 
state borders amounts to the imposition of a duty to 
admit refugees, which – verifiable by way of the travaux 
préparatoire of the Refugee Convention – is precisely 
not that which was supposed to have been agreed. In 
1993 the US Supreme Court found in the case of Sale 
v. Haitian Centers Council that national law and the 
Refugee Convention do not commit the States Parties 
to the granting of protection from refoulement on high 
seas.393 The issue at hand in this case was the picking 
up of persons seeking protection in international waters 
and their return to Haiti. The interpretation of the his-
tory of origins of the Convention that lies at the base 
of this argumentation can be accepted, but not the 
argument itself. To be considered in this regard is first, 
that according to Article 32 of the VCLT, the prepara-
tory work and the circumstances surrounding the con-
clusion of a treaty can be called on only then and in 
complement to the interpretation: if they confirm an 
interpretation reached by other methods; if the inter-
pretation by other methods leaves the meaning ambigu-
ous or obscured; or if the interpretation leads to obvi-
ously nonsensical or unreasonable results (which can 
not be approved of here). In any case, a reference to 
the history of the treaty’s origins does not create an 
unambiguously clarifying indication that extra-terri-
torial applicability is ruled out. It may be correct that 
agreement could not be reached on the standardisa-
tion of a individual right to asylum and access to terri-
tory. However, the travaux préparatoires simultaneous-
ly substantiate the primary humanitarian goal of the 
Refugee Convention: to forbid actions and omissions 
that lead to a refoulement to areas in which the life 
or the freedom of a person is endangered.394
This US Supreme Court decision, in any case, has no 
influence on existing obligations under international 
393  US Supreme Court: Judgment from 21 January 1993, Reference No 509, US 155.
394  See UNHCR, Advisory Opinion (2007), para. 30 with further references.
395  Goodwin-Gill / McAdam (2007), p. 248.
396  Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Case 10.675, Haitian Center for Human Rights v. United States, Report No 51/96, 
Inter-Am. CHR Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 Doc. 7 re. (13 March1997), paras. 156-158.
397  Goodwin-Gill / McAdam (2007); pp. 244-253 ff.; Hathaway (2005), pp. 335-342; Lauterpacht / Bethlehem (2003), para. 242.
398  See, for example, UNHCR (1994); UNHCR (2000), para. 23; UNHCR, Advisory Opinion (2007).
399  Hathaway (2005), p. 337.
400  Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly (2003), Doc. No 10011, Point No II, 3.3. In this regard, see also Access to 
Assistance and Protection of Asylum-seekers at European Seaports and Coastal Areas: Council of Europe, Parliamentary 
Assembly, Recommendation 1645 (2004); Resolution 1521 (2006).
401   EU, European Commission, COM (2006) 733, paras. 31-35. See above Part 2 (II)(3).
402   UNHCR, Executive Committee, Conclusion No 97 (2003).
law. Both underlying American law as well as high-
level American officials have always confirmed the 
validity of the principle of non-refoulement, also in 
cases where persons are picked up on high seas.395 The 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found 
that the US practice of repatriating Haitian boat refu-
gees violates Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention.396
The validity of the principle of non-refoulement stem-
ming from Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention on 
high seas beyond the state borders, has found broad 
approval in newer works of international law397 and 
from the UNHCR,398 based on the argument from the 
wording of this provision, which forbids expulsion and 
return. According to Hathaway, that Article 33 of the 
Refugee Convention does not explicitly include extra-
territorial actions can be explained by the empirical 
reality at the time the Convention was drafted, when 
no state was trying to turn back refugees through con-
trol measures beyond state borders.399 Moreover, the 
Refugee Convention is to be interpreted according to 
its purpose, so that this intended purpose of refugee 
protection can be effective. The Council of Europe’s 
Parliamentary Assembly, too, has expressed itself in 
this vein several times.400
From a Communication of the European Commission 
of November 2006, it emerges that disunity currently 
exists regarding the extent of obligations arising, espe-
cially from the principle of non-refoulement, in rela-
tion to interception and search and rescue measures 
on high seas.401 On the other hand, the UNHCR Execu-
tive Committee – currently comprised of 72, and at the 
time of the 2003 decision, 64 state representatives – 
has recommended that independent of the place they 
are picked up, the principle of non-refoulement is to 
be respected and the rights to protection under inter-
national law to be enforced for persons seeking pro-
tection on ships.402 Older Conclusions of the UNHCR 
Executive Committee stress the importance of the 
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principle of non-refoulement, likewise independent of 
the question of whether the refugee is on the terri-
tory of the particular State Party.403
In accordance with the VCLT, the interpretation of 
international treaties must also consider “any subse-
quent practice in the application of the treaty which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation”.404 In the interpretation of human rights 
treaties, however, the practice of the States Parties can 
only be invoked with consideration of the treaty’s pur-
pose: the protection of individual rights. Namely, it 
would contradict the common purpose of individual 
protection in the human rights treaties if human rights 
were simply limitable through the practice of the obli-
gated States Parties. In the circle of EU states a com-
mon practice and legal view does not seem to current-
ly exist. However, from the UNHCR Executive Commit-
tee decision of 2003, noted above, one can conclude 
that in 2003, the then-16 EU states represented in the 
UNHCR Executive Committee405 supported the validity 
of the principle of non-refoulement on high seas, or in 
any case did not deny it. Reports of non-compliance 
with the principle of non-refoulement on high seas 
and occasionally expressed doubts of single EU states 
about the applicability of the principle of non-refoule-
ment on high seas are not relevant indications under 
international law for the interpretation of the Refugee 
Convention. Even if this were established as common 
practice and an agreement on the interpretation of the 
EU states, for two reasons this would not be suitable 
for displaying decisive influence in interpretation of 
the Refugee Convention. First, because the common 
practice and legal conviction relevant for interpreta-
tion under international law must be established in the 
entire group of Parties to the Refugee Convention, not 
just in the group of EU states. Second, because the 
organs and Member States of the EC are obligated by 
Article 63 of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (ECT) to enact immigration and asylum law 
in conformity with the Geneva Refugee Convention. 
An interpretation of the Geneva Refugee Convention 
only in accordance with the ideas of EU states would 
leave this obligation empty and therefore also violate 
EU law.
403  See also UNHCR (2007), para. 33 with further references to UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusions.
404  Article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT.
405  Cyprus is counted here, which only joined the EU in 2004.
406  Article 98 of UNCLOS (1982), and international customary law.
It can be ascertained that the Geneva Refugee Con-
vention does not unambiguously regulate the extra-
territorial validity of the principle of non-refoulement, 
but that weighty arguments for the acceptance of the 
extra-territorial validity of the principle of non-
refoulement exist in its wording, as well as the Refu-
gee Convention’s object and purpose. As the interna-
tional organisation for the defence and promotion of 
the Refugee Convention, the UNHCR also supports this 
argumentation. There is no legally relevant common 
practice and legal view among States Parties and no 
unambiguous historical interpretation that would lead 
to the exclusion of extra-territorial validity.
However, the prohibition of refoulement found in the 
Refugee Convention is not applicable for persons who 
are still in the territorial sea of their state. But in this 
respect, prohibitions of refoulement stemming from 
the human rights treaties can be applied.
The principle of non-refoulement found in Article 33 
of the Refugee Convention forbids the act of expulsion 
or return, and with these, state actions through which 
a person could be exposed to the dangers named in 
Article 33. But a general duty to grant asylum to every 
person encountered at sea does not follow from the 
Refugee Convention – even with extra-territorial appli-
cation. It is therefore to be assumed that the mere 
omission to pick up refugees encountered at sea does 
not violate the Refugee Convention. In practice, it is 
important that when state ships engage in rescue at 
sea – in accordance with their obligations stemming 
from international law of the sea406 – the requirement 
of the law of the sea to bring those shipwrecked to a 
place of safety represents an action that must be mea-
sured against Article 33 of the Refugee Convention.
1.2.3 Obligations stemming from the prohibitions of 
refoulement in the European Convention on Human 
Rights
In light of the ECHR’s special meaning for the EU and 
its Member States, it will now be examined whether 
obligations arise from Article 3 of the ECHR for meas-
ures of migration control and rescue at sea beyond the 
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territorial sea. Included in the examination are the 
contiguous zones of the EU states, the territorial sea 
and contiguous zones of third states, as well as the 
remaining high seas.
1.2.3.1 The principle of non-refoulement as expression 
of a duty to protect
The validity of the principle of non-refoulement in bor-
der controls on high seas at first seems particularly 
suggestive because – as presented above407 – ECHR 
jurisprudence assumes that the principle of non-
refoulement stems from states’ duty to protect.408 Thus 
it is not decisive whether the States Parties to the Con-
vention have obligated themselves to pick up certain 
persons, but rather whether through certain actions 
they seriously endanger the individual rights of these 
persons. In this respect, the assessment of rejection on 
high seas seems not to differ from that of rejection at 
the state border, or to a state with the potential to 
persecute.
1.2.3.2 The extra-territorial applicability of the ECHR
However, in answering the question of the validity of 
the principle of non-refoulement in border controls 
beyond state borders, ECtHR jurisprudence on the 
extra-territorial applicability of the ECHR must be con-
sidered. This is fundamentally a question of the inter-
pretation of Article 1 of the ECHR, which states:
“The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone 
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined 
in Section I of this Convention.”
ECtHR jurisprudence on the question of the extra- 
territorial applicability of the ECHR – as its jurispru-
dence on other questions, too – is characterised by 
strong casuistry. As of yet there have not been ECtHR 
or ECJ judgements in which the validity of the princi-
ple of non-refoulement beyond state borders has been 
expressis verbis recognised or rejected.
407   See above, Part 4 (II)(3).
408  In this vein, see also Noll / Fagerlund / Liebaut (2002), p. 45.
409  See also the analyses of Gondek (2005) and Lawson (2004).
410   In this regard, see recent ECtHR, Admissibility Decision of the Grand Chamber of 2 May 2007 (Saramati and Others / France, 
Germany and Norway), Application Nos 71412/01 and 78166/01.
411   See Peters (2003), p. 18 ff.
412   Above, Part 4(II)(3).
413   See, for example, ECtHR: Admissibility Decision of the Grand Chamber of 12 December 2001 (Bankovic´ / Belgium and 
Others), Application No 52207/99, para. 64; Judgement of 7 July 1989 (Soering / United Kingdom), Application No 14038/88, 
para. 102; Judgement of the Grand Chamber of 18.02.1999 (Matthews / United Kingdom), Application No 24833/94, para. 
39.
414   An example for this is the jurisprudence of the Court on the rights of transsexuals, which has changed dramatically over time.
That such cases have not yet reached the courts by 
way of individual appeal (ECtHR) or preliminary rulings 
procedure (ECJ) can be explained by the precarious 
situation of the persons concerned, who as a rule do 
not have the possibility to pursue their rights in the 
courts. However, from the many ECHR judgements in 
which the question of extra-territorial applicability has 
played a role, fundamental baselines of jurisprudence 
can be developed.409 Of particular interest here are 
judgements concerning wartime or peace-keeping 
measures. However, these judgements are character-
ised by two aspects that play no role in the ECHR’s 
extra-territorial application to measures of migration 
control. For migration control carried out by the EU 
and its Member States, it is first of all irrelevant wheth-
er and to what extent the ECHR is applicable to war 
or post-conflict situations. Also irrelevant is the extent 
to which a State Party is liable before the ECtHR when 
it is acting in the framework of an international man-
date in which the group of international participants 
goes beyond the Parties to the ECHR.410 Of fundamen-
tal importance, in contrast, is the question of the circum-
stances under which the ECHR has extra-territorial 
applicability.
The principles of interpreting international law that 
are codified in Article 31 of the VCLT also apply for the 
interpretation of the ECHR by the ECtHR and national 
courts. Accordingly, a regulation’s wording, purpose 
and object, as well as its connection with later agree-
ments and later practice are of importance. The travaux 
préparatoires are only to be invoked in complement. 
The ECtHR stresses the protection of the individual as 
the purpose and object of the Convention. From this 
arise two special emphases in the ECtHR’s interpreta-
tion of the ECHR411 whose effects on the jurisprudence 
on prohibitions of refoulement in the ECHR were 
already presented above.412 The first emphasis is on the 
ECtHR’s dynamic-teleological interpretation – its inter-
pretation of the Convention as a “living instrument”413 
that considers a provision’s current purpose and object, 
which can have changed since the ECHR’s signing.414 
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415   ECtHR: Judgement of the Grand Chamber of 11 July 2002 (Goodwin / United Kingdom – rights of trans-sexuals),  
Application No 28957/95, para. 85.
416   ECtHR: Judgement of the Grand Chamber of 11 July 2002 (Goodwin / United Kingdom – rights of trans-sexuals),  
Application No 28957/95, para. 74.
417   See, for example, ECtHR: Judgement of the Grand Chamber of 23 March 1995 – preliminary objections (Loizidou / Turkey), 
Application No 15318/89 para. 72; Judgement of 11 July 2000 (Jabari / Turkey), Application No 40035/98, para. 50. On the 
jurisprudence concerning procedural guarantees and the right to effective legal remedy, see above, II.6. and II.7.
418   See above, II.6.
419   ECtHR: Admissibility Decision of the Grand Chamber of 12 December 2001 (Bankovic´ / Belgium and Others), Application  
No 52207/99, para. 59.
420  ECtHR: Judgement of the Grand Chamber of 10 May 2001 (Cyprus / Turkey), Application No 25781/94, para. 77; Admissibility 
Decision of the Grand Chamber of 12 December 2001 (Bankovic´  / Belgium and Others), Application No 52207/99, paras. 70-71.
421   ECtHR: Admissibility Decision of the Grand Chamber of 12 December 2001 (Bankovic´ / Belgium and Others), Application No 
52207/99, para. 73.
422  ECtHR: ibid. See also, ECtHR: Judgement of the Grand Chamber of 12 May 2005 (Öcalan / Turkey), Application No 46221/99, 
para. 91, in which one issue among others was detention by Turkish officials in an airplane of Turkish nationality, in Kenyan 
territory.
423  Kimminich / Hobe (2004), p. 441; Noll / Fagerlund / Liebaut (2002), pp. 43-44. See above Part 3(I).
Of importance here is that the ECtHR also explicitly 
considers international trends on the recognition of 
certain rights even when a common European consen-
sus is still absent.415 This is justified with the argument 
that the ECHR without a dynamic and evolutionary 
interpretation would become an instrument in need of 
reform and improvement.416 The second special empha-
sis lies in securing effectiveness through interpreta-
tion, which has manifested itself in jurisprudence on 
procedural rights and legal remedy,417 and on the right 
of access to individual application before the ECtHR.418
Decisive in assessing the extra-territorial validity is the 
interpretation of the phrase “everyone within their 
jurisdiction” in Article 1 of the ECHR. In its oft-quoted 
Bankovic´ decision, in which the matter at hand was 
the bombing of Yugoslavia by 16 NATO States, the 
ECtHR stressed that the obligations arising from the 
ECHR are as a rule territorial in nature, and that excep-
tions to this principle require special justification in 
light of special circumstances of an individual case.419 
With regard to the exceptions, in which jurisdiction is 
derived from elements other than territoriality, the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence before Bankovic´, as well as its 
more recent jurisprudence, is of importance. The ele-
ments that can form the basis for jurisdiction and thus 
also elicit a liability of the States Parties for actions 
carried out beyond state borders will be briefly pre-
sented in the following.
1.2.3.2.1 Effective control over a territory as an 
element forming the basis for jurisdiction
An element forming the basis for jurisdiction can first 
be the effective control over a territory beyond the 
state borders of the State Party. This control can exist 
through occupation or with agreement of the govern-
ment in the area concerned.420 However, as a rule with 
(forward placement of) measures of border or migra-
tion control, no effective control over the territory on 
which the relevant measures are being carried out exists. 
Thus, in this context no jurisdiction in the sense of 
Article 1 of the ECHR can be derived from this element. 
1.2.3.2.2 Nationality of a ship as an element forming 
the basis for jurisdiction
It is of importance for the management of the southern 
maritime borders that the ECtHR, in consistent rulings, 
has explicitly recognised the nationality of a ship as 
an element forming the basis for jurisdiction. According 
to its jurisprudence, for actions “on board craft and 
vessels registered in, or flying the flag of, that State”,421 
the ECHR is also applicable beyond state borders. “In 
these specific situations, customary international law 
and treaty provisions have recognised the extra-territorial 
exercise of jurisdiction by the relevant State.”422
For actions in the area of migration control and border 
protection this means that the ECHR’s applicability on 
government ships for border protection or search and 
rescue services is based on the jurisdiction of ships, 
which is determined by international law. For lack of 
territory, the Flag State’s jurisdiction is not territorial 
jurisdiction, but rather a legal jurisdiction,423 with the 
result that for disagreements relating to the ship, the 
Flag State’s law applies. As a consequence, ships with 
the nationality of a State Party to the ECHR are sub-
ject to its jurisdiction in the sense of Article 1 of the 
ECHR, and therefore the prohibitions of refoulement 
found in Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR are also appli-
cable. The reason for possible liability of the States 
Parties according to the principle of non-refoulement 
derived from the ECHR is the obligation of the States 
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Parties not to subject the person concerned to the dan-
ger of grave rights violations through actions of expul-
sion or return.424
This has as one consequence that a violation against 
the state duty to protect, as described, can exist both 
where the person seeking protection is on a ship of the 
State Party’s nationality and also where only the offi-
cials who are carrying out the return, rejection or 
refoulement are on this ship. This can be the case, for 
example, if ships engaged in border protection or offi-
cial rescue at sea do not take on board people from 
refugee boats, but rather stop the refugee boats, 
accompany them back to the harbours of non-EU 
states, or deny them entry into the territorial sea and 
a safe harbour despite these vessels’ visually ascer-
tained unseaworthiness. The limiting of the protective 
effect of the principle of non-refoulement arising from 
the ECHR to persons on the ship would not be appro-
priate because, according to ECtHR jurisprudence, the 
reason for the liability lies in the responsibility for the 
action of return. Thus in such cases, liability attaches 
to the legal jurisdiction over the officials on the ship.425 
That the Flag State is also responsible for human rights 
violations caused by a vessel to persons not on board, 
also arises from ECtHR jurisprudence in the case of 
Xhavara and Others vs. Italy and Albania, in which people 
on a refugee boat drowned after colliding with a state 
guard ship.426 
One consequence of this is that the actions of private 
persons on ships which, for example, are putting per-
sons down in their human-rights-abusing country of 
origin, in principle do not create a foundation for lia-
bility of the Flag State before the ECtHR. At the out-
side, this could differ for private ships officially com-
missioned for such sovereign tasks as rescue at sea or 
border protection, because then these actions would 
be attributable to a State Party.427
424  See above II.3.
425  The carrying out of patrols alone does not constitute jurisdiction at sea. In this regard, see also Eick (2006), p. 121.
426  ECtHR: Admissibility Decision of 11 January 2001 (Xhavara and Others v Italy and Albania), Application No 39473/98.  
The complaint was dismissed as inadmissible for the reason that the ECtHR found no grounds to believe that there had 
been a willing causation of the collision, and was of the view that Italy had fulfilled its duty to protect by introducing 
regular criminal proceedings against the commander.
427  See Article 5 of the International Law Commission’s draft “Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts”, 
contained in Resolution No 56/83 of the United Nations General Assembly of 12 December 2001.
428  ECtHR: Admissibility Decision of the Grand Chamber of 12 December 2001 (Bankovic´ / Belgium and Others), Application  
No 52207/99, para. 59.
429  Gondek (2005), p. 365.
430  ECtHR: Judgement of 26 June 1992 (Drozd and Janousek / France and Spain), Application No 12747/87, para. 91.
431   In this case the actions of the persons concerned were not attributable to the States because at issue were independent 
judges, who in the exercise of their office were not bound by instructions of the respondent States.
The Flag State’s jurisdiction is determined and restric-
ted by other affected states’ rights of control.428 This 
restriction serves the demarcation of state spheres 
under international law.429 The restriction therefore 
corresponds with, but does not exceed, the rights of 
coastal states in the various maritime zones. Because, 
however, these rights of control do not contradict the 
obligations arising from the ECHR, there are no grounds 
for the assumption of a restriction on ECHR obligations.
It should be noted that the ECHR and the prohibitions 
of refoulement derived from it also apply on ships that 
have the nationality of a State Party under whose flag 
they are sailing, or in which they are registered. As a 
consequence, the ECHR state is especially liable for the 
actions of officials who expose people on board a ship 
or elsewhere, perhaps in refugee boats, to the danger 
of cruel or inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment (Article 3 of the ECHR) or of endangerment to 
life (Article 2 of the ECHR). The actions of private per-
sons on ships with the nationality of a State Party can 
also lead to liability in accordance with the ECHR when 
the private persons exercise such sovereign authorities 
as rescue at sea in an official capacity.
1.2.3.2.3 Acts of officials attributable to the State 
Party as an element forming the basis for jurisdiction
The responsibility for the actions of border guard offi-
cials and government sea-rescue employees can, how-
ever, also arise independently of whether the person in 
action is on a ship. In the case of Drozd and Janousek430 
the ECtHR, with reference to a series of older decisions 
by the European Commission of Human Rights, accep-
ted that the responsibility of Contracting Parties could, 
in principle, be engaged because of acts of their 
authorities which produced effects or were performed 
outside their own territory, if the action can be attribu-
ted to the State Party.431 This was last confirmed by the 
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ECtHR in its Bankovic´ Decision.432 The attribution to 
the State Party can be assumed in cases, in which offi-
cials or other government employees act in the context 
of authorities transferred to them.
1.2.3.2.4 Effective control over a person as an 
element forming the basis for jurisdiction
In the case of such extra-territorial actions as the 
accompanying back or escorting of refugee boats to 
harbours of non-EU states, under some circumstances 
the effective control over the persons concerned can 
also form the basis for jurisdiction of the liable state, 
and therefore also the applicability of the ECHR. The 
ECtHR confirmed this in recent decisions Öcalan vs. 
Turkey and Hussein vs. Albania and others: all cases in 
which at issue was detention on foreign territory.433 It 
can come to such an effective control over persons in 
connection with control measures at sea, for example 
when small refugee boats cannot oppose the instruc-
tions of border guard or sea-rescue ships without risk-
ing a critical collision with these ships.
1.2.3.2.5 Prohibition on the circumvention of human 
rights obligations as an element forming the basis 
for jurisdiction
At the border, the commitments of ECHR states arising 
from the ECHR are indisputable. At the same time, on 
the basis of EU border management strategy, border 
controls are being shifted to areas beyond state borders. 
The targeted shifting of actions beyond state borders 
does not, however, release states from their ECHR obli-
gations. In this vein, the ECtHR has decided that extra-
territorial validity of the ECHR can arise from the pro-
hibition on the circumvention of human rights:
“Accountability in such situation stems from the fact 
that Article 1 of the Convention cannot be interpreted 
so as to allow a State party to perpetrate violations of 
the Convention on the territory of another State, which 
it could not perpetrate on its own territory.“ 434
From this prohibition of circumvention results the obli-
gation to apply the same standards for the protection 
of human rights at pre-border controls as for those 
controls carried out directly on the state border. The 
political argument occasionally put forward, that for 
practical reasons the granting of procedural guaran-
tees and legal remedies in accordance with the usual 
ECHR criteria or EU law cannot be demanded for pre-
border and migration controls, must be rejected in light 
of this circumvention prohibition. Because the forward 
placement of immigration controls is targeted and sys-
tematic to prevent arrival at the state borders, the States 
Parties cannot appeal to the practical impossibility of 
granting adequate procedural guarantees and legal reme-
dies. On the contrary, from this practical impossibility 
of granting adequate procedural guarantees and legal 
remedies, the conclusion must be drawn that the per-
sons concerned must be granted just the same access 
to state territory and procedures as if they had sought 
international protection on the border. As already pre-
sented above, a ship is not part of the state territory, and 
the procedural guarantees and legal remedies, required 
by human rights, cannot be ensured on a ship.
One passage in the ECtHR’s Bankovic´ Decision, accor-
ding to which the meaning of the ECtHR as an instru-
ment of a regional European ordre public in the espace 
juridique of the States Parties was emphasised, has led 
to discussions in the literature.435 From this, some drew 
the conclusion that an exceptional extra-territorial 
application of the ECHR can in any case only be given 
on the territory of ECHR states. If this interpretation 
were accurate, the ECHR’s applicability on high seas 
and in the territorial sea of non-ECHR states could be 
restricted. However, at the latest, such an interpreta-
tion was refuted in the case Issa vs. Turkey, in which the 
ECtHR examined whether Turkey had jurisdiction over 
areas in Iraq that substantiated Turkey’s liability under 
the ECHR,436 meaning: jurisdiction in the meaning of 
Article 1 of the ECHR can be derived from the exist-
ence of effective control over a partial area of the ter-
ritory of a non-ECHR state and defines the extent of 
432  ECtHR: Admissibility Decision of the Grand Chamber of 12 December 2001 (Bankovic´ / Belgium and Others), Application  
No 52207/99, para. 69. See also ECtHR: Judgement of the Grand Chamber of 23 March 1995 – preliminary objections 
(Loizidou / Turkey), Application No 15318/89, para. 62.
433  ECtHR: Judgement of the Grand Chamber of 12 May 2005 (Öcalan / Turkey), Application No 46221/99, para. 91; Admissibility 
Decision of 14 March 2006, Application No 23276/04 (Hussein / Albania and Others). See also ECtHR: Judgement of  
16 November 2004 (Issa / Turkey), Application No 31821/96, para. 71; Gondek (2005), p. 358; German Federal Government 
(2006): Observations of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning Application No 78166/01 (Saramati and Others / France, 
Germany and Norway), paras. 19, 20.
434  ECtHR: Judgement of 16 November 2004 (Issa / Turkey), Application No 31821/96, para. 71.
435  ECtHR: Admissibility Decision of the Grand Chamber of 12 December 2001 (Bankovic´ / Belgium and Others), Application  
No 52207/99, para. 80.
436  ECtHR: Judgement of 16 November 2004 (Issa / Turkey), Application No 31821/96, para. 74.
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legal space in which the ECHR can be applied. The 
ECHR’s espace juridique can therefore absolutely extend 
beyond the territory of ECHR states.437
1.2.3.3 Conclusion
It should be noted that the EU and its Member States, in 
pre-border control or sea-rescue measures, are obligated 
to observe the prohibitions of refoulement from Articles 
2 and 3 of the ECHR, as well as all other ECHR rights.438
This liability of ECHR states is grounded in the action 
that causes the danger of human rights violation. 
Therefore not every omission triggers liability under 
the ECHR. As explained in connection with the extra-
territorial applicability of the Refugee Convention, the 
ECHR also does not give rise to a general duty to pro-
vide every person encountered at sea access to state 
territory for the examination of their applications for 
international protection. However, the ECHR prohibits 
exposing people to grave violations of human rights 
through actions beyond state borders. Return to a 
country in which torture, inhuman or degrading pun-
ishment or treatment, or mortal danger threaten, is 
thus forbidden. In this, ECHR states are bound by the 
previously described standards for procedural guaran-
tees and legal remedies,439 just as these apply at the 
border. Because these cannot be ensured on a ship, 
boats may not be diverted or escorted back to states 
outside the EU for the reason that in a mixed group of 
migrants on such a boat there can also be found per-
sons seeking protection. This is because, in practice, 
there are no adequately safe third countries.440 
When government ships carry out rescues at sea in 
accordance with their commitments stemming from 
the international law of the sea, they are bound by the 
obligation of the law of the sea to bring those ship-
wrecked to a place of safety.441 The bringing of those 
shipwrecked to a place of safety is an action that also 
must be measured against the ECHR. This means that 
rescued persons, too, may not be brought to third 
countries without first having their applications for 
international protection examined in an EU state.
1.2.4 Obligations stemming from the prohibitions  
of refoulement in the UN human rights treaties
As already presented above, prohibitions of refoule-
ment also arise from Article 3 of the CAT and Articles 
6 and 7 of the ICCPR. The UN human rights treaties 
belong to the relevant rules of international law appli-
cable in the relations between the parties, which the 
ECtHR – in application of the VCLT442 – takes into 
account when interpreting the ECHR. The UN human 
rights treaties serve as a legal reference for the ECJ. 
With regard to extra-territorial applicability, it is of 
importance that both the UN Committee against Tor-
ture as the treaty body of the Convention against Tor-
ture and the Human Rights Committee as the treaty 
body of the ICCPR have clearly advocated for the extra-
territorial applicability of each Convention.
The UN Committee against Torture, on the one hand, 
has expressly confirmed the applicability of the explicit 
principle of non-refoulement in Article 3 of the CAT at 
the border, and additionally derived from this the 
requirement of appeals for denials of entry, with sus-
pensive effect.443 The explicit principle of non-refoule-
ment in Article 3 of the CAT takes as its starting point 
the forbidden actions of expulsion, deportation or 
extradition, not the notion of jurisdiction.444 Article 
1(1) of the CAT, which includes a definition of torture, 
takes as its starting point an official’s action. Both 
speak for the applicability of the principle of non-
refoulement in Article 3 of the CAT independent of the 
location of the forbidden action. In regard to the prison 
camp in Guantánamo, the UN Committee against Tor-
ture’s conclusions and recommendations to the USA’s 
July 2006 state report emphasised that not only the 
principle of non-refoulement, but also other provisions 
of the Convention – which, as opposed to Article 3, 
explicitly take as their starting points the concepts of 
jurisdiction and territory445 – have extra-territorial 
437  Similarly, see also Coomans / Kamminga (2004), p. 5; Gondek (2005), pp. 375 ff.; Lawson (2004), S. 114, Schäfer (2006), S. 33 f.
438  Similarly: EU, European Commission, SEC (2007), p. 4.
439  See above, II.6. and II.7.
440  See above, II.5.
441   Article 98 of UNCLOS, and international customary law.
442  Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT.
443  UN, CAT (2006), p. 36, see above II.6. and II.7.
444  Article 3(1) of the CAT states: “No State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another State where 
there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.“
445  See, for example, Article 2(1) of the CAT: “Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other 
measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.”
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applicability. In so doing, the Committee began partly 
with the control over a territorially definable area,446 
partly with the de facto existing control over a detained 
person,447 and explicitly confirmed the applicability of 
the principle of non-refoulement beyond state bor-
ders.448 In the case of pre-border or migration controls 
at sea, sovereign authorities in many cases and cir-
cumstances exercise de facto control over persons. It 
can therefore be concluded that both the principle of 
non-refoulement as well as other provisions of the CAT 
are also valid for in these cases.
The ICCPR obligates a State Party to guarantee rights 
recognised in the Covenant “to all individuals within 
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction”.449 The treaty 
body of the Covenant, the UN Human Rights Commit-
tee, confirmed the extra-territorial applicability of the 
ICCPR for certain cases early on. Thus in its decisions 
in the cases López Burgos vs. Uruguay450 and Montero 
vs. Uruguay451 it measured against the ICCPR the lega-
lity of a detention conducted by Uruguayan sovereign 
authorities in Brazil and the confiscation of a passport 
by the Uruguayan consulate in Germany, respectively. 
In its General Comment No. 31, directed at the States 
Parties in accordance with Article 40(4) ICCPR, in 2004 
the Committee summarised its stance on extra-terri-
torial application of the ICCPR:
“States Parties are required by article 2, paragraph 1, 
to respect and to ensure the Covenant rights to all per-
sons who may be within their territory and to all persons 
subject to their jurisdiction. This means that a State 
Party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in 
the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective 
control of that State Party, even if not situated within 
the territory of the State Party. As indicated in General 
Comment 15 adopted at the twenty-seventh session 
(1986), the enjoyment of Covenant rights is not limited 
to citizens of States Parties but must also be available 
to all individuals, regardless of nationality or stateless-
ness, such as asylum seekers, refugees, migrant workers 
and other persons, who may find themselves in the terri-
446  UN, CAT (2006), Doc. No CAT/C/USA/CO/2, Para. 14.
447  UN, CAT (2006), Doc. No CAT/C/USA/CO/2, Paras. 17, 20.
448  UN, CAT (2006), Doc. No CAT/C/USA/CO/2, Para. 20.
449  Article 2(1) of the ICCPR.
450  UN, HRC, Communication No 52/1979.
451   UN, HRC, Communication No 106/1981.
452  UN, HRC (2004), General Comment No 31, para. 10.
453  ECtHR: Admissibility Decision of the Grand Chamber of 12 December 2001 (Bankovic´ / Belgium and Others), Application  
No 52207/99, para. 78.
454  Eick (2006), p. 119.
455 See quotation above in the text.
456 Scheinin (2004), p. 76.
tory or subject to the jurisdiction of the State Party. This 
principle also applies to those within the power or 
effective control of the forces of a State Party acting 
outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in 
which such power or effective control was obtained, 
such as forces constituting a national contingent of a 
State Party assigned to an international peace-keeping 
or peace-enforcement operation.” 452
Admittedly, in its Bankovic´ Decision in 2001, the ECtHR 
was not convinced that the ICCPR was extra-territori-
ally applicable. In any case, according to the ECtHR’s 
argumentation at the time, the applicants had not given 
enough examples of relevant jurisprudence for the 
interpretation of “jurisdiction” in the sense of Article 2 
of the ICCPR.453 Future ECtHR jurisprudence, however, 
will have to consider the clear statements of the Human 
Rights Committee’s General Comment from 2004. 
As aids in the interpretation of the ICCPR, the Gene ral 
Comments have special importance because they are 
thoroughly discussed and adopted by consensus in the 
ICCPR’s treaty body (the Human Rights Committee), 
which is composed of independent experts.454 Of spe-
cial importance when looking at border protection is 
that in its General Comment, the Committee primarily 
applies the ICCPR depending on whether, “anyone [is] 
within the power or effective control,[…] regardless of 
the circumstances in which such power or effective 
control was obtained”455 of that State Party. The start-
ing point is not the concept of State territory, but the 
control over persons. Professor Martin Scheinin, a 
member of the Human Rights Committee until 2004, 
sees as an essential criterion for deciding on the extra-
territorial application the state’s factual control over 
the consequences of its actions.456 If one applies the 
criteria of effective control over a person and control 
over the consequences of actions to measures of bor-
der and migration control at sea, then the ICCPR’s 
applicability must be assumed. It follows that in con-
ducting such measures, States Parties must comply 
with both the principle of non-refoulement from Arti-
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cles 6 and 7, as well as the human rights guaranteed 
in the rest of the ICCPR. 
1.2.5 The right to leave, the right to seek asylum, and 
the principle of good faith
Article 12(2) of the ICCPR, Article 2(2) of the ECHR’s 
Fourth Optional Protocol, Article 8(1) of the Conven-
tion on Migrant Workers,457 Article 5 of the UN Inter-
national Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), Article 10 of the Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child, and Article 13(2) 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights all con-
tain a right to leave from one’s own or a foreign coun-
try, or refer to this. Due to the socialist states’ strong 
restrictions on the right to leave, during the 1970s and 
1980s the right to leave was an important issue in the 
framework of the CSCE.458 Here the examination will 
focus on the ICCPR and the ECHR’s Fourth Optional 
Protocol.
In accordance with the ICCPR and the ECHR’s Fourth 
Optional Protocol, every person is entitled to the right 
to leave, independent of citizenship and the legality of 
their stay459 and this may be restricted only under cer-
tain pre-conditions that will be explained later. The 
right serves the free development of a person460 and is 
grounded in the understanding that migration is a nor-
mal aspect of human history.461 The right to leave does 
not simultaneously include the right to enter a certain 
other state.462
According to Article 12(3) of the ICCPR, the right to 
leave may only be restricted if the restrictions are pro-
vided by law, are necessary to protect national secu-
rity, public order (ordre public), public health or morals 
or the rights and freedoms of others, and the restric-
tions are consistent with the other rights recognised 
457  International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, A/RES/45/158; 
in this regard, see Spieß (2007).   
458  See, among other things, the 1975 Final Act of the CSCE in Helsinki and the “Strasbourg Declaration on the Right to Leave 
and Return“ of 26 November 1986. Further references in Nowak (2005), Article 12 CCPR para. 16, footnote 50.
459  Article 12(2) of the ICCPR: “Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.” On independence from 
citizenship and the legality of the stay, see also UN, HRC (1999), General Comment No 27, para. 8.
460  UN, HRC (1999), General Comment No 27, para. 1.
461   Similarly, see Juss (2004), p. 292.
462  Juss (2004), p. 293.
463  UN, HRC (1999), General Comment No 27, paras. 11-17.
464 UN, HRC (1999), General Comment No 27, para. 18.
465 Hofmann (1988), p. 184; UN, HRC (1999), General Comment No 27, para. 13.
466 Like for example visa regimes and carrier sanctions. See above Part 2(II)(1.3).
467  Harvey / Barnidge (2007), p. 2. On the export of European migration policy concepts, including the Schengen Standards,  
to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe since the beginning of the 1990s in the so-called Budapest Process and 
through the process of eastern enlargement, see Weinzierl (2005), Parts 3 and 4.
468 UN, HRC (1999), General Comment No 27, para. 10.
in the Covenant. In a General Comment, the Human 
Rights Committee has stressed the requirements of a 
concrete legal basis, the necessity in a democratic soci-
ety for the protection of the mentioned purposes and 
the observance of the principle of proportionality.463 
Beyond this, it has pointed out that restrictions may 
not be discriminatory, and thus distinctions such as 
those on the basis of race, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national origin, birth or other legal sta-
tus are impermissible.464 Restrictive measures are only 
admissible as an exception. Measures that systemati-
cally and regularly impair exit are inadmissible.465
With the fall of the Iron Curtain, the restrictions of 
socialist states on the freedom to leave also almost 
entirely disappeared. Meanwhile, changing migration 
policies – especially among West European states – 
brought about restrictions not through those states in 
which those wanting to travel were located, but rather 
through the potential target states of the migration. 
These restrictions were and are realised, for example, 
through the introduction of so-called non-arrival 
measures466 and the export of Schengen standards of 
border and migration control to states outside the EU, 
which can lead to the implementation of immigration 
and emigration controls by third countries.467 The 
Ge neral Comments of the UN Human Rights Commit-
tee have also confronted the fact that today the right 
to leave a country is often not restricted by the migra-
tion’s countries of origin, but rather by the countries 
of destination. For example, in its General Comment 
No 27 on the right to freedom of movement arising 
from Article 12 of the ICCPR, the Committee calls on 
the States Parties to include, “information in their 
reports on measures that impose sanctions on interna-
tional carriers which bring to their territory persons 
without required documents, where those measures 
affect the right to leave another country.” 468 It is appa-
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rent from this that violations of the ICCPR’s right to 
leave can not only be committed by those states that 
are to be left, but also by potential countries of desti-
nation. When measures are carried out jointly, there 
can exist also a joint liability of the countries of depar-
ture and destination – determined specifically by the 
principles of state responsibility presented below.469
If a country prevents a person from leaving because 
he or she has no entry papers for the state that he or 
she would like to enter, then the right to leave takes 
on an international dimension that touches on the 
obligations of the country of destination that stem 
from the principle of non-refoulement and the right 
to seek asylum.470 What is more, when measures sys-
tematically impair access of refugees to asylum pro-
cedures, a violation of the principle of good faith under 
international law with regard to the Refugee Conven-
tion can exist.471 In this respect it is important that 
restrictions on the right to leave a country are only 
then permissible under the ICCPR when they are com-
patible with the other rights anchored in the ICCPR, 
including the non-refoulement principle in Article 7 of 
the ICCPR. If EU Member States conduct joint patrols 
with third countries, in the territorial sea and conti-
guous zones of these, then they are bound – independ-
ent of the admissibility of the control measures accord-
ing to the international law of the sea – both by obliga-
tions from the right to leave and those from the prin ciple 
of non-refoulement. However, ECtHR jurisprudence 
and the Human Rights Committee have not clarified in 
detail when a violation against the right to leave exists.
For two reasons the cliché-ridden expression used by 
the ECtHR, that 2(2) of the ECHR’s Fourth Optional 
Protocol “implies a right to leave for such a country of 
the person´s choice to which he may be admitted”472 
contributes little to clarification. First, with an exit by 
sea it is not clearly determinable in which country 
entry will be achieved. Second, at issue in the relevant 
decisions of the ECtHR was the restriction on the free-
469 Hathaway (2005), p. 310. See below Part 5(II).
470  Goodwin-Gill / McAdam (2007), p. 382.
471  Goodwin-Gill / McAdam (2007), p. 387 ff.
472  ECtHR: Admissibility decision of 20 February 1995 (Peltonen / Finland), Application No 19583/92; Amissibility decision of  
24 May 1995 (KS / Finland), Application No 21228/93.
473 In this vein, see also Goodwin-Gill / McAdam (2007), p. 381.
474 ECtHR, Admissibilty decision of 11 January 2001(Xhavara u.a. / Italien und Albanien), Application No 39473/98, para. 3.
475 Additional Protocol to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime.
476 See the reservation clause in Article 19 of the Protocol.
dom to exit through the denial of a passport, so that 
neither the later country of destination could be deter-
mined, nor a theoretical impossibility of entry could 
play a role in the decision. Thus the decisions provide 
no information about the reasons for which the ECtHR 
made the restriction on the right to leave although it 
does not arise from the text of the Fourth Optional 
Protocol.473
There is one indication that, in any case, the ECtHR 
does not view all pre-border control measures as 
simultaneously constituting exit controls in the sense 
of the Fourth Optional Protocol. This indication lies in 
the relatively brief Decision in the Xhavara case474, 
which does not divulge the exact details of the case, 
especially the exact location where the controls were 
carried out. 
The right to leave – in any case, to the extent it is 
derived from Article 12(2) of the ICCPR – can also be 
injured through so-called non-arrival measures of the 
potential destination countries. Even if rulings to date 
give no information on details, core principles can be 
derived from the Decisions and General Comments of 
the Human Rights Committee. It should be assumed 
that, above all, violations of the right to leave occur 
where emigration restrictions are conducted through 
tight controls, the emigration control is discrimina-
tory, or when this serves the illegitimate purpose of 
preventing applications for international protection. 
The Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by 
Land, Sea and Air475 cannot be introduced as legitimis-
ing such migration-control measures, because these 
provisions are only valid subject to human rights.476 At 
the same time, the countries of destination must com-
ply with obligations arising from the principle of non-
refoulement and the obligation of good faith, not to 
act against the sense and purpose of the Refugee Con-
vention. Good faith would conflict with a systematic 
thwarting of efforts to seek protection.
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477 Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 (Schengen Borders Code).
478 Article 6(2) of the EU Treaty; Art. 51 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
479 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
480 See above Part 2(II)3.
2. Implementation of border controls in con-
formity with human rights
Article 6 of the Schengen Borders Code477 includes an 
obligation of Member States to maintain human dig-
nity and proportionality in carrying out border-cross-
ing controls. Moreover, the article strictly forbids dis-
crimination on grounds of sex, race, ethnic origin, reli-
gion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. 
However, the provision cannot be understood in such 
a way that, in carrying out border controls, the Mem-
ber States are merely obligated to maintain human 
dignity or avoid grave violations of human rights. On 
the contrary, arising from the Member States’ obliga-
tion to respect EU fundamental within the scope of 
application of EU law,478 in carrying out border controls 
along or beyond the common EU external borders in 
accordance with the Schengen Borders Code, the 
Member States are bound by the entirety of EU fun-
damental rights. Violations of EU fundamental rights 
in the implementation of border controls fall under the 
ECJ’s jurisdiction.
The extent of human rights commitments beyond state 
borders is determined by whether the human rights 
treaties and EU fundamental rights are applicable 
there. As already seen in connection with the principle 
of non-refoulement, at least the ECHR, ICCPR and CAT 
are binding on the Member States in carrying out border 
and migration controls, also beyond state borders.
In light of the problems of human rights relevance in 
practice, particularly important here are the rights to 
life and freedom from bodily harm (Articles 2 and 3 of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and Article 2 
of the ECHR, Article 6 of the ICCPR), right to liberty 
(Article 6 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
and Article 5 of the ECHR, Art. 9 of the ICCPR ), and 
the right to health (Article 35 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, and Article 12 of the UN ICESCR.)
3. Conclusions for border and migration control 
measures beyond state borders
Weighty arguments exist for the acceptance of the 
validity of the principle of non-refoulement deriving 
from the Refugee Convention in situations of intercep-
tion, control and rescue measures beyond state bor-
ders. The arguments exist in the wording, as well as 
the Refugee Convention’s object and purpose. As the 
international organisation for the defence and promo-
tion of the Refugee Convention, the UNHCR also sup-
ports this argumentation. There is no legally relevant 
common practice and legal view among States Parties 
and no unambiguous historical interpretation that 
would lead to the exclusion of extra-territorial validi-
ty. However, the prohibition of refoulement found in 
the Refugee Convention is not applicable for persons 
who are still in the sea of their state. But in this respect, 
prohibitions of refoulement stemming from the human 
rights treaties can be applied.
The ECHR and the UN human rights treaties are appli-
cable on ships engaged in border protection or official 
rescue at sea, also those moving beyond their own ter-
ritorial sea. From this arises a duty of the States to 
respect all of the rights contained in these treaties.
Thus the actions of officials on ships may not lead to 
human rights violations. In light of problems encoun-
tered in practice, it must especially be pointed out that 
beyond the duty of rescue at sea under the law of the 
sea, migration controls may not be carried out in such 
a way as to bring harm to people – for example through 
collisions with small refugee boats or through driving 
unseaworthy boats out to high sea. EU Member States 
are bound in all of their measures by the prohibition 
on discrimination, so that the differentiated treatment 
of migrants, for example on the basis of their ethnic 
or social origin, is in violation of human rights. This 
obligation stemming from the prohibition on discrimi-
nation arises from the Schengen Borders Code, EU fun-
damental rights, ICERD479, and the international law of 
the seas.
Beyond the obligation stemming from the law of the 
sea, the question of which cases trigger additional 
obligations to rescue shipwrecked persons discovered 
through sea surveillance will not be conclusively clari-
fied here. However, with regard to planned develop-
ment of radar and satellite surveillance of the seas480, 
this question will become relevant in practice.
In connection with persons in need of international 
protection, the commitments from the prohibitions of 
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refoulement in the Refugee Convention, the ECHR, the 
UN human rights treaties and EU fundamental rights 
are particularly important. These prohibitions of 
refoulement are also applicable on high seas and in 
the territorial sea of third countries. The extra-territo-
rial application of the human rights treaties can arise 
from the jurisdiction in situations of interception, con-
trol or rescue measures. This jurisdiction may be based 
on the nationality of the state ship, the accountabi lity 
of actions of officials, effective control over persons 
and/or the prohibition on the circumvention of human 
rights obligations. The prohibitions of non-refoulement 
must be secured in accordance with the general guar-
antees of procedure and legal remedy arising from the 
human rights treaties. This requires, for example, a 
thorough examination of whether a danger of human 
rights violations threatens in other states. Additio nally, 
a crucial requirement is the suspensive effect of a legal 
remedy against the rejection of applications for inter-
national protection. This cannot be ensured on a ship, 
which, in the absence of adequately safe third coun-
tries, means that protection seekers must have access 
to a procedure in an EU state that examines their need 
for protection.
The liability of states is grounded in the action that 
causes the danger of human rights violation. Therefore 
not every omission beyond state borders triggers liability. 
The Refugee Convention and the international human 
rights treaties do not give rise to a general duty to pro-
vide every person encountered at sea access to state 
territory for the examination of their applications for 
international protection. However, they prohibit exposing 
people to grave violations of human rights through 
actions beyond state borders. Return or rejection to a 
country in which the life or freedom, torture, inhuman 
or degrading punishment or treatment, or mortal danger 
threaten, is thus forbidden. In this, ECHR states are bound 
by the previously described standards for procedural 
and legal protection, just as these apply at the border.
When government ships carry out rescues at sea in 
accordance with their commitments stemming from 
the international law of the sea, they are bound by the 
obligation of the law of the sea to bring those ship-
wrecked to a place of safety. The bringing of those 
shipwrecked to a place of safety is an action that also 
must be measured against the prohibitions of refoule-
ment. This means that rescued persons, too, may not 
be brought to third countries without first having their 
applications for international protection examined in 
an EU state.
Duties also exist with regard to mixed groups of 
migrants who are not on a state ship, but are encoun-
tered in the course of border and migration controls, 
or actions of rescue at sea. It is recognised that, as a 
rule, boats contain not exclusively, but also persons in 
need of international protection. In light of this fact, 
grounds always exist to assume that the escorting or 
towing back of a boat to states outside the EU could 
result in grave violations of human rights. Thus it is 
incompatible with human rights for state ships engaged 
in border protection or rescue at sea to force migrant 
ships with migrants to sail to third countries.
If official ships of an EU state are located near harbours 
of origin on the southern Mediterranean or West African 
coast, collaboration in emigration controls can additio-
nally represent a violation of the human right to leave 
and the right to seek asylum. Furthermore, with regard 
to the access to refugee protection thus thwarted, a 
violation of the commitment to interpret the Refugee 
Convention in good faith can exist.
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Part 5: 
Human rights liability in common action
This section of the study is concerned with human 
ights responsibility for joint actions of various states. 
Following the results in part 4 of the examination of 
EU secondary law and fundamental and human rights, 
it will first be examined whether and to what extent 
the EU as a supranational community is bound by an 
obligation stemming from EU fundamental rights to 
regulate certain questions of human rights relevance 
explicitly through EU law. Finally, a question of inter-
national law will be examined: the human rights 
responsibility for measures conducted by EU states 
together with third states.
I. The EU as a Union based on  
fundamental rights: duties to adopt 
legal norms 
1. Human rights liability and distribution of 
responsibilities in the supra-national EU 
Migrants and persons seeking protection view the 
European Union as a unitary affluent community and 
region of destination that is enclosed by a common 
external border. From the beginning, the arrangement 
of robustly securing the EU external border intended 
to serve as compensation for security deficits resulting 
through the lifting of internal borders. In the region of 
the single European market, an “area of freedom, secu-
rity and justice”481 was to be established through the 
creation of the Dublin responsibility system and the 
harmonising of refugee law, so that asylum applica-
tions would only be examined once. At the same time, 
however, it was always the goal to guarantee that every 
application for protection really would be examined. 
Through the establishment of minimum standards 
under EU law for the examination of applications for 
international protection, the levels of protection in the 
varying Member States were to be brought in line with 
each other, in order to avoid secondary movements 
within the EU. In accordance with the detailed Schen-
gen acquis, the States along the external border are 
responsible for the conducting of border controls. In 
the conducting of border controls, these states along 
the external borders are supported only financially and 
through the work and operations of the EU border pro-
tection agency FRONTEX. Additionally, in most cases 
the EU states situated at the external EU-border are 
responsible for examining applications for asylum. This 
is because responsibility in accordance with the 
 Dublin II-regulation often arises from the fact that the 
asylum seeker has crossed the border of the state 
legally or illegally, or has first rendered an application 
for international protection482 there.483 This functional 
assignment of tasks under EU law to specific states, 
namely the states along the external border, are a 
peculiarity in EU law, which as a rule otherwise obli-
gates all Member States equally. This peculiarity is 
grounded in the trans-nationality of migration, which 
is regulated in EU law through immigration and asy-
lum law, as well as the Schengen acquis.
This chapter deals with the question of how responsi-
bility for human rights fares with regard to the func-
481  Article 61 of the EC Treaty and Article 29 of the EU Treaty.
482  The Regulation 343/2003 (Dublin II-regulation) is older than the Qualification Directive and is therefore not applicable  
to applications for subsidiary protection. In practice, this is seldom problematic because according to Article 2 of the 
Asylum Procedures Directive, when doubts arise, every application for international protection is considered an application 
for asylum, which then falls under the Dublin II-regulation. Soon the European Commission will recommend the expansion 
of the Dublin II-regulation to cover subsidiary protection. COM (2007) 299, p. 6.
483 Articles 9-13 of the Dublin II-regulation.
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tional distribution of responsibilities among the EU and 
the Member States – determined under EU law, as 
described above. It will also examine whether beyond 
the liability of the states implementing the protection 
of EU external borders, there exists a fundamental or 
human rights liability of the EU, or of the totality of 
EU Member States as a Union based on fundamental 
rights. This question is sparked by a number of credible 
reports of violations of human and refugee rights in 
connection with protection of the external borders, 
especially on the part of small border states, which 
complain of being overburdened by the tasks assigned 
them by EU law.484 In this, there occur both violations 
of the rescue duties under the international law of the 
sea and violations of the principle of non-refoulement 
and other human rights.485 Such human rights viola-
tions in the course of protecting common EU external 
borders happen as a rule through actions of single or 
several Member States, not through those of EU organs 
or EU institutions themselves. However, as described 
above, in the framework of FRONTEX, a tight horizon-
tal and vertical interlocking of EU actions and those 
of the Member States can come about.486 This is 
because the decision on deployment of the Rapid Bor-
der Intervention Teams, as well as portions of their 
financing and equipping, are realised at the commu-
nity level. Additionally, operations are to be based on 
a mission plan agreed by FRONTEX and a host Member 
State. National officials are to be provided with a spe-
cial FRONTEX badge and an armband with the insignia 
of the European Union. The amendment to the FRON-
TEX regulation foresees the delegation of sovereign 
powers among Member States. Through this, the 
actions of Member States will be further entwined 
horizontally. Officers in action are to be bound by Com-
munity law and the law and instructions of a host 
Member State, but remain under the disciplinary law 
of their home Member State.487 Also important is that 
the analyses, plans and co-ordinating tasks to be car-
ried out by FRONTEX will naturally have strong influ-
ence on operations that in the end are carried out by 
Member States – even if due to a lack of executive 
powers488 operationally effective measures by FRONTEX 
in violation of human rights are hardly conceivable.489 
The EU border protection agency’s understanding of 
the existence or non-existence of an obligation to 
examine applications for international protection made 
on high seas, will, for example, have a fundamental 
effect on an operation’s planning and coordination.
As such, the Member States are all bound by the Refu-
gee Convention, the ECHR, and the UN human rights 
treaties. Especially important for the system of pro-
tecting fundamental rights in the EU is that the trans-
fer of sovereignty from the Member States to the EU, 
expressed in legislative competence and superiority of 
EU law, is compatible with the ECHR; according to 
ECtHR jurisprudence, this is only the case insofar, and 
as long as human rights protections at EU level are 
guaranteed to be equivalent to those of the ECHR both 
in material and procedural respect.490 
The supranational system of protecting fundamental 
rights is characterised by a division of responsibility 
with regard to securing the protection of fundamental 
rights. To the extent that the Member States have 
transferred authorities to the EU, the precedence of 
Union law over national law demands standard appli-
cation and interpretation of Union law by the ECJ. To 
the extent that national fundamental rights and 
national court controls cannot guarantee the protec-
tion of fundamental rights, this protection occurs 
through EU fundamental rights. Therefore, in the scope 
of application of Union law, both the EU organs and 
the Member States are bound by EU fundamental 
rights. These principles are undisputed and have been 
accepted by national courts in their acquiescence to 
the equivalent protection of fundamental rights at EU 
level.491 The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, in 
accordance with the conclusions of the European 
Council of June 2007, will in future have the status of 
legally binding EU primary law.492 The Charter was 
484  See, for example, “Malta calls on EU to take up dialogue with Libya”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 5 July 2007, p. 7; Council of 
Europe, CPT (2007); Pro Asyl (2007). See above Part 1.
485  See above, Part 1.
486  See above, Part 2(II)(2.1).
487  Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of 11 July 2007 establishing a mechanism for the creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams 
and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 as regards that mechanism and regulating the tasks and powers of 
guest officers (OJ (2007) L 199, p.30).
488  Exceptions are conceivable in the areas of data collection and processing, especially with regard to the EU fundamental 
right to data protection.
489  On the question of possible FRONTEX measures causing infringements of human rights, see Fischer-Lescano / Tohidipur (2007).
490  ECtHR: Judgement of the Grand Chamber of 30 June 2005, Application No 45036/98 (Bosphorus Airways / Ireland), para. 155.
491   German Federal Constitutional Court: Ruling of 22 October 1986, Reference No 2 BvR 197/83 (Solange II); Judgement of  
12 October 1993, Reference No 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92 (Maastricht).
492  EU, European Council (2007), Annex 1, para. 5.
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fashioned with the goal of making visible in one docu-
ment the fundamental rights already valid in the EU, 
which stem from aforementioned national and inter-
national sources.493 It is remarkable in the present con-
text that the Charter of Fundamental Rights also 
includes the granting of the right of asylum in accor-
dance with the Refugee Convention as an EU funda-
mental right.494
A duty of the EU legislator arises from EU primary law 
to pass EU secondary law in accordance with EU fun-
damental rights and the Refugee Convention.495 How-
ever, EU law does not regulate everything, since not all 
political areas are harmonised; and within those that 
are, the harmonisation has happened only in part, or 
as minimal harmonisation. The Member States, espe-
cially national legislators, are therefore responsible for 
the application and implementation of EU law in con-
formity with EU fundamental and human rights, and 
additionally use autonomous national law in non-har-
monised areas.
1.1 Prohibition of explicit or implicit permission under 
EU law for actions in violation of fundamental rights 
In its Judgement on the family-reunification Directive, 
the ECJ grappled with the distribution of responsibi lity 
for the protection of fundamental rights between the 
EU and the Member States. At issue here was first the 
question of the extent to which the Member States are 
also bound by EU fundamental rights in areas where EU 
secondary law leaves them a margin of appreciation. 
Also at issue was the question of the circumstances 
under which EU secondary law itself can violate fun-
damental rights if it allows actions by the Member 
States that violate those rights. The ECJ decided that 
EU fundamental rights are also applicable in those areas 
493  Constitutional traditions of the Member States and human rights treaties by which the Member States are bound, 
especially the ECHR, but also UN human rights treaties.
494  Article 18 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
495  Article 6(2) of the EU Treaty and Article 63 of the EC Treaty.
496  ECJ: Judgement of 27 June 2006, Case C-540/03, paras. 104-106; see also Judgement of 6 November 2003, Case C-101/01, 
paras. 83-87.
497  For lack of individual application to the ECJ, as a rule it will take up relevant issues pursuant to submissions through the 
national courts.
498  ECJ: Judgement of 27 June 2006, Case C-540/03, paras. 22, 23: “As to that argument, the fact that the contested 
provisions of the Directive afford the Member States a certain margin of appreciation and allow them in certain circum-
stances to apply national legislation derogating from the basic rules imposed by the Directive cannot have the effect of 
excluding those provisions from review by the Court of their legality as envisaged by Article 230 EC. Furthermore, a 
provision of a Community act could, in itself, not respect fundamental rights if it required, or expressly or impliedly 
authorised, the Member States to adopt or retain national legislation not respecting those rights.”
499  ECJ: Judgement of 27 June 2006, Case C-540/03, para. 104, where the ECJ finds that the Directive in question leaves a 
margin of appreciation sufficient for its application by the Member States in a manner consistent with the protection of 
fundamental rights.
in which EU secondary law leaves a margin of appre-
ciation to the Member States. It stressed the responsi-
bility of the Member States, and thus, above all, 
national legislatures, to choose an interpretation with-
in a margin of appreciation that is compatible with EU 
fundamental rights.496 The binding of the Member 
States to EU fundamental rights means that in the end, 
judgement of whether their actions conform to fun-
damental rights is a responsibility of the ECJ, and not 
that of the national courts.497
The second question of the circumstances under which 
EU law itself can violate fundamental rights goes to 
the responsibility of the Community legislature for 
guaranteeing the protection of fundamental rights in 
the EU. In this regard, the ECJ has determined that a 
Community act itself can violate fundamental rights 
if it requires the Member States, or explicitly or impli-
citly authorises these, to adopt or retain national legis-
lation that violates fundamental rights.498 This means 
that Community legislation can also violate fundamen-
tal rights when it does not require acts of the Member 
States in violation of fundamental rights, but even 
when the explicit or implicit admissibility of violations 
of fundamental rights arises from it. The jurisprudence 
does not finally resolve when an explicit or implicit 
authorisation exists. In another part of the aforementio-
ned judgement, the ECJ has taken account of whether 
secondary law leaves to the Member States a margin 
of appreciation adequate to enable application consis-
tent with fundamental rights.499 From this it can be 
concluded that not every margin of appreciation and 
gap in regulation that Member States can fill in violation 
of fundamental rights leads to a violation of fundamen-
tal rights on the part of EU law. The ECJ is apparently 
assuming here that more is required for an explicit or 
implicit authorisation to lead to a violation of funda-
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mental rights on the part of EU law, namely a concrete 
point of connection for the conformity with EU secon-
dary law of certain legislation and practices of the 
Member States that violate fundamental rights. In a 
similar vein, Advocate General Kokott has referred to 
a material criterion regarding the judgement on the 
illegality of Community legislation. In her pleadings in 
the case of the European Parliament against the Direc-
tive on family reunification, she raised the issue of 
whether the absence of the explicit adoption of legal 
norms leads to misunderstandings about the obliga-
tions of fundamental rights, and therefore increases 
the risk of violations of human rights. If this is the case, 
then “responsibility would lie not only with the national 
legislature which implemented the Directive, but also 
with the Community legislature”.500 This would lead to 
the illegality of the provision of secondary law.501
1.2 EU legislature’s positive duties to adopt legal norms
If the Community’s implicit authorisation of the main-
taining or adopting of national legislation in violation 
of EU fundamental rights can cause the violation of 
EU fundamental rights on its part, then this means 
conversely that a positive obligation of the Commu-
nity legislature can exist with regard to the adoption 
of legal provisions that protect fundamental rights – if 
the absence of such legal norms can be understood as 
an explicit or implicit authorisation that increases the 
danger of human rights violations.
Even if no EU secondary law exists that explicitly or 
implicitly authorises legislation and practices of the 
Member States in violation of fundamental rights, 
duties to adopt legal norms can additionally arise 
directly from EU fundamental rights. For states, duties 
to adopt legal norms that protect fundamental rights 
arise directly from national fundamental rights or 
international human rights treaties.502 By enacting 
such legal norms, the public authority can fulfil its duty 
500  ECJ: Opinion of Advocate General Juliane Kokott in Case C-540/03, para. 105. In this specific case, the ECJ did not follow 
the Advocate General’s conclusions.
501   Ibid.
502   See, for example, Article 1 of the ECHR, which requires all States Parties to secure all rights contained in the Convention for 
all persons within their jurisdictions. On the resulting duty to pass legislative regulations for the protection of rights in the 
Convention, see Frowein / Peukert-Frowein (1996), Article 1 ECHR, para. 10.
503  Rengeling / Szczekalla (2004), para. 6, No 413.
504  Rengeling / Szczekalla (2004), para. 6, Nos 410-411.
505  Rengeling / Szczekalla (2004), para. 6, No 412. Borowsky (2006), Article 51, para. 22; Heselhaus (2006), para. 29;  
Ladenburger (2006), Article 51, para. 61.
506  See also Article 51 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
507   Article 5 of the EC Treaty; Para. 5 of the Preamble and Article 51(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
508  Ladenburger (2006), Article 51, para. 61; Heselhaus (2006), para. 3, No 24.
to safeguard a certain legally protected interest. In 
this, it is irrelevant whether the protected interest of 
fundamental rights is threatened by such actors com-
posed under public law as the EC or Member States, 
or private actors.503 The protective legislation can be 
of civil, public, or criminal legal nature.504 It is generally 
recognised that such duties to adopt legal norms can 
also apply to the Community legislature.505 The Com-
munity legislature’s duties to adopt legal norms can, 
however, only be taken up in accord with the distribu-
tion of competences within the Union506 and the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity.507
Because both with regard to border protection, and 
with regard to immigration and asylum law, compe-
tence of the European Community (EC) exists, no spe-
cial problems arise in light of the distribution of com-
petences in this area. But in individual cases it must 
be examined whether the assumption of an EU duty to 
adopt legal norms is compatible with the principle of 
subsidiarity. If human rights obligations form the basis 
of the state’s duty to adopt legal norms, it must be 
asked whether and to what extent the protection of 
fundamental rights required of the Member States 
cannot be sufficiently realised (the necessity require-
ment), but can better be achieved precisely at EU level 
(the efficiency criterion).508 If both criteria are met, the 
EU legislature has a duty to adopt legal norms that 
arises directly from EU fundamental rights.
The consideration of duties to adopt legal norms under 
EU law on the basis of threats to human rights origi-
nating with Member States can be understood as a 
reaction to structural threats to the protection of 
human rights that exist in the supra-national Union. 
As presented above, the harmonizing of law of the 
Member States through EU law, as a rule, has not been 
a complete, but rather a partial harmonisation. In the 
area of immigration and asylum law, so far there exists 
only an EU competence for the issuance of minimum 
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standards. The political dynamic of the Union holds 
the danger that through partial harmonisation restric-
tive aspects will be more quickly, intensively and com-
pletely regulated than will those aspects that serve the 
protection of human rights.509 Furthermore, in the 
course of the first harmonisation phase for EU immi-
gration and asylum law, it became apparent that the 
regulation of aspects of human rights protection were 
mostly effected on the basis of the least common 
denominator, while gaps in regulation remained as sore 
points for the protection of human rights. National 
legislators are thus tempted to fill the discretionary 
room and regulatory gaps under EU law in a manner 
that degrades protection standards or violates funda-
mental rights. In light of a missing burden-sharing 
mechanism for refugee protection within the EU, such 
a temptation is especially great with regard to immi-
gration and asylum law. This is because lowering the 
level of protection and deterrent measures superfi-
cially promises an easing of the burden. As a conse-
quence, in many areas the required protection of fun-
damental rights by Member States cannot be realised 
(the necessity requirement). Simultaneously, in light of 
the standardised functional distribution of responsi-
bilities under EU law among Member States and the 
tightly interlocking actions of the EU with those of the 
Member States in the areas of immigration and asylum 
law, as well as border protection, there is especially 
reason to assume a human rights responsibility of the 
Union. Applying legal categories, this means that often 
the required protection of fundamental rights can better 
be achieved at EU level (efficiency criterion).
With regard to the foregoing aspects, the state of EU 
secondary law as it affects the protection of the EU´s 
external border can now be examined.
2. Regulatory gaps in EU secondary law in 
violation of fundamental rights
As presented above, in several areas crucial to the pro-
tection of human rights, EU secondary law is charac-
terized by the ambiguity or the complete lack of per-
tinent provisions, despite the existence of clear human 
rights obligations that include a duty of clear legisla-
tive regulation. These areas are:
procedural guarantees for applications for protec-■■
tion made at the border;
509  See Weinzierl (2005), p.207.
510   Part 4(II)(6).
511   Compare for the same result Peers / Rogers(2006), p.507f.
legal remedy and its suspensive effect against rejec-■■
tions of applications for international protection 
made at or beyond the border;
and the obligations of Member States stemming ■■
from the principle of non-refoulement with regard 
to persons encountered beyond state borders in the 
course of border or migration controls and rescue 
actions.
2.1 Procedural guarantees in border procedures
As presented above,510 the Asylum Procedures Direc-
tive creates an opening for Member States to restrict 
procedural guarantees in border procedures. Article 
35(2) of the Asylum Procedures Directive creates espe-
cially far-reaching possibilities in this regard by author-
ising Member States to maintain special border proce-
dures.According to the Directive, in this case the gene-
rally established minimum guarantees of its Chapter II 
are not valid. Rather, only rudimentary procedural 
rights expressly named as minimum guarantees. Thus 
the Directive permits the Member States to retain pro-
cedural standards that violate human rights. Specifi-
cally, the Directive would allow a Member State to 
conduct border procedures under further exclusion of 
the right to legal representation, the right of contact 
with the UNHCR, and the right to a written decision 
with advice on applicable legal remedies. The level of 
minimum guarantees, standardised under secondary 
law, lies below that required under EU fundamental 
rights and the obligations of the Member States under 
international law. This means that the Directive expli-
citly authorises actions and legislation in violation of 
fundamental rights. This explicit authorisation of legis-
lation and practice in violation of fundamental rights 
is suitable to cause or cement misunderstandings 
about the duties arising from fundamental and human 
rights; thus it increases the risk of human rights viola-
tions. This means that Article 35 of the Asylum Proce-
dures Directive violates fundamental rights.511 The 
Community legislature’s assumption of an obligation 
to bring into line the procedural guarantees in border 
procedures with general procedural guarantees – in 
conformity with fundamental rights – cannot be 
opposed by the subsidiarity principle. This is because 
the implementation of minimum guarantees for pro-
cedural rights in conformity with fundamental rights 
cannot be achieved at the level of Member States. 
Through the functional allocation of responsibility for 
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border protection and the examination of applications 
for protection in states situated at the EU external 
border, the conformity of border procedures with fun-
damental rights to a great extent has become a matter 
of common European interest. Without adoption of 
legal norms under EU law, there would be danger of 
increasing human rights violations committed by over-
burdened states along the EU´s external border . In the 
medium-term, such human rights violations could also 
call into question the functionality of the common 
Dublin responsibility system, which presupposes mutu-
al trust in systems of protection. The goal of setting 
and legally implementing common procedural stand-
ards in conformity with fundamental rights is better 
achievable at Community level.512 It is therefore the 
responsibility of the Community legislature to adopt 
legal norms explicitly under EU law for procedural 
rights that arise from EU fundamental and human 
rights, and are valid at the common European external 
border.
2.2 Legal remedy against the rejection of asylum 
applications
As shown, the Asylum Procedures Directive leaves it to 
Member States to regulate legal remedy against the 
rejection of asylum applications made at and beyond 
the border. In accordance with the criteria laid out 
above, this would then violate EU fundamental rights 
if adoption of legal norms under EU law authorises the 
retaining or issuing of national regulations in violation 
of fundamental rights.
The relevant provisions of the Asylum Procedures 
Directive state:
“Article 39 The right to an effective remedy
(1) Member States shall ensure that applicants for asy-
lum have the right to an effective remedy before a court 
or tribunal [...]
(3) Member States shall, where appropriate, provide for 
rules in accordance with their international obligations 
dealing with:
(a) the question of whether the remedy pursuant to 
para graph 1 shall have the effect of allowing applicants 
to remain in the Member State concerned pen ding its 
outcome;
512   In this regard, see also para. 31 of the Preamble to the Asylum Procedures Directive.
513   Part 4 (II)(6) and (7). See especially ECtHR: Judgement of 26. April 2007 (Gebremedhin [Geberamadhien] / France), 
Application No 25389/05.
514   Article 4(2)(e) of the Asylum Procedures Directive.
515   Article 7(1) of the Asylum Procedures Directive.
516   Compare for the same results Peers / Rogers (2006), p. 409 f.
(b) the possibility of legal remedy or protective mea-
sures where the remedy pursuant to paragraph 1 does 
not have the effect of allowing applicants to remain in 
the Member State concerned pending its outcome. 
Member States may also provide for an ex officio 
re medy [...]”
The Directive’s provision goes beyond this point of 
granting to the Member States a general regulatory 
discretion to be applied in conformity with fundamen-
tal rights with regard to legal remedy. From the wor-
ding, the Member States only provide “where appro-
priate” for rules on the suspensive effect of the legal 
remedy or at least the possibility of protective measure 
where there is no suspensive effect of the remedy – 
without at least prescribing the latter as a minimum 
guarantee. Thus the provision gives the impression that 
a general exclusion of the suspensive effect of the 
remedy and the concomitant right to stay in the terri-
tory until a decision has been reached on the legal 
remedy would be compatible with EU fundamental 
rights. Since, as outlined above513, Art. 13 ECHR requires 
an automatic suspensive effect of legal reme dies 
against decisions refusing leave to enter a country in 
cases where the violation of a ECHR right is claimed, 
this impression is completely wrong. Taken together 
with other provisions that explicitly permit a decision 
at the border to be made exceptionally by other than 
a specialised asylum agency514 and restrict the right to 
remain in the Member State for the period pending an 
examination of the application by the administrative 
authority,515 the text of the Directive should be under-
stood to the effect that the exclusion of suspensive 
effect or protective measures is implicitly authorised. 
Because this is liable to create misunderstandings 
about the requirements stemming from EU fundamen-
tal and human rights, and can lead national legislators 
to promulgate or retain law in violation of fundamen-
tal rights, in this point the Asylum Procedures Direc-
tive is contradictory to EU fundamental rights.516 The 
assumption of an EU legislative duty to explicitly adopt 
legal norms on the right to an effective legal remedy 
with suspensive effect also arises from another factor: 
harmonising minimum guarantees that enable the 
exami nation of applications for protection in conform-
ity with EU fundamental rights in an area of freedom, 
security and justice cannot be achieved at national 
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level. The required protection of EU fundamental rights 
can be better achieved through legal norms under EU 
law for the reason alone that absent individual appeal 
to the ECJ, this is the only way for the granting of the 
right to effective legal remedy to be enforced. From 
this arises the Community legislature’s duty to explicit-
ly adopt legal norms on effective legal remedy with 
suspensive effect and a concomitant right to stay in 
the territory until a decision has been reached on the 
legal remedy.
2.3 Obligations beyond state borders stemming from 
the principle of non-refoulement
As presented above, human rights – especially the prin-
ciple of non-refoulement – in many situations also 
obligate the Member States beyond state borders. As 
a consequence, Member States must bring persons res-
cued or otherwise taken up at sea to an EU country in 
order to examine applications for international protec-
tion with adequate legal remedy.517 Furthermore, this 
means that Member States may not expose persons in 
refugee boats to danger through driving away or 
escorting them to open seas, or to the danger of tor-
ture or inhuman or degra ding treatment.
As already explained, beyond the borders, with excep-
tion of the contiguous zones, it is not the Asylum Pro-
cedures Directive, but only the Schengen Borders Code 
that applies. While the Schengen Borders Code refers 
to the principle of non-refoulement, it does not expli-
citly regulate the resulting obligations of Member 
States with respect to their actions. The Schengen Bor-
ders Code expressly rules out the suspensive effect of 
legal remedy against refusals of entry.
From the foregoing it is clear: the Border Code’s exclu-
sion without exception of the suspensive effect of a 
legal remedy is in violation of EU fundamental rights 
because the provision cannot even be interpreted in a 
way that it conforms to those fundamental rights. The 
Community legislature thus has a duty to regulate 
explicitly the requirement of suspensive effect of the 
remedy against denials of entry at the border with 
respect to those seeking protection.
There is the additional question of the extent to which 
EU law implicitly authorises non-compliance with the 
principle of non-refoulement in border and migration 
controls beyond state borders. To come to a judgement 
on this question, the entire relevant set of regulations 
must be considered because the Asylum Procedures 
Directive is explicitly not applicable. Already the absent 
applicability of this materially akin legal act can be 
interpreted as an implicit denial of a duty to examine 
applications for protection beyond the border. With 
regard to the Schengen acquis, it is important to note 
that it exhibits an extremely high regulatory density 
as far as the prescribed restrictive control measures 
go. By comparison, the absence of regulation for 
required protection measures gives the impression that 
these are not legally mandated. This judgement is 
apparently shared by several Member States and 
FRONTEX, which very often represent their operations 
from the perspective of mere rescue at sea, without 
even posing questions about responsibility for exami-
ning applications for international protection.518 Addi-
tionally of importance, the program adopted by the 
Council of the European Union for the fight against 
illegal immigration across the maritime borders519 sug-
gests the implementation of pre-border and migration 
controls, and has this as its goal. Admittedly, the pro-
gram is not a legally binding act of EU law. However, 
the structures of the decision-taking process among 
the Member States of the supra-national EU result in 
a significance even of such EU acts that technically 
are not legally binding which goes far beyond that of 
a mere political statement. Just such EU strategies and 
programs take on a strong steering and legitimising 
effect for further legal development at EU level and in 
the Member States.520 Considered together, the regu-
latory state of EU law is therefore apt to create mis-
understandings with regard to the requirements of 
fundamental and human rights that must be observed 
in protecting common EU external border. This argues 
for the assumption that at national level the required 
protection of fundamental rights cannot be adequately 
guaranteed, and would be better at EU level. The EU 
legislature is therefore obligated to clearly adopt legal 
norms under EU law for the requirements stemming 
from applicability of the principle of non-refoulement 
beyond state borders.
517   As shown above, there are currently no safe third countries beyond the southern external sea borders to which persons 
could be brought without examination of their applications for international protection.
518   See for example FRONTEX (19 February 2006) Longest FRONTEX coordinated operation – HERA, the Canary Islands; press 
release and timesofmalta.com: Border mission starts today…without Libyan support (25 June 2007).
519  EU, Council of the European Union, Doc. Nr. 15445/03. See above Part 2(II)(3).
520  This is especially the case for such measures that promise to ease the burden on national asylum systems. In regard to the 
example of the introduction of the third-country arrangement in Germany, see Weinzierl (2005), pp. 176-190 and 208 ff.
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Even if one is not of the opinion that the gaps in EU 
law constitute implicit authorisation of violations of 
the principle of non-refoulement, the Union legislature 
still has a duty to legally regulate these matters. This 
can be derived from the EU fundamental rights. 
Assumption of this duty does not conflict with the 
principle of subsidiarity. As previously explained, in 
border and refugee protection, the horizontal and ver-
tical interlocking of EU actions and those of the 
 Member States are very tight. Lopsided distribution of 
responsibility to over-burdened border states holds the 
danger of increasing human rights violations. To gua-
rantee the required protection of human rights under 
these circumstances, national regulations are apparent-
ly insufficient. To counter the dangers described for 
the protection of human rights, the efficient adoption 
and enforcement through judicial review of protection 
standards can be better achieved through the adop-
tion of norms under EU law.
The absence of a burden-sharing system within the EU 
in regard to refugee and border protection recogni sably 
diminishes the willingness of EU border states to 
observe human rights obligations. This is a political 
factor that should be considered for future decisions. 
While the overburdening of the states situated at the 
external border does not justify their violations of 
human rights, in light of the consequences of this over-
burdening it appears imperative for human rights poli-
cy that observance of human rights at the common EU 
external border also be secured though the creation of 
an EU burden-sharing mechanism.
2.4 Conclusion
There is a fundamental and human rights obligation 
to provide to persons seeking protection, taken up at or 
beyond state borders at sea, access to a procedure in an 
EU state that examines their need for protection. The 
human rights of the protection seekers must be secured 
through procedural rights and legal remedy. At the same 
time, EU fundamental and human rights prohibit the 
escorting or towing back of boats with a mixed group 
of migrants on board to states outside the EU, because 
this could result in grave violations of human rights. 
Although EU law regulates border protection and refu-
521   Compare for the same results UNHCR (2007c), p. 50.
522  Article 6 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts;  
on the requirement for exclusivity of command and control, see Crawford (2002), paras. 2 and 7, with regard to Article 6.
523  ECtHR, Admissibilty decision of 11 January 2001(Xhavara u.a. / Italien und Albanien), Application No 39473/98, para. 1; see 
also European Commission for Human Rights: Admissibility Decision of 14 July 1977, Application No 7289/75 and 7349/76 
(X and Y/Switzerland), p. 73.
gee law and the EU border management strategy fore-
sees pre-border migration controls, EU law does not 
regulate this obligation. Rather it even or explicitly or 
implicitly permits for actions in violation of EU funda-
mental and human rights. The duty to regulate in this 
re gard, arising from EU fundamental rights, lies at the 
feet of the EU legislature. Due to the tightly interlock-
ing actions of the Union and Member States in border 
protection and the functional distribution of respon-
sibility to overburdened EU border states, adequate 
protection of fundamental rights can only be efficiently 
guaranteed through regulation under EU law.521
II. Joint action with third countries: no 
release from human rights responsibility
If Member States are conducting joint border and 
migration controls with third countries, this raises the 
question of responsibility for possible human rights 
violations. This question must be judged not according 
to the criteria of EU law, but rather those of interna-
tional law. Accordingly, the actions of one state’s organs 
are only attributable to another state when these 
organs are made available to the other state in such a 
way that the other state exercises exclusive command 
and control, and when the actions of these state organs 
appear to be the sovereign actions of the other state.522 
For joint patrols with third countries in the territorial 
sea and contiguous zones of these third countries, such 
effective control by other states does not exist. For this, 
the contractual transfer of individual control rights to 
which only the coastal states are entitled is insuffi-
cient. The ECtHR has ruled accordingly, most recently 
in the Xhavara Decision, where in agreement with older 
jurisprudence, it found that Albania is not responsible 
for migration control measures conducted by Italy on 
the basis of an agreement between Albania and Italy. 
At the same time, Italy’s responsibility for these actions 
remained untouched by the agreement.523
However, joint action with third countries can lead to 
joint responsibility. In joint actions, each state is 
responsible in its own right for committing violations 
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of international law, and therefore infringes its own 
obligations.524 It is also significant that even when a 
state’s action itself does not violate human rights, 
international law provides for human rights responsi-
bility if the action constitutes an act of abetting a vio-
lation of human rights on the part of another state. 
Such an abetting act that triggers responsibility exists 
if the assistance is offered in knowledge of the circum-
stances of the violation of international law, and the 
abetting act supports the main action of the prima-
rily acting state. Such abetting acts can include the 
provision of infrastructure and financing,525 but also 
such political actions as declarations, assurances and 
the conclusion of contracts that support an act that 
violates international law.526 In this connection, joint 
patrols in the territorial sea of third countries and the 
support and advising of third countries must be con-
sidered critically, as these especially can constitute the 
abetting of violations of the right to leave. Additio nally 
in this regard, the external dimension of the migration 
strategy must be considered critically. The exercise of 
political pressure on issues of migration control or the 
granting of financial or technical assistance in border 
control527 can possibly support the treatment of migrants 
in violation of human rights, and in ways that are fore-
seeable. This is especially true when assistance is given 
to states that are recognised as having an especially low 
standard for human rights protection and an inadequate 
asylum system. Giving cause for concern in this regard 
are reports from non-governmental organisations, accor-
ding to which, for example, the Moroccan government 
carried out raids on migrants and expulsions that entailed 
grave violations of human and refugee rights, presented 
as measures in the framework of an action agreed at 
the European-African intergovernmental conference.528
In conclusion, it should be noted that the EU and its 
Member States have a responsibility for violations of 
human rights even when these are jointly committed 
with third countries, or when the human rights viola-
tions of third countries are supported or sponsored in 
a foreseeable manner. For the further development of 
external aspects of EU border strategy, clear boundaries 
exist to the extent that these may not render impos-
sible access to international protection. 
EU-primary law defines the objective of developing and 
consolidating of the rule of law, and respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms as an objective of 
the EU’s external policies.529 Therefore, in the external 
migration strategy as a whole, the EU interest in easing 
its burdens should not be at the fore, but rather, along 
with the battle against causes for flight, support for 
systems of human rights and refugee protection in 
countries of origin and transit. The creation of an inter-
national burden-sharing system should ensure that the 
EU and its Member States take on the burdens of inter-
national protection to a degree that corresponds to 
their strong economic position.
524  Felder (2007), p. 125.
525  Article 16 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts; 
Crawford (2002), para. 1, with regard to Article 16.
526  Felder (2007), p. 252.
527  For greater detail, see above, Part 2 (II)(2.4) and (4).
528  Human Rights Watch (2006b), p. 364; Migration Policy Group (2007).
529  See Article 11(1) EU and Articles 177 (1) and 181a(2) EC.
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